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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Senator Chris Dodd pro-
posed the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (the "Dodd-
Frank Act"). The Dodd-Frank Act, the result of more than eighteen
months of negotiation and debate, aims to strengthen consumer protection
and regulate complex financial products. President Obama called the
Dodd-Frank Act "the greatest overhaul of Wall Street since the Great De-
pression. "' Among the many changes and hopes for the Dodd-Frank Act is
that it will finally end the financial calamity, social unrest, and massive
federal bailouts associated with the "too big to fail concept." The too big
to fail concept describes the belief that certain entities are so central to the
macro-economy that their failure will precipitate widespread financial dis-
aster and, thus, should become recipients of beneficial financial and eco-
nomic policies from governments and central banks. Favorable treatment,
however, leads to moral hazard when an entity does not take account of
the full consequences and responsibilities of its actions, and therefore has
a tendency to act less carefully than it otherwise would, leaving another
party to hold some responsibility for the consequences of those actions, a
perversion of insurance theory.
Conceptually, moral hazard provides a rich perspective for analyzing
the consequences of treating shadow banks as "too big to fail. " From this
perspective, "shadow bank" institutions, such as Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, and Lehman Brothers, contributed to the 2008 financial crisis by
adopting risk prone strategies, despite the possibility of collapse, because
they relied on the federal government subsidizing their losses, specifically
the Federal Reserve to provide bailouts. Thus, shadow banks are encour-
aged to act with moral hazard long before a federal bailout becomes ne-
cessary. First, shadow banks are encouraged to engage in "high risk"
strategies, defined as using extreme amounts of leverage to fund high risk
investments during a credit bubble, while taking advantage of weak regu-
lations, ineffective monitoring by public and private stakeholders, and pro-
market laws, policies and entrenched relationships. Second, shadow
banks use these high risk strategies to net financial largesse, acquire addi-
1. Michael Hirsh, Bonfire of the Loopholes, THE DAILY BEAST (May 20, 2010), http://
www.thedailybeast. com/newsweek/2010/05/21/bonfire-of-the-loopholes.html.
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tional political influence, and become highly interconnected with other
companies and industries, characteristics often qualifying it as too big to
fail. Third, when that shadow bank's high-risk strategies bring the pros-
pect of financial collapse it expects the federal government to provide bai-
louts, given these pro-market laws, policies, and relationships. Fourth,
these bailouts provide the impetus for new, but weak, regulations that al-
low for subsequent bailouts and thus more moral hazard.
Given the decades of treating entities as being too big to fail and the
corresponding policy inertia, it is fair to question whether the Dodd-Frank
Act, in attempting to end the too big to fail concept, addresses the moral
hazard implicit to it. To that end, passage of the Dodd-Frank Act raises
three related questions, which this Article will address. First, how does
the Dodd-Frank Act purport to eliminate the moral hazard underlying too
big to fail? Second, does Dodd-Frank Act, in fact, encourage or discou-
rage moral hazard? Third, are there changes to the framework of the
Dodd-Frank Act that would better enable it to end the moral hazard under-
lying too big to fail?
While many scholars have analyzed the too big to fail concept and the
causes and consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, there is a dearth of
scholarship assessing the collective impact of the laws, policies, and rela-
tionships that encourage the moral hazard underlying the too big to fail
concept in the U.S. financial system. To better enable analysis of moral
hazard, this Article introduces the Legal Political Moral Hazard (LPMH)
model, which utilizes a rating system that measures the extent of moral
hazard based on the following five (5) factors: (1) over-speculation and
over-leveraging (Minsky-evolution) to become too big to fail; (2) three-
dimensional information asymmetry; (3) entrenched relationships and poli-
cy; (4) principal-agent separation; and (5) institutionalized government
intervention. The LPMH model's rating system assesses, on a scale rang-
ing from "nominal" to "dangerous, " whether moral hazard is being en-
couraged. The LPMH model can be used to assess whether moral hazard
is encouraged within an industry, entity, or even whether specific pieces of
legislation encourage or discourage moral hazard.
In applying the LPMH model to the Dodd-Frank Act, it is clear that,
while it takes important steps in attempting to curb the moral hazard un-
derlying too big to fail, it fails to address several of the factors that cause
moral hazard and that led to the 2008 financial crisis; therefore, too big to
fail will continue. First, because the Dodd-Frank Act does not require
liquidity requirements and does not break up or reduce the size of large
bank-like institutions, it allows shadow banks to become "too big to fail,"
thus, encouraging moral hazard. Second, because the Dodd-Frank Act
codifies additional information asymmetries that contributed to the 2008
financial crisis, it further encourages moral hazard. These codifications
include the following provisions: regulatory exemptions for derivatives;
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allowing banks and investment firms to continue to mask their losses
through over-valued assets and esoteric accounting methods; and an ab-
sence in the Dodd-Frank Act compelling shadow banks to reveal their fi-
nancial statements indicating their actual liabilities. Third, because the
Dodd-Frank Act does not strip the Federal Reserve, one of the prime cul-
prits in perpetuating pro-cyclical and pro-shadow bank policies, of its
bank-supervision roles, it helps perpetuate the same policies that led to the
2008financial crisis also encouraging moral hazard. Moreover, given the
manner in which the pro-shadow bank relationships and pro-cyclical po-
lices metastasized into federal bailouts, it is difficult to imagine that the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act will temper the Federal Reserve's and
Treasury Department's pro-market policies, which have historically en-
couraged moral hazard. Fourth, because the Dodd-Frank Act does not
restrict the size of shadow banks or the scope of their activities, it allows
for more principal-agent separation, which encourages moral hazard.
Fifth, because the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes, or fails to prohibit, resort
to the same laws that permitted the 2008 bailouts, emergency mergers and
sales of entire shadow banks, it further codifies moral hazard.
Given that all five factors in the LPMH model are present, the Dodd-
Frank Act "dangerously" encourages moral hazard. As the LPMH analy-
sis demonstrates, the Dodd-Frank Act shadow banks are still encouraged
by pro-cyclical policies to act with high-risk strategies, additional informa-
tion asymmetries are codified, and federal bailouts still exist under the
Federal Reserve Act, despite the Dodd-Frank Act. Therefore, the Dodd-
Frank Act has not ended the too big to fail concept.
This Article concludes by recommending that the Dodd-Frank Act be
modified to include a counter-cyclical policy framework to better enable it
to end the moral hazard underlying the too big to fail concept. Such a
framework would include: (1) imposing wind-down procedures for highly
interconnected shadow banks; (2) implementing random, counter-cyclical
shocks to the financial markets by contracting credit to determine system
stability; (3) re-implementing some version of the Glass-Steagall Act; (4)
creating an independent regulatory body responsible solely for monitoring
systemic risk; (5) avoiding governmentally orchestrated ad hoc "deals" in
favor of principled actions based on balanced policies; and (6) imposing
bank-like capital requirements to all lending entities. Ultimately, the
Dodd-Frank Act is certainly groundbreaking for its attempt to regulate
under-regulated areas of the economy and correcting polices that had be-
come unquestioned. Arguably, the Dodd-Frank Act has enshrined moral
hazard while attempting to limit the chaos the too big to fail concept will
cause in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In light of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent financial reform
designed to end the too big to fail concept, the Dodd-Frank Act, one can
place arguments about the proper scope and content of financial reform
and their effect on shadow banks2 as occurring on a spectrum between
anti-market interventionism and pro-market fundamentalism. While no-
menclature may vary, these terms describe the theoretical, political, and
philosophical opposing poles of financial and economic innovation and
government regulation, with politicians, economists, scholars, and busi-
nesspeople debating about how close to either extreme any financial regu-
lation should lie when attempting to balance free market innovation and
prudence.
Pro-market fundamentalism embodies nearly unfettered pro-cyclical
monetary policies and lax regulations that not only encourage innovation
but often allow for risky behavior. Over time, pro-market fundamentalism
can metastasize into cozy relationships with friendly regulators and lax
regulations that prohibit effective monitoring.4 For shadow banks that are
2. See Paul McCulley, The Shadow Banking System and Hyman Minsky's Economic Journey,
GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK Focus (2009), http:// media.pimco-global.com/ pdfs/ pdf/ GCB% 20Focus%
20May %2009.pdf?WT.cg_n = PIMCO-US&WT.ti = GCB %20Focus %20May %2009.pdf. McCulley
coined the term "shadow banking system" in August 2007 at the Federal Reserve's annual symposium
in Jackson Hole. Shadow banking institutions are typically intermediaries between investors and
borrowers. According to McCulley, shadow institutions do not accept deposits like a depository bank
and therefore are not subject to the same regulations.
3. Investopedia defines a market economy as one that:
work[s] on the assumption that market forces, such as supply and demand, are the best de-
terminants of what is right for a nation's well-being. These economies rarely engage in
government interventions such as price fixing, license quotas and industry subsidizations.
While most developed nations today could be classified as having mixed economies, they
are often said to have market economies because they allow market forces to drive most of
their activities, typically engaging in government intervening only to the extent that it is
needed to provide stability. Although the market economy is clearly the system of choice
in today's global marketplace, there is significant debate regarding the amount of govern-
ment intervention considered optimal for efficient economic operations.
INVESTOPEDIA.CoM, Dictionary, http:// www.investopedia.com/ terms/ m/ marketeconomy.asp#
axzztx 57xRBPN (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
4. See SORKIN, infra note 4, at 68. A prime example of the entrenched policies and relationships
in the financial sector was between the Federal Reserve and Treasury and Bear Steams. On March
14, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to provide a $25 billion loan to Bear Stearns
collateralized by free and clear assets from Bear Stearns in order to provide Bear Stearns the liquidity
for up to twenty-eight days that the market was refusing to provide. Yet, the Federal Reserve reneged
and told Bear Stearns that the twenty-eight-day loan was unavailable to them. The New York Federal
Reserve changed the deal to provide a $30 billion loan to J.P. Morgan, and on March 16, 2008,
"Paulson had called [Jamiel Dimon [J.P. Morgan's CEO] and told him: '1 think this should be done at
a very low price.'" Given Bear Stearns' financial distress, J.P.Morgan initially negotiated a low $2
per share offer. The wording of the merger, however, gave Bear Stearns the credible argument that
J.P. Morgan would be required to absorb the $30 billion loss regardless of whether they rejected the
merger deal. See also Avinash Persaud, The Inappropriateness of Financial Regulation,
REALCLEARMARKETS, May 1, 2008. Bear Stearns leveraged the Federal Reserve's and Treasury's
backstopping into a better negotiating position. In other words, Bear Stearns forced J.P. Morgan to
6 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 3:1
too big to fail, risky behavior, poor monitoring, and weak regulations can
coalesce to create a perfect storm that leads to catastrophic financial col-
lapses requiring government sponsored or brokered bailouts of businesses
and industries considered "too big to fail. "'
Conversely, anti-market interventionism holds that the government is
the correcting agent to the market's entropy.6 Anti-market interventionism
regards the market as being indestructible.' Those advocates of anti-
market interventionism believe that large entrepreneurs, which would in-
clude financial institutions, like shadow banks, will produce an endless
flow of wealth, services, products, taxes and jobs, regardless of how re-
strictive economic laws and policies Congress and regulators implement
Whether shadow banks are viewed as fearsome, politically connected fi-
nancial juggernauts to be subjugated by draconian measures, or viewed as
vulnerable capitalists, essential to the functioning of the financial system,
easily dissuaded by legal and regulatory disincentives, is conjecture, but
such views are bound to influence individuals' ideas on financial reform.
In discussing the proper balance between anti-market interventionism
and pro-market fundamentalism, applying a consistent framework for ana-
lyzing moral hazard can limit the enacting of policies and laws that trend
too strongly toward pure pro-market fundamentalism. 9 This Article will
argue that laws that allow for policies that allow or create information
asymmetries, foment pro-market policies and entrenched relationships
between regulators and the regulated, and allow for government bailouts,
encourage moral hazard. This Article premises this argument on the basis
that shadow banks are incentivized to take risk with a tacit belief that fed-
eral assistance will be forthcoming should the risks taken result in finan-
cial collapse.
Generally, moral hazard describes a situation where an institution does
not take the full consequences and responsibilities of its actions, and there-
fore has a tendency to act less carefully than it otherwise would, leaving
another party to hold some responsibility for the consequences of those
actions-a perversion of insurance theory.'0  Applied to the context of
financial regulation, moral hazard describes the tendency of some financial
institutions lobbying for financial deregulation and pro-cyclical monetary
re-negotiate for a contractually clear right to buy 39.5 % of Bear Stearns for $10 per share.
5. See generally ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG To FAIL (2009).
6. Leon Louw, "Market Fundamentalists" Who are they?, THE AFRICAN EXECUTIVE, JUL. 16-
23, 2008, at 1 (Louw describes in theoretical terms about the distinction between "market fundamen-
talists" and "interventionsists").
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. This Article will be the first of several where I apply the LPMH model to assess governmental
responses to financial, environmental, and other crises.
10. See Eric Weiner, Subprime Bailout: Good Idea or "Moral Hazard?," NPR (Nov. 29, 2007),
http:// www.npr.org/ templates/ story/ story. php?storyld = 16734629.
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policies, while manipulating financial innovations to lure investors, while
regulators, like the Federal Reserve, declare these institutions too big to
fail when bankruptcy appears imminent, allowing them to negotiate for
federal bailouts."' Over the decades, many institutions, including financial
institutions, have been subsidized by federal government assistance.' 2
Moral hazard can gain inertia when the U.S. government protects risk-
prone entities from the consequences of their own behavior.
13
The era of pro-market fundamentalism has created a cyclical pattern.' 4
First, the fervent advocacy of market-based policy ideas, followed by their
implementation, creates a bubble. Second, during the creation of these
bubbles, some institutions not only acquire financial largesse, but also
develop relationships with their regulators sufficient to influence the laws
and policies designed to regulate them. 15 Third, the bursting of this bub-
ble threatens widespread financial damage sufficient to require extensive
government intervention that often results in pro-market ad hoc bailouts,
weak post-crisis remedial regulations, and subsequent moral hazard, par-
ticularly from institutions that have acted recklessly and benefitted from or
ultimately lost little from federal bailouts. 6
11. See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF
BANK BAILOUTS (2004). In this book, Bank of Minneapolis Fed President Gary Stern and Vice Presi-
dent Ron Feldman examine whether government policy influences bank failures. This book lucidly
explains the moral hazard problem that plagues large financial institutions that policymakers deem "too
big to fail."
12. See Jesse Nankin, et al., History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (last updated April 15,
2009, 12:02 PM), http:// www.propublica.org/ special/ government-bailouts. This website contains a
partial list of federal bailouts since the 1970s. The following is a list of federal bailouts and their
corresponding year: Penn Central Railroad (1970), Lockheed (1971), New York City (1975), Chrysler
(1980), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (1984), Savings & Loan (1989), Airline
Industry (2001), Bear Stearns 2008, J.P. Morgan (2008), Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac (2008), American
International Group (A.I.G.) (2008), Auto Industry (2008), Troubled Asset Relief Program (2008),
Citigroup (2008), and Bank of America (2009).
13. See generally infra notes 59, 290.
14. See Greg Anrig, Paradox of Deregulation: Why market fundamentalism eventually leads to
more government, not less, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Nov/Dec 2008) available at http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com/ features/ 2008/ 0811 .anrig.html (citing LAWRENCE D. BROWN AND
LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, THE PRIVATE ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: MARKET MYTHS AND POLICY
MUDDLES (2008)). Brown and Jacobs discern five phases in the cycle, but I have condensed phases
two and three into phase one. First, conservatives deem the central problem in every arena to be an
insufficient reliance on markets. Second, conservative policy experts propose a simple solution: a
substitution of market forces for government. The third step in Brown and Jacobs's framework is
legislative action to implement the ideas proposed by the market worshippers. The fourth phase is
when the seductive simplicity of free market theory meets complicated institutional reality. The final
stage is when political backlash forces policymakers to respond to the unintended consequences and
failures of the market-based approaches-causing government to grow and thereby subverting the
original goals of the pro-market adherents. Even though Brown and Jacobs framework applies to
banking deregulation, given that their publication predates the 2008 financial crisis, they could not
have applied it to the financial crisis.
15. See Anrig, supra note 15.
16. Id.
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The tide of pro-market fundamentalism that caused the 2008 financial
crisis has been building with increasing momentum for three decades. 7
Over the past thirty years, economic policies reflected the prevailing view
that any regulation that limited free market innovation was anathema to
pro-market fundamentalism. 8 Ronald Reagan's presidency ushered in an
era of pro-market fundamentalism, and its underlying economic imple-
mented ideology became the basis for the incremental deregulation of the
U.S. banking system.1 9 Even after the savings and loan fiasco of the
1980s and 1990s, the wave of pro-market fundamentalism led to the Clin-
ton administration's 1999 repeal of the sixty-six-year-old Glass-Steagall
Act, 20 which tore down barriers between investment and commercial bank-
ing activities. This pro-market fundamentalism also informed former Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's passive economic policies vis-A-
vis the shadow banking system, as well as those of his successor, Benja-
min Bernanke. 2' The Bush administration also adhered to the pro-market
trend. Despite the fact that it passed few deregulatory laws, the Bush eco-
nomic team ignored the obvious dangers posed by unregulated financial
17. See Krugman, infra note 19. That wave of pro-market momentum produced the deregulation
of the banking system that began in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency.
Even after the savings and loan fiasco of the 1980s and '90s, the pro-market wave led to the repeal old
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, and a sustained, if not unreasonable, belief in free markets by Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, and the Bush economic team in the face of clear dangers posed by
unregulated financial derivatives, predatory lending practices, and overly leveraged institutions and
consumers.
18. Id.
19. See Paul Krugman, Reagan Did It, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 2009 at A21, available at
http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2009/ 06/ 01/ opinion/ Olkrugman.html. Krugman notes that Reagan
broke with longstanding rules of fiscal prudence, and that indebtedness began rising under Reagan; it
fell again in the Clinton years, but resumed its rise under the Bush administration, leaving us ill pre-
pared for the recent financial crisis. Krugman continues by stating that the increase in public debt was
dwarfed by the rise in private debt, which was made possible by Reagan's financial deregulation.
Krugman attributes the savings and loan crisis to Reagan's deregulation, which gave the industry a
license to gamble with taxpayers' money. By the time the government closed the books on the affair,
taxpayers had lost $130 billion, but Krugman argues that there was also a longer-term effect: Reagan-
era legislative changes essentially ended New Deal restrictions on mortgage lending, restrictions that,
in particular, limited the ability of families to buy homes without putting a significant amount of mon-
ey down.
20. See Tony Wilsdon, How the Democrats Are Also Responsible for the Financial Crisis,
SOCIALISTALTERNATIVE.ORG, (Oct. 6, 2008), http:// www.socialistalternative.org/ news/ ar-
ticlel2.php?id=941. Wilsdon notes that between the years of 1988-1996, Congress made four legis-
lative attempts to weaken or repeal parts of the Glass-Steagall Act; however, Citigroup spent $100
million to vigorously advocate for passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In 1995, however, Robert
Rubin, President Clinton's Treasury Secretary, testified before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services that the Clinton Administration was ready to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act:
The banking industry is fundamentally different from what it was two decades ago, let
alone in 1933 . . . U.S. banks generally engage in a broader range of securities activities
abroad than is permitted domestically ... Even domestically, the separation of investment
banking and commercial banking envisioned by Glass-Steagall has eroded significantly.
Id. Former President Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act into law on November 12,
1999, thus repealing the Glass-Steagall Act.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
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derivatives, predatory lending practices in the housing market, and overly
leveraged shadow banks.2 ' Deregulation, however, has led to threatened
widespread financial collapse, which has "forced" federal government
bailouts or government orchestrated mergers or sales.2 3
True to the cycle of pro-market fundamentalism, as the Wall Street
shadow banks collapsed or contemplated becoming bank holding compa-
nies in 2008, credit markets froze and stocks crashed; the Bush adminis-
tration partially nationalized the banking industry while still espousing the
virtues of free market, deregulatory policies. 24  Thus, from one perspec-
tive, the 2008 financial crisis was the result of thirty years' worth of poli-
cies designed to encourage economic growth by implementing laws and
22. Robert Berner and Brian Grow, Bush Administration Warned of Mortgage Crisis in 2003,
FREEDOM FROM THE PRESS (Oct. 3-13, 2008), available at http:// freedomfromthepress.net/ bush-
admin-ignored-2003-mortgage-crisis-warnings-freedom-from-the-press/ #more-69 (This article is from
the original article They Warned US About the Mortgage Crisis from Yahoo! News by Robert Berner
and Brian Grow. For unknown reasons, Yahoo! News has pulled this story). Berner and Grow argue
that, "the Bush Administration and many banks clung to what is known as "preemption," a legal
doctrine that can be invoked in court and at the rulemaking table to assert that, when federal and state
authority over business conflict, the feds prevail even if it means little or no regulation." Id. Berner
and Grow interviewed Kathleen E. Keest, "a former assistant attorney general in Iowa who now works
for the Center for Responsible Lending, a nonprofit in Durham, N.C." Id. Keest stated:
There is no question that preemption was a significant contributor to the subprime melt-
down .... It pushed aside state laws and state law enforcement that would have sent the
message that there were still standards in place, and it was a big part of the message to the
industry that it could regulate itself without rules.
Id.
23. See Krugman, supra note 19 (Krugman argues that the proximate causes of the 2008 financial
crisis lie in events that took place long after Reagan left office, but Reagan-era legislative changes
essentially ended New Deal restrictions on mortgage lending that limited the ability of families to buy
homes without putting a significant amount of money down. Overstretched borrowers were bound to
start defaulting in large numbers once the housing bubble burst and unemployment began to rise.
These defaults in turn wreaked havoc with a financial system that due to Reagan-era deregulation took
on too much risk with too little capital.); see also McCullagh, infra note 23.
24. See Declan McCullagh, Will U.S. Taxpayers Need A Bailout?, CBS NEWS (April 22, 2009),
available at http:// www.cbsnews.com/ stories/ 2008/ 10/ 14/ politics/ otherpeoplesmoney/
main4522346.shtml. McCullagh notes that President Bush stated the move to partially nationalize
large U.S. banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, was necessary to "preserve" the free
market. McCullagh states that the Bush administration's actions invite federal micromanaging and that
politicians who are members of the committees overseeing the Treasury Department's budget will
enjoy outsize influence, so will Treasury and other regulators that banks must please to stay in busi-
ness. Moreover, McCullagh notes that Washington bureaucrats charged administering bailout funds
face temptation to favor their former banking colleagues, especially if they plan to return to their Wall
Street jobs after departing the Bush administration. See also SORKIN, supra note 5, at 192. Rodgin
Cohen, a Sullivan & Cromwell attorney, advised Lehman Brothers to become a bank holding company
for the purpose of giving it "access to the [federal reserve] discount window indefinitely, just like
Citigroup or JP Morgan." Id. Tim Geithner was lukewarm to the idea, if for no other reason, than the
signal of desperation it would send through the markets. Id. at 194. Moreover, Sorkin notes that
during the financial crisis of 2008, each of the big five investment banks failed, was sold, or became a
bank holding company: J.P. Morgan acquired Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers collapsed, and both
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies. Id. at 529. Sorkin notes that
chaos further embroiled the markets: fear of loss, nationalization, and more turmoil resulted in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average losing as much as 37% of its value even after President Bush signed
TARP into law. Id.
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policies that minimize the federal government's role in the financial mar-
ketplace.25 Suffice to say, the severity of moral hazard in the U.S. fman-
cial system cannot be overstated. Federal bailouts are not new,26 but one
must ask whether bailouts simply encourage moral hazard problems.
Frank Herbert's Dune series analyzed many aspects of the human con-
dition, including the moral hazard associated with government subsidies,
and the best way to reduce this moral hazard.27 In God Emperor of
Dune," a popular science fiction novel, a prescient and long-lived emperor
determined that the only way to purge moral hazard from his military's
collective consciousness was to allow the notion of federal assistance to
fade from memory, by simply doing nothing when calamity struck; with
no federal safety net, this fictional emperor's logic followed, institutions
become resilient and self-reliant. 29 Essentially, the God-Emperor recog-
nized that he had to destroy the belief that a bailout was inevitable. To the
extent that the "financial catastrophe followed by federal bailout" cycle is
socially undesirable, disruptive, tremendously costly, and an inefficient
use of resources, governments must implement prudential regulation to
reduce the moral hazard, without unreasonably curtailing financial innova-
tion and economic growth. Thus, for the Dodd-Frank Act to end the too
big to fail concept, the extent to which it encourages or discourages moral
hazard associated with the too big to fail concept will be an essential per-
formance measure of its success.3"
This Article introduces the Legal Political Moral Hazard (LPMH)
model, a five-prong standard for assessing the presence of moral hazard
within a given regulatory environment and acting upon an organization or
industry. The LPMH model can help anticipate future crises, analyze past
crises, and adjust current policies and laws by focusing discussion and
analysis on the composite risk factors that contribute to moral hazard.
This Article will then apply this model to the Dodd-Frank Act, the regula-
tory progeny of the 2008 financial crisis, to determine whether and to
what extent it encourages or discourages the moral hazard underlying the
too big to fail concept. Thus, this Article will explore three questions: (1)
how does the Dodd-Frank Act purport to end too big to fail; (2) does the
Dodd-Frank Act encourage or discourage legal political moral hazard; and
(3) are there changes to the framework of the Dodd-Frank Act that would
25. See Krugman, supra note 19.
26. See Nankin, supra note 12.
27. The Dune series, set in the distant future of humanity, has a history that stretches tens of
thousands of years (some 15,000 years in total) and covers considerable changes in political, social,
and religious structure as well as technology. The Dune series portrays the downfall of empires as
being caused, in part, to the corruption and division within the governing bodies.
28. FRANK HERBERT, GOD EMPEROR OF DUNE (1981).
29. See generally id.
30. See generally infra note 57.
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better enable it to end the moral hazard underlying too big to fail? This
Article will argue that the finalized version of the Dodd-Frank Act offers
various measures designed to address the too big to fail concept but leaves
open important opportunities for pursuing unstable growth, does not close
information asymmetries, fails to align the interests of shadow bank execu-
tives and shareholders, does not adequately remove entrenched pro-market
policies and relationships, and still allows for federal bailouts. Therefore,
the Dodd-Frank Act dangerously encourages the moral hazard underlying
the too big to fail concept.
II. CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE
DODD-FRANK ACT
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, many clamored for financial
reform that would end the reviled too big to fail concept, particularly in
light of the massive federal bailouts for the shadow banks who many be-
lieved caused or exacerbated the meltdown.31 Such an endeavor, however,
beckons the question: what is the too big to fail concept? In essence, the
too big to fail concept represents the belief that bankruptcy proceedings by
a large firm can cause a financial crisis and that, if possible, bankruptcy
should be prevented by loans, asset purchase, direct investment, and fed-
eral loan guarantees.32 Economist Anna Schwartz dubbed this logic as the
too big to fail doctrine. 3
31. See Ilan Moscovitz & Morgan Housel, It's Time to End 'Too Big to Fail,' THE MOTLEY
FOOL, (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http:// www.fool.com/ investing/ general/ 2009/ 11/ 13/ its-time-
to-end-too-big-to-fail.aspx. Moscovitz and Housel argue that in 2009, of the 8,195 banks in this
nation, just four: J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America control nearly
40% of the deposits. Those four, plus Goldman Sachs, hold 97% of the industry's notional derivative
exposure. They argue, however, that there is a downside: being "too big to fail." In essence, taxpay-
ers pay the price for their mistakes, yet many bankers still defend the practice.
32. See Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed's Discount Window, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ST. Louis REV. (Sept./Oct. 1992) at 62, available at http:// research.stlouisfed.org/ publications/
review/ 92/ 09/ MisuseSep_Oct1992.pdf. After two years of operations, the Penn Central Transpor-
tation company was put into bankruptcy on June 21, 1970. It was the largest corporate bankruptcy in
American history up until that time. The Penn Central's bankruptcy was the final blow to long-haul
private-sector passenger train service in the United States. The troubled line filed to abandon most of
its remaining passenger rail service, causing a chain reaction among its fellow railroads. The federal
government stepped in and, in 1971, created Amtrak, a virtual government agency, which began to
operate a skeleton service on the tracks of Penn Central and other U.S. railroads. The Penn Central
continued to operate freight service under bankruptcy court protection. After private-sector reorgani-
zation efforts failed, Congress nationalized the Penn Central under the terms of the Railroad Revitali-
zation and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. Facing continued loss of market share to the trucking
industry, the railroad industry and its unions were forced to ask for deregulation. The 1980 Staggers
Act, which deregulated the railroad industry, proved to be a key factor in bringing Conrail and the old
Penn Central back to life. Schwartz notes that "the Penn Central crisis episode fostered the view that
bankruptcy proceedings by a large firm created a financial crisis, and that, if possible, bankruptcy
should be prevented by loans and loan guarantees: the too big to fail doctrine in embryo." Id. at 62.
33. Id. at 62.
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The too big to fail concept relies on five (5) justifications." First, po-
tentially major "systemic" problems can arise when a large shadow bank
fails, leaving some investors and other creditors unprotected. Investors
will rapidly withdraw funds from failing banks, and counter parties will
insist on more collateral, thereby accelerating the problems facing these
banks.35 The spillover effects of this exodus can further weaken other
viable banks and cause their failure. Rapid investment reallocations in the
shadow banking system also have negative effects on extension and main-
tenance of credit. Second, shadow bank regulators have a difficult time
determining which shadow banks are viable and non-viable, once a run on
a bank begins.3 6 Third, a considerable amount of time is required to un-
wind a large shadow bank. 37 Fourth, the failure of large banking organi-
zations adversely affects the market for mortgage-backed securities, gov-
ernment securities and municipal securities .38 Shadow banks provide li-
quidity to many of these markets because the banks play the role of a mar-
ket maker. Consequently, the collapse of a large shadow bank could tem-
porarily damage the operation of these markets. Fifth, because the too big
to fail concept diminishes the incentive for investors to closely monitor
and discipline risky banks, federal intervention is necessary to mitigate the
consequences of total collapse. 9  Such justifications can reinforce the
moral hazard present within the financial system if shadow banks rely on
these justifications and believe that they will not bear the full consequences
of their actions.40
A. The Dodd-Frank Act: Opportunity for Financial Reform
On January 21, 2010, President Barack Obama announced his inten-
tion to end the too big to fail concept.4 Originally, President Obama's
34. See generally Richard E. Randall, The Need to Protect Depositors of Large Banks, and the
Implications for Bank Powers and Ownership, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV. (Sept./Oct. 1990), availa-
ble at http:// www.bos.frb.org/ economic/ neer/ neerl990/ neer590e.pdf.
35. Id. at 67.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See SORKIN, supra note 5, at 389. For example, AIG's senior vice president of strategic
planning during the financial crisis, Brian Schreiber, insisted that the Federal Reserve would come to
rescue from its credit default swap troubles given its vast counterparty exposure, stating with an air of
cockiness "At this point, it's a game of chicken." Id. Moreover, according to Sorkin, the Federal
Reserve had articulated a policy by 2008 that if the consequences of a financial crisis were serious
enough to affect the entire financial system, the Federal Reserve might indeed have broader obliga-
tions that might require intervention. Id. at 219.
41. Press Release, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of Financial
Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (January 21, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/ president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-scope-
financial-institutions-rein-e.
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proposal for financial reform following the 2008 financial crisis included
the following components: (1) consolidation of regulatory agencies, elimi-
nation of the national thrift charter, and new oversight council to evaluate
systemic risk; (2) comprehensive regulation of financial markets, including
increased transparency of derivatives (i.e., incorporation onto exchanges);
and (3) tools for financial crises, including a "resolution regime" comple-
menting the existing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) au-
thority to allow for orderly winding down of bankrupt firms, including a
proposal that the Federal Reserve receive authorization from the Treasury
Department for extensions of credit in "unusual or exigent circums-
tances. "42
Representative Barney Frank and Senator Chris Dodd also proposed a
financial reform bill in response to the 2008 financial crisis on December
2, 2009. After many months of negotiation and compromise, President
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law on July 21, 2010.43  The
Dodd-Frank Act, a product of the financial regulatory reform agenda of
the democratically controlled 11 1th United States Congress and the Obama
administration, is arguably the most sweeping change to financial regula-
tion in the United States since the Great Depression," and represents the
beginning of a paradigm shift in the American financial regulatory envi-
ronment. By providing supervision and regulation where none existed
previously and limiting or prohibiting the use of taxpayer dollars to sal-
vage failing institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly seeks to end the
too big to fail concept.45
42. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on 21st Century
Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (transcript available at http:// whitehouse.gov/
thepress__office/ remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/); see also Department of the Trea-
sury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regula-
tion, available at http:// permanent.access.gpo.gov/ LPS113933/ LPS 113933/
www.financialstability.gov/ docs/ regs/ FinalReport web.pdf; see also Wall Street Journal Staff,
Obama's Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version, WALL STREET J., (June 17, 2009), http://
blogs.wsj.com/ washwire/ 2009/ 06/ 17/ Obamas-financial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version /tab
/article.
43. "Bill Summary & Status-111th Congress (2009-2010)-H.R.4173-All Information-THOMAS
(Library of Congress)," THE LtBRARY OF CONGRESS, http:// thomas.loc.gov/ cgi-bin/ bdquery/
z?d 111 :HR04173:@@@L&summ2 =m&#major%20actions.
44. Damien Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape: Senate Passes
Overhaul That Will Touch Most Americans; Bankers Gird for Fight Over Fine Print, THE WALL
STREET J. (July 16, 2010), available at http:// online.wsj.com/ article/
SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.html; see also Annie Lowery, Obama to Sign
Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform Bill Into Law Today, WASH. INDEP. (July 21, 2010), avail-
able at http:// washingtonindependent.com/ 92161/ obama-to-sign-dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-
reform-bill-into-law-today; see also Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Overhaul, Pledges 'No More'
Bailouts, Fox NEWS (July 21, 2010), available at http:// www.foxnews.com/ politics/ 2010/ 07/ 21/
obama-poised-sign-sweeping-financial-overhaul.
45. See Dodd-Frank Act, infra note 46 (The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act, in pertinent part, is
as follows: "To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end too big to fail, to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.").
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B. Structure of the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act changes the existing regulatory structure by
creating several new agencies and combining and removing others, in an
effort to streamline the regulatory process, increase oversight of specific
institutions regarded as a systemic risk, amend the Federal Reserve Act,
promote transparency, and increase coordination among regulatory agen-
cies. The Dodd-Frank Act establishes relatively rigorous standards and
supervision to protect the economy and American consumers, investors,
and businesses; supposedly ends taxpayer funded bailouts of financial in-
stitutions; provides for an advanced warning system on the stability of the
economy; creates rules on executive compensation and corporate gover-
nance; and eliminates the loopholes that led to the economic recession.46
In many respects, the Dodd-Frank Act alters the way America's financial
markets will operate in the future. It eliminates the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office
of Financial Research, in addition to creating several consumer protection
agencies, including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.4" The
Act is divided is into sixteen titles 8 and by one law firm's count, it re-
quires that regulators create 243 rules, conduct sixty-seven studies, and
issue twenty-two periodic reports . 4' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required, by
comparison, a few dozen.5°
While the Dodd-Frank Act specifically addresses the objectives of
President Obama's proposal, it nevertheless includes factors that encour-
age moral hazard. Those factors include over-speculation, the oversight
of the Federal Reserve and Treasury, vague and overbroad directives to
implement counter-cyclical financial policies, multiple information asym-
46. See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Summary: Restoring Ameri-
can Financial Stability: Create a Sound Economic Foundation to Grow Jobs, Protect Consumers, Rein
in Wall Street, End Too Big to Fail, Prevent Another Financial Crisis, available at http:// bank-
ing.senate.gov/ public/ _files/ FinancialReformSummaryAsFiled.pdf.
47. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Con-
gress, §§ 111, 152, 1011 (2010).
48. Id.
49. See generally Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(July 21, 2010), available at http:// www.davispolk.com/ files/ Publication/ 7084f9fe-6580-413b-
b870-b7c025ed2ecf/ Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/ ld4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/
070910_Financial ReformSummary.pdf. Davis Polk & Wardell LLP created a summary addressing
the major aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act.
50. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, H.R. 3763, 107th Congress (2002), required more than fifteen
separate rulemaking projects to implement many of the Act's provisions. The Act also called for
several mandated studies on particular aspects of the capital markets. The Act requires six studies,
pursuant to § 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act also mandated studies, such as those to be
conducted by the General Accounting Office on consolidation of public accounting firms (§ 701),
mandatory rotation of accounting firms (§ 207) and investment banks (§ 705). The Act also called for
reviews of Federal Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission (§§ 805, 905,
and 1104).
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metries, misalignment of shadow bank executive and shareholder interests,
and institutionalized government intervention in the form of federal bai-
louts. Given that the Dodd-Frank Act fails to address these risk factors,
all of which directly contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, it is important
to specifically assess how the Dodd-Frank Act encourages the moral ha-
zard implicit to the too big to fail concept.
III. THE LEGAL POLITICAL MORAL HAZARD MODEL
Moral hazard describes the risk that a party to a transaction has not
entered into the contract in good faith, has provided misleading informa-
tion about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incentive to
take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the con-
tract settles.51 The common example is for the car owner to drive more
recklessly once he obtains car insurance. Thus, moral hazard is the pros-
pect that a party, once insulated from risk, may behave differently from
the way it would behave if fully exposed to that risk. Moral hazard arises
because an individual or institution does not take full account of the conse-
quences of its actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully
than it otherwise would, leaving another party to bear responsibility for
the consequences of those actions.52 Conventional theory on moral hazard
posits that information asymmetries and principal-agent separation alone
produce moral hazard.53 This Article will argue, however, that the tradi-
tional conception of moral hazard (i.e., a one-dimensional information
asymmetry and principal-agent problem) is inadequate to explain the dy-
namics among the shadow banks, credit rating agencies, regulators, and
investors that, not only contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, but also
continue to plague the financial system.
51. Investopedia defines moral hazard as "the risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into
the contract in good faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit
capacity, or has an incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the
contract settles."
Moral hazard can be present any time two parties come into agreement with one another.
Each party in a contract may have the opportunity to gain from acting contrary to the prin-
ciples laid out by the agreement. For example, when a salesperson is paid a flat salary with
no commissions for his or her sales, there is a danger that the salesperson may not try very
hard to sell the business owner's goods because the wage stays the same regardless of how
much or how little the owner benefits from the salesperson's work. Moral hazard can be
somewhat reduced by the placing of responsibilities on both parties of a contract. In the
example of the salesperson, the manager may decide to pay a wage comprised of both sala-
ry and commissions. With such a wage, the salesperson would have more incentive not on-
ly to produce more profits but also to prevent losses for the company.
INVESTOPEDIA, http:// www.investopedia.com/ terms/ m/ moralhazard.asp#axzzlX57XRBPN.
52. See id.
53. See J6rg Guido Hulsmann, The Political Economy of Moral Hazard, LUDWIG VON MISES
INSTITUTE available at http:// mises.org/ daily/ 2935 (stating that the combination of informational
asymmetries in conjunction with separation of ownership and control can produce moral hazard).
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Economist Hyman Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis provides
the theoretical basis for the LPMH model." Economist Paul McCulley
further states that the longer an actor can derive profits from excessive
risk taking the more imprudent the risk-taking becomes.5 If every actor
in a sector is simultaneously becoming more risk-prone, as many shadow
banks had become, this dynamic "drives up the value of collateral, in-
creases the ability to use leverage," and causes a general sense of stabili-
ty. 56  When one extrapolates stability into infinity, one is likely to ignore
the consequences of a credit freeze or massive default.57 Likewise, the
federal government can encourage this sense of stability by implementing
laws and financial policies that encourage shadow banks to engage in risky
behavior and protect them should collapse become possible. Specifically,
the federal government has encouraged moral hazard through pro-cyclical
interest rates,58 deregulation of shadow banks and the investments they
54. Hyman Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (May 1992), available at http://
ssrn.com/ abstract= 161024. Minsky wrote this article in 1992, long before the 2008 financial crisis.
The FIH is descriptive and is being heavily adapted to apply to the LPMH model for this Article.
Specifically, the LPMH model, as it applies to the shadow banking industry, examines the how sha-
dow banks respond to business cycles.
55. McCulley, supra note 2, at 5. The longer people make money by taking risk, the more im-
prudent they become in risk-taking. "If everybody is simultaneously becoming more risk-seeking, that
brings in risk premiums, drives up the value of collateral, increases the ability to lever and the game
keeps going." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. McCulley writes:
This pro-cyclical tendency applies to central banks and policymakers as well; ... too much
success in stabilizing goods and services inflation, while conducting an asymmetric reaction
function to asset price inflation and deflation, is a dangerous strategy. Yes, it can work for
a time. But precisely because it can work for a time, it sows the seeds of its own demise.
Or, as Minsky declared, stability is ultimately destabilizing, because of the asset price and
credit excesses that stability begets. Put differently, stability can never be a destination, on-
ly a journey to instability.
Id.
58. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Testimony (Oct. 1, 1998), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/ boarddocs/ testimony/ 1998/ 19981001 .htm (Greenspan eerily acknowledged
in a cost-benefit analysis during a Congressional hearing in 1998 that the cost of American prosperity
and a "free market" was moral hazard and the occasional recession borne of excessive leverage and
weak financial regulations.); see also BARRY RITHOLZ, BAILOUT NATION: How GREED AND EASY
MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY (2009) (Specifically, Green-
span's policies of adjusting interest rates to historic lows certainly contributed to a housing bubble in
the U.S.); see Chris Martenson, Connect the Dots, ATLANTIC FREE PRESS (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/ content/ view/ 768/ 81/ (A few months after luring homeowners
with this 1 % interest rate and his recommendation, however, Greenspan began raising interest rates in
a series of rate hikes that would bring the funds rate to 5.25% about two years later.); see Nouriel
Roubini, Who is to Blame for the Mortgage Carnage and Coming Financial Disaster? Unregulated
Free Market Fundamentalism Zealotry, ECONOMONITOR (Mar. 19, 2007), http://
www.economonitor.com/ nouriel/ 2007/ 03/ 19/ who-is-to-blame-for-the-mortgage-carnage-and-
coming-financial-disaster-unregulated-free-market-fundamentalism-zealotry/ (For borrowers who were
not prepared for an increasing interest rate, massive defaults were inevitable. As a result of these
schizophrenic policies Greenspan has been criticized for his role in the rise of the housing bubble and
the subsequent problems in the mortgage industry.); See Scott Lanman & Steve Matthews, Greenspan
Concedes to 'Flaw' in His Market Ideology, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2008), http://
www.bloomberg.com/ apps/ news?pid=20601087&sid=ah5qh9Up4rlg (noting, moreover, that
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make,59 and legislative enactments that provide for federal bailouts.' ° The
combined effect of this hodge-podge of laws ultimately fosters the percep-
tion that the federal government will act as a lender of last resort when
shadow banks face the prospect of bankruptcy. Descriptively, ignoring
known risks while believing that the federal government will subsidize the
costs is moral hazard. 61 Indeed, the federal government has "forced" pri-
vate mergers or acquisitions to rescue too big to fail institutions when they
faced failure. 62  Consequently, each federal bailout encourages moral ha-
zard in the future if the institutions that take excessive risks come to be-
lieve the federal government, as the proxy for taxpayers, will subsidize the
costs of their risky behavior. 63  The lack of attention paid to the moral
hazard presented by decades of federal bailouts simply serves to reaffirm
this perception.
Greenspan admitted that his free-market ideology shunning certain regulations was flawed during a
congressional hearing on October 23, 2008).
59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed §§ 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Section 20 prohi-
bited any member bank from affiliating in specific ways with an investment bank. Section 32 prohi-
bited investment bank directors, officers, employees, or principals from serving in those capacities at a
commercial member bank of the Federal Reserve System. The repeal of § 32 allowed interlocking
directorships that made untangling Lehman Brothers' affiliations extremely complicated. The most
significant aspect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is that it purposely weakened several important
enforcement provisions. For example, § 108 for a study of the "[u]se of Subordinated Debt to Protect
Financial System and Deposit Funds From 'Too Big To Fail' Institutions." This section is significant
because it refers to an institution as "too big to fail," and represents an explicit recognition that finan-
cial institutions have been acquiring such power and influence that they cannot be allowed to fail.
60. In 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991), which amended § 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to allow the Federal Reserve to lend directly to shadow banks in unusual and exigent
circumstances. Prior to that amendment, only a narrowly restricted set of loans and securities, that
most shadow banks tended not to hold, could be collateral under § 13(3). The amendment eliminated
the requirement that the notes, drafts, or bills tendered by non-banks be eligible for discount by mem-
ber banks. It is not surprising that law firms seized on this language and construed it as a de facto
insurance policy for shadow banks. For example, as construed by Sullivan & Cromwell LLP for its
clients in a memorandum of December 2, 1991, a shadow bank's security firm could seek loans from
the Federal Reserve in emergencies. See generally Schwartz, supra note 32. The Dodd-Frank Act
Title XI, § 1101 does limit this authority to prohibit assisting an individual company, but it does not
eliminate it.
61. See Investopedia, supra note 51 (Moral hazard also includes a situation where one has an
incentive to take unusual risks.).
62. See Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns' Big Bailout, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14,
2008), http:// www.businessweek.com/ bwdaily/ dnflash/ content/ mar2008/ db20080314_993131.htm
(On March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve "asked" J.P. Morgan to acquire Bear Stearns and agreed to
issue a non-recourse loan of $29 billion to J.P. Morgan, thereby assuming the risk of Bear Stearns's
less liquid assets.); see also Yalman Onaran, Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11,
Bernanke Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008), http:// www.bloomberg.com/ apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&refer=worldwide&sid=a7coicThgaEE. This interventionism certainly
prevented Bear Stearns from facing bankruptcy. Two days later, on March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns
signed a merger agreement with J.P. Morgan Chase in a stock swap worth $2 a share or less than 7%
of Bear Stearns's market value just two days before.
63. See SORKIN, supra note 5, at 219.
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In order for the Dodd-Frank Act to end the too big to fail concept, it
must attack the various factors that have built the expectation that unrea-
sonably risky behavior will be subsidized because of the supposed impor-
tance of a shadow bank to the financial system. In other words, the Dodd-
Frank Act must reverse decades of moral hazard to end the too big to fail
concept. Otherwise, the federal government and the American people will
forever be hostages to the moral hazard of those considered "too big to
fail." We will never fully eliminate moral hazard in any industry or sys-
tem, but sufficient attention must be focused on reasonably reducing the
moral hazard present in the financial system, lest another financial crisis
occurs that requires another round of massive federal bailouts. 64 With the
objective of reasonably reducing moral hazard in mind, the LPMH model
is designed for use by risk managers and companies in all industries and
sectors, financial or otherwise, regulatory agencies, and investors to assist
in focusing discussion and analysis on the risk factors that contribute to
moral hazard.
The LPMH model incorporates the traditional elements of information
asymmetry and principal-agent separation, but also analyzes the manner in
which an institution becomes too big to fail; the policies that have encour-
aged risk taking and use of extreme leverage; and the laws that authorize
taxpayer money to be allocated for federal bailouts. Thus, the LPMH
model examines these five (5) factors:
(1) Minsky-Evolution to Become Too Big to Fail (5 points)-The
LPMH model examines how shadow banks achieve the too big to
fail status, and focuses on whether "Minsky Cycle" growth is
permitted to "force" the government to render assistance to them
during a crisis, regardless of the cause, given the shadow bank's
importance to a vital sector in the economy.65 Three stages cha-
racterize this progression: (1) hedge, (2) speculative, and (3) Pon-
zi. 66 Allowing shadow banks to use Minsky Cycle growth strong-
ly encourages moral hazard-because shadow banks are free to
over-speculate but expect the federal government to cushion any
shocks attributable to their actions. 67 This pattern of unsustainable
64. See Weiner, supra note 10.
65. McCulley, supra note 2, at 1. McCulley notes that the private sector wants to reduce the
extent of its risk on its balance sheet, so the federal government through the Federal Reserve is "per-
suaded" to do so. McCulley states that when the Federal Reserve extends balance sheet support to
buffer a "reverse Minsky journey," there is no difference between the federal government's balance
sheet and the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. See id. at 11.
66. Minsky, supra note 54, at 6.
67. See SORKIN, supra note 5.
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shadow bank growth also helped precipitate the 2008 financial cri-
sis 68
(2) Three-Dimensional Information Asymmetry (2 points per in-
formation asymmetry)-There are three dimensions of information
asymmetry that prevent effective monitoring of the investment ac-
tivities within the shadow banks, thereby encouraging a lack of ac-
countability. First, the investor shadow bank information asym-
metry examines the manner and extent to which shadow banks
share material information with shareholders and investors.
Second, the government shadow bank information asymmetry pre-
vents government regulators from appreciating or understanding
the risk being taken by the shadow bank, or the regulator simply
does not the risk being taken by the shadow bank. Third, the cre-
dit rating agency shadow bank information asymmetry examines
the cause and effect of rating agencies lacking the historical data,
or understanding of the financial products and instruments, that
shadow banks are using. This sub-factor also examines how sha-
dow banks obscure the ability of rating agencies to assign accurate
ratings for these financial products and instruments. An informa-
tion asymmetry (factor two) can be exogenous or endogenous.
(3) Principal-Agent Separation (5 points)-Investing in complex
and interwoven financial instruments separates ownership from
control, encouraging shadow banks to mismanage and underma-
nage the investments of their principals. The principal-agent prob-
lem arises when a principal compensates an agent for performing
acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, where
the interests of the principal and agent may not align, and where
aspects of agent's performance are cost prohibitive to monitor.
Conceptually, the solution to this problem is simple: ensure the
provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way prin-
cipals wish. In reality, this problem is much more complicated to
68. McCulley, supra note 2, at 6. McCulley states that the 2008 financial crisis involved a
Minsky cycle:
[Tihe progression of risk-taking in the financial markets represented by the excess of sub-
prime loans, structured investment vehicles (S1Vs) and other shady characters inhabiting the
shadow banking system. Their apparent stability begat ever-riskier debt arrangements,
which begat asset price bubbles. And then the bubbles burst[,j . . . we have since
been ... moving backward through the three-part progression, with asset prices falling,
risk premiums moving higher, leverage getting scaled back and economic growth getting
squeezed. Minsky's Ponzi debt units are only viable as long as the levered assets appre-
ciate in price. But when the price of the assets decline, as we've seen in the U.S. housing
market, Minsky tells us we must go through the process of increasing risk-taking in re-
verse-with all its consequences.
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solve. Shadow bank executives and managers are naturally inter-
ested in maximizing their own profits.6 9 In order to maximize
their profits, shadow bank executives and managers took huge
risks that led to huge short-term profits in the run-up to the 2008
financial crisis.7" These short-term profits often corresponded to
the profit a shadow bank earns in the short run, or bonuses, and
there was often no downside for the executives and managers.
This arrangement is inevitable; nevertheless, the potential for mi-
salignment of interest does encourage moral hazard. The more
significant problem, however, is when information asymmetries
develop from the principal-agent separation. By definition, the
presences of information asymmetry and principal-agent separation
are sufficient to encourage moral hazard. Thus, the presence of
factor two and factor three indicate both endogenous and exogen-
ous influences on moral hazard.
(4) Entrenched Policies and Relationships (5 points)-Close affilia-
tions and relationships between government regulatory personnel
and shadow banks often lead to pro-market policies.71 These poli-
cies become entrenched over time and the relationships that devel-
op between shadow banks and their regulators nullify the regulato-
ry function because they often either result in pro-shadow bank ar-
rangements, strained interpretations of existing legislation, or re-
quests for extraordinary authority through new legislation.
(5) Institutionalized Government Intervention (6 points)-The
presence of institutionalized government intervention (factor five)
69. See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 773 (Corporate managers are trained to profit maximize. Moreover, one of the
core doctrines of corporate law is that the managers have no obligation to maximize shareholder re-
turns in any particular time frame.); see also Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)
(holding that directors may not delegate determination of whether to sell company to shareholders);
See also Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) (court may not "substitut[el its judg-
ment as to what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's board . . ").
70. McCulley, supra note 2, at 5 ("The longer people make money by taking risk, the more
imprudent they become in risk-taking.").
71. SORKIN, supra note 5, at 173. For example, a relatively minor provision in the Grarmn-
Leach-Bliley Act illustrates the effects of relationships on policy. While Congress was drafting the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, lobbyists for Goldman Sachs persuaded the committee writing the bill to
include a minor amendment they had sought in the event that Goldman Sachs ever wanted to become a
bank holding company. That provision allowed any bank that owned a physical power plant to contin-
ue to own it as a bank holding company. Goldman Sachs was the only bank that owned a power plant.
Id. As a bailout example, AIG leveraged its securities lending business, financial products unit, and
its high degree of interconnectivity with many other Wall Street firms to extract a bailout from the
Federal Reserve in 2008, despite the fact that the Federal Reserve did not regulate AIG. Id. at 208.
Even when AIG though considered filing for bankruptcy protection, an AIG executive still insisted that
the Federal Reserve would come to the rescue, stating with an air of cockiness "[alt this point, it's a
game of chicken." Id. at 389.
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indicates the presence of laws that allow for federal bailouts, such
as the § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Section 13(3), despite
the Dodd-Frank Act limitations, can still be authorized to provide
massive loans to shadow banks during "unusual and exigent cir-
cumstances."7 2  Thus, even when these laws are not used, their
very presence can strongly encourage moral hazard.
After performing a qualitative analysis of the above five (5) factors, the
quantitative aspect of the LPMH model requires the user to total the penal-
ty points corresponding to each factor present in the qualitative analysis.
The penalty point total identifies the extent to which moral hazard is being
encouraged on the rating chart below:
72. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act read, in pertinent part, as
follows:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal re-
serve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in ac-
cordance with the provisions of ... § 35 of this title, to discount for any individual, part-
nership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and
bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve
bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an in-
dividual, or a partnership, or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence
that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accom-
modations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships,
or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as ... the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 343 (1991). Title X!, § 1101 amends § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as follows:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal re-
serve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in ac-
cordance with the provisions of [§] 357 of this title, to discount for any participant in any
program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when
such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfac-
tion of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft,
or bill of exchange the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such participant in
any program or facility with broad-based eligibility is unable to secure adequate credit ac-
commodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for any participant in
any program or facility with broad-based eligibility shall be subject to such limitations, re-
strictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may
prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 343 (2010).
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e "Nominally encourages moral hazard" (0 points): If no factor
is present, then moral hazard is being nominally encouraged.
* "Encourages moral hazard" (2-8 points): The only way to
score a "0" or "2" on the LPMH model is to have no more than
one level of information asymmetry. This score indicates that
moral hazard is being weakly encouraged based on the presence of
one level of information asymmetry. While problematic, one in-
formation asymmetry should not encourage moral hazard, unless
the presence of another factor present as well. The implications of
endogenous information asymmetry include delayed responses to
changing circumstances within a shadow bank. Examples of the
potential consequences of endogenous information asymmetry in-
clude AIG's Financial Products Unit in relation to the larger cor-
porate structure.73 In each instance, the endogenous information
asymmetry prevented the larger corporate structure from respond-
ing proactively to limit, or perhaps prevent, losses from the de-
clining housing market. With exogenous information asymme-
tries such as those between shadow banks and rating agencies,
73. See generally SORKIN, supra note 5, at 160 (It was not until January 2008, that the Chairman
of AIG's Board, Robert Willumstad, realized just how precarious AIG's financial situation was.
While reading a monthly report issued to AIG board members, Willumstad read that "the FP group
had insured more than $500 billion in subprime mortgages, mostly for European banks." Only after
reading this report did Willumstad understand the gravity of the situation: With mortgage defaults
dramatically increasing, AIG may have to pay absurd amounts of money. In addition to Willumstad
not knowing the depth of FP's involvement in subprime mortgages, he also hired AIG's outside audi-
tor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), and ordered a secret meeting to help him gain an understanding
of what FP was doing-because neither he, nor many others, had an understanding of FP's business
model.).
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and between shadow banks and regulators-the shadow bank pre-
vents the broader public from predicting mid-to-long-term trends,
because the information upon which they rely is inaccurate. On
the other end of this range, in order to score an "8," an endogen-
ous or exogenous information asymmetry must be present along
with a strongly weighted exogenous factor, such as entrenched
policies and relationships or institutionalized government interven-
tion. The combination of two exogenous factors or exogenous and
endogenous factors working together certainly encourages shadow
banks to act pro-cyclically, or in expectation of a government bai-
lout.
* "Strongly encourages moral hazard" (9-18 points): To score
"9" or higher on the LPMH model requires the presence of either
multiple endogenous factors, or the presence of strongly weighted
exogenous and endogenous factors. Taken together, the presence
of enough factors to score "9" or more demonstrates that there are
multiple information asymmetries and either: serious over specula-
tion and over leveraging, or the misalignment of principal and
agent's interests; all of which seriously encourage moral hazard.
Clearly, on the other end of the range, even a single dimension of
information symmetry along with the misalignment of principal
and agent's interests, over speculation and over-leveraging, en-
trenched policies and relationships or institutionalized government
intervention strongly encourages moral hazard.
* "Dangerously encourages moral hazard" (19-28 points): To
score "19" or higher on the LPMH model requires the presence of
four or five factors, which indicate that moral hazard is being
dangerously encouraged, both exogenously and endogenously.
Whether there are single or multiple information asymmetries, the
shadow bank is operating pro-cyclically and over-leveraging and
over-speculating entrenched policies and relationships; it may be
expecting a bailout in case its business strategies result in financial
collapse. The confluence of these factors dangerously encourages
moral hazard.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
While the Dodd-Frank Act makes many important changes to the
regulatory environment and makes a significant stride toward ending the
too big to fail concept and its implicit moral hazard, it still cannot be ar-
gued to have ended it. In summary, the LPMH model demonstrates that
the Dodd-Frank Act encourages moral hazard rather than discourages it.
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Specifically, it fails to empower a single regulator that would have
stripped the Federal Reserve, one of the prime culprits in perpetuating
pro-cyclical and pro-shadow bank policies, of its bank-supervision roles;
rather, it grants the Federal Reserve additional supervisory powers,74 such
as placing the supposedly "independent" consumer protection agency with-
in the Federal Reserve. 75 In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act implements a
version of the "Volcker Rule" to prohibit risky trading by banks, but only
after a period of study. 76 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act is deficient in
that it fails to address other factors that encourage moral hazard in the
financial system, namely the influence of entrenched policies and relation-
ships, principal-agent misalignment, and institutionalized government in-
tervention codified in the form of federal bailouts.
A. Minsky-Evolutionary Growth
In light of the boom-bust cycle that characterizes the American econ-
omy, 77 institutions have an incentive to engage in risky speculative activity
because during "good times," speculative activities allow for greater de-
mand for underlying assets and, in turn, higher asset prices. 78  Hyman
Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis demonstrates the importance of
limiting a use of speculation.79 Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis
offers the theoretical framework for understanding how over-speculation
helped create the bubbles in property prices, mortgage finance, and sha-
dow banking that characterize the 2008 financial crisis.'O Minsky's Finan-
cial Instability Hypothesis argues that economic cycles can be described as
a progression through kinds of debt units: (1) hedge financing units, in
which the borrower's cash flows cover interest and principal payments; (2)
speculative finance units, in which cash flows cover only interest pay-
74. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 801-814, 1101-1109.
75. See id. at § 1011.
76. See id. at §§ 701, 754. Section 754 states that:
the provisions of this subtitle shall take effect on the later of 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this subtitle or, to the extent a provision of this subtitle requires a rulemaking,
not less than 60 days after publication of the final rule or regulation implementing such
provision of this subtitle.
77. McCulley, supra note 2, at 3. McCulley adapts Minsky's Hypothesis to "explain the endemic
boom-bust cycles of capitalism, including the bubbles in property prices, mortgage finance, and sha-
dow banking that characterize the [2008 financial crisis]."
78. Id. at 4 (McCulley cites Minsky's teaching that "when credit is evolving from hedge units to
speculative units, there is no fear, as the journey increases demand for the underlying assets that are
being levered, and drives up their prices.").
79. Minsky, supra note 54, at 7 ("It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the
economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the
weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation
amplifying system.").
80. McCulley, supra note 2, at 3 ("The shadow banking system, from its explosive growth to its
calamitous collapse, followed a path that may have looked quite familiar to the economist Hyman P.
Minsky.").
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ments; and (3) Ponzi units, in which cash flows cover neither and are re-
liant on rising asset prices to keep the Ponzi unit afloat. 81  The mortgage
debt market followed Minsky's three-step path almost precisely. 82  There-
fore, in order for the Dodd-Frank Act to end the too big to fail concept it
must discourage the over-speculation Minsky warned against.
The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to directly address speculation by ad-
dressing its two related aspects, securitization and leverage, through me-
chanisms: (1) Title VI entitled "Improvements to Regulation" (the
"Volcker Rule");83 (2) the "Collins Amendment"; 84 and (3) the new rules
81on securitization. These mechanisms, while providing important
changes, would do little to prevent the same over-speculation that led to
the 2008 financial crisis', and thus do not end the too big to fail concept.
1. The Volcker Rule
Title VI § 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act contains the "Volcker Rule." 87
Named after former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, it
specifically prohibits a bank, or institution that owns a bank, from engag-
ing in proprietary trading not requested by a client, from owning or invest-
ing in a hedge fund or private equity fund, as well as limiting the liabilities
81. Minsky, supra note 54, at 7.
82. McCulley, supra note 2, at 6 (McCulley states that "the bubble in the U.S. housing market
provides a plain illustration of the forward Minsky journey in action, as people bet that prices would
stably rise forever and financed that bet with excessive debt."). The first phase of the progression in
Minsky's hypothesis involved the shadow banking system's excessive use of subprime loans, struc-
tured investment vehicles (SIVs), and other dubious financial instruments to create new types of finan-
cial instruments. Id. at 6. By 2008, many shadow banks had become Minsky's Ponzi units and they
imploded as a run on their assets forced them to decrease their leverage, which, in turn, drove down
asset prices, and eroded equity. Id. at 8-9. Because the shadow bank system is particularly vulnerable
to bank runs during credit crunches, shadow banks drained their back-up lines of credit with conven-
tional banks or liquidated assets at distressed prices. Id. at 10. Indeed, conventional banks sought to
reduce their connectedness to shadow banks. Id. Such a credit contraction can cause a liquidity crisis,
if a shadow bank relies on this short-term financing, like Bear Stearns.
83. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 601-628.
84. The "Collins Amendment" refers to SA 3879 to bill S. 3217. S. Amend. 3879, 111th Cong.
(2010) (enacted).
85. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 901-991.
86. See The'Volcker Rule' Could Clarify Roles and Risks in the Financial System, WASH. POST
(Jan. 23, 2010), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2010/ 01/ 22/
AR2010012204348.html. The article notes that the Volcker Rule would not have prevented the cur-
rent financial crisis, which began with the collapse of a pure investment bank, Lehman Brothers;
moreover, two non-commercial banks, Bear Stearns and AIG, received bailouts, but their interconmec-
tion with other institutions, not size alone, frightened the government into saving them. Id.
87. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619. The Volcker rule separates investment bank-
ing, private equity and proprietary trading (hedge fund) sections of financial institutions from their
consumer lending arms. Banks are not allowed to simultaneously enter into an advisory and creditor
role with clients, such as with private equity firms. The Volcker rule aims to minimize conflicts of
interest between banks and their clients through separating the various types of business practices
financial institutions engage in.
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that the largest banks could hold.88 However, this proprietary trading ban
was dropped at the request of Senator Scott Brown, whose vote was
needed in the Senate to pass the bill. 89  The rule attempts to distinguish
between the activities and transactions that banking entities may conduct
and those that nonbank financial companies' supervised by the Federal
Reserve Board may conduct. 9' The Volcker Rule also requires that regu-
lators impose capital requirements upon financial institutions that are
"countercyclical, so that the amount of capital ... maintained by a [finan-
cial institution] increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in
times of economic contraction . . ." to ensure the safety and solvency of
the financial institution and society;' however, this crucial aspect of the
Volcker rule has yet to go into effect.93
88. See Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Calls
for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of Financial Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Tax-
payers (Jan. 21, 2010), http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/ president-obama-calls-new-
restrictions-size-and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e.
89. See Matt Taibbi, Wall Street's Big Win, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 19, 2010, at 56.
90. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 102(a)(4)(B). Section 102(a)(4)(B) defines the term
"U.S. nonbank financial company" to mean:
A company (other than a bank holding company, a Farm Credit System institution char-
tered and subject to the provisions of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (12 U.S.C. § 2001 et
seq.), or a national securities exchange (or parent thereof), clearing agency (or parent the-
reof, unless the parent is a bank holding company), security-based swap execution facility,
or security-based swap data repository registered with the Commission, or a board of trade
designated as a contract market (or parent thereof), or a derivatives clearing organization
(or parent thereof, unless the parent is a bank holding company), swap execution facility or
a swap data repository registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission)-that
is (i) incorporated or organized under the laws of the United States or any State; and (ii)
predominantly engaged in financial activities, as defined in paragraph (6).
Id.
91. See Kathleen W. Collins, Monica Lea Parry & P. Georgia Bullitt, Financial Regulatory
Reform Heads Down the Homestretch, MORGAN LEWIS PUBLICATIONS (Jun. 29, 2010), http://
www.morganlewis.com/ index.cfm/ fuseaction! publication.print/ publicationID/ dd2cd589-9b01-
4d3a-93ff-a412198fdcfa/. Collins, Parry, and Bullitt note that "the final version of the Volcker Rule
adopted by the conference committee applies to proprietary trading activity conducted by a banking
entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve as a systemically important
nonbank." Id. They further write that any:
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that engages in proprietary trading or
takes or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge
fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), to
additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative limits with regards to such
proprietary trading and taking or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership in-
terest in or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private equity fund, except that permitted ac-
tivities as described in subsection (d) shall not be subject to the additional capital and addi-
tional quantitative limits except as provided in subsection (d)(3), as if the nonbank financial
company supervised by the Board were a banking entity.
Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619(a)(2).
92. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 616(a)(2).
93. See Will Henley, CFTC Says Rule Deadlines "Might Slip," GLOBAL FIN. STRATEGY NEWS
(Mar. 17, 2011), http:// www.gfsnews.com/ article/ 1374/ 1/ CFTC says ruledeadlines might slip
(noting that "Gary Gensler, the chairman of the futures regulator, said ... that the Volcker rule
deadline "might slip" and not be completed by April [2011]).
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Additionally, the Volcker Rule prohibits a bank, having a direct or in-
direct relationship with a hedge fund or private equity fund, from entering
"into a transaction with the fund, or with any other hedge fund or private
equity fund that is controlled by such fund... "'9 without disclosing the
full extent of the relationship to the regulating entity; the rule seeks to
prevent conflicts of interest. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act's approach to
ending the too big to fail concept relies on this approach of distinguishing
"good" from "bad" trades and classifying financial institutions as either
"banking entities" or "non-bank financial companies."' In essence, the
Volcker Rule restricts banking entities from making speculative invest-
ments that do not benefit their customers, and requires non-bank financial
companies (shadow banks) that engage in proprietary trading to hold addi-
tional capital and subjects them to quantitative limits.' Volcker argued
that this speculative activity contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. 97
Simply stated, while the Volcker Rule made important steps to toward
curbing the abuses that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, it fails to
prohibit shadow banks from becoming too big to fail for three reasons.
First, the Volcker Rule's reliance on categorization and characteriza-
tion for determining prohibited activities invites the kind of regulatory
discretion that will lead to inefficient and ineffective action. Regulators
are still placed in the unwinnable position of having to determine what
trades should be permissible, because they are done on behalf of a client,
and which trades should be prohibited.9 8  In fact, the U.S. Congress is
clearly aware that the Volcker Rule would not have prevented the 2008
financial crisis and, more importantly, was not designed to do so.9 Sena-
94. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619(f)(1) (which amends 12 U.S.C §§ 1841, 13(f)).
95. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619.
96. Id.
97. See David Cho and Benjamin Appelbaum, Obama 's "Volcker Rule ": Shifts Power Away From
Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/
2010/ 01/ 21/ AR2010012104935.html (noting that Volcker "has argued that such speculative activity
played a key role in the financial crisis: Banks, which are sheltered by the government because lending
is important to the economy, should be prevented from taking advantage of that safety net to make
speculative investments.").
98. See John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule, NF w YORKER (Jul. 26, 2010), at 25, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/ reporting/ 2010/ 07/ 26/ 100726fa fact cassidy. Cassidy notes that the prac-
tical challenge in implementing the Volcker Rule lies ahead. Cassidy states that institutions may try to
avoid it by, for example, placing big proprietary bets and trying to define them as something else.
Without the legislative purity that Volcker was hoping for, enforcing his rule will be difficult, and will
rely on many of the same regulators who did such a poor job the last time around, particularly those at
the Federal Reserve.
99. See Nicole Gelinas, The Volcker Rule and Congress' Unlearned Lesson, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb.
11, 2010), http:// www.fool.com/ investing/ general/ 2010/ 02/ 11/ the-volcker-rule-and-congress-
unlearned-lesson.aspx. Gelinas argues that the Volcker Rule's "separate and regulate" strategy will
fail unless Congress bans debt securitization and trading. She notes that during a hearing, Sen. Mike
Johanns got Volcker to admit that the Volcker Rule "certainly would not have solved the problem at
A1G nor at Lehman Brothers .... [lI]t was not designed to solve those particular problems." More-
over, Gelinas asserts that Congress knows that the Volcker Rule will not work because of the inability
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tor Chris Dodd, one of the principal drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act, and
Paul Volcker acknowledged that regulators would likely have great diffi-
culty distinguishing between appropriate bank hedging activities and dan-
gerous for-profit trading.'° Within a week of its passage, Goldman Sachs
had devised a way around several of the most important aspects of the new
regulations regarding proprietary trading imposed by the Volcker Rule. 1
Second, because the Volcker Rule still permits shadow banks to en-
gage in proprietary trading, (with capital requirements and quantitative
limits to be determined later), it fails to meaningfully address the dangers
posed by rampant securitization.0 2 The Volcker Rule permits nonbank
financial companies to engage in proprietary trading, and if a nonbank
financial company engages in activities permitted of a banking entity, then
the capital requirements or quantitative limits applied to banking entities
will apply to the nonbank financial company.I03 The Volcker Rule, while
giving the appearance of being "tough" on Wall Street, does little to pre-
vent another similar financial crisis from occurring, °4 because the 2008
financial crisis did not result from proprietary trading; rather, it resulted
from over-leveraging and speculation.""
Third, if a banking entity is prepared to abandon the insurance and
protections afforded depository institutions under the Federal Reserve, it
can become a nonbank financial company and still openly engage in pro-
to distinguish between allowable "bank hedging behavior" and prohibited "profit making trades." Id.).
100. See Alison Vekshin, Dodd 'Strongly' Supports Volcker Rule Limiting Banks, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 2, 2010), http:// www.bloomberg.com/ apps/ news? pid= newsarchive& sid=
a4Yx7pCGUval&pos=7 ("Dodd asked Volcker how Congress should interpret the proposed ban on
proprietary trading and whether it's possible to separate bank hedging behavior from profit-making
activities. 'It does put a burden I think, inevitably, on the supervisor,' Volcker said.").
101. See Charlie Gasparino, Goldman Already a Step Ahead of FinReg, Fox BusINEss (Jul. 27,
2010), http:// www.foxbusiness.com/ markets/ 2010/ 07/ 27/ goldman-step-ahead-finreg (noting that
while the Volcker Rule is supposed to scale back proprietary trading, Goldman Sachs,
moved about half of its "proprietary" stock-trading operations-which had made market
bets using the firm's own capital-into its asset management division, where these traders
can talk to Goldman clients and then place their market bets .... But by having the traders
work in asset management, where they will take market positions while dealing with
clients, Goldman believes it can meet the rule's mandates, avoid large-scale layoffs, and
preserve some of the same risk taking that has earned it enormous profits.... The move
is designed to exploit a loophole in the Volker Rule.... Goldman's move also unders-
cores the weakness in the Volcker Rule, which was designed to reduce the same type of
risk-taking activities that led to the 2008 financial meltdown.
Id. Bank of America seems to be following suit, the rest of Wall Street may soon follow Goldman
Sachs' lead.
102. Id.
103. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619.
104. Cassidy, supra note 98, at 3. Cassidy notes a conversation he had with Benn Steil, an econo-
mist at the Council on Foreign Relations where Steil states that even if the Volcker Rule had been in
effect before 2008 "'the crisis would have unfolded exactly as it did.'" Id. This is so because their
proprietary-trading desks had not been the problem. Many independent analysts agreed, arguing that
Bear and Lehman had been destroyed by excessive borrowing and by their sunny view of the sub-
prime-mortgage market.
105. Id.
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prietary trading while performing the permitted activities of a banking
entity.'°6 It is doubtful that the Volcker Rule would discourage the moral
hazard associated with becoming too big to fail because Goldman Sachs, a
bank holding company, has indicated that its own deposit-taking bank is an
insignificant part of its $900 billion balance sheet.'°7 The implication be-
ing that it could abandon the deposit-taking bank and resume its proprie-
tary trading as a U.S. nonbank financial company. Despite the supposed
toughness of the Volcker Rule, Goldman Sachs executives do not believe
they must relinquish their bank-holding company status, acquired during
the 2008 financial crisis, to escape the Volcker Rule's ban on proprietary
trading, because of the vagueness within the proprietary trade ban defimi-
tion.108 Therefore, bank holding companies like Goldman Sachs can oper-
ate both a private equity unit and a proprietary trading desk, allowing
them to borrow from the Federal Reserve's "discount window" while tak-
ing massive risks.1" Any financial institutions wishing to avoid the
Volcker Rule and escape regulation have an incentive to follow Goldman
Sachs' rationale for evading the proprietary trading ban. " If correct,
Goldman Sachs and others that adopt the same strategy could force the
federal government to bailout an entire industry, regardless of whether the
industry acted recklessly. "' The Dodd-Frank Act has not eliminated the
moral hazard implicit to the too big to fail concept-it has encouraged it.
106. See Vekshin supra note 100 (Vekshin notes that Treasury Deputy Secretary Neal Wolin stated
the Volcker Rule "forces firms to choose between owning an insured bank, protected by government
programs, and engaging in proprietary trading, hedge fund or private equity activities."); see also,
McCulley, supra note 2.
107. See Chrystia Freeland & Francisco Guerrera, "Volcker Rule" Gives Goldman Stark Choice,
FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 12, 2010), http:// www.ft.com/ intl/ cms/ s/ 0/ 12lfe9d0-1753-11df-94f6-
00144feab49a.html#axzzliypPkW00.
108. See Gasparino, supra note 102.
109. Id. (A bank-holding company, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A), would be able to access the Federal Reserve's discount window, much like
Goldman Sachs.); see also Christine Harper & Craig Torres, Goldman, Morgan Stanley Bring Down
Curtain on an Era, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 22, 2008, http:// www.bloomberg.com/ apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aoDmO_dOUSU&refer=home (It has been strongly suggested that
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank-holding companies to secure their capital
bases.).
110. Id.
111. The Dodd-Frank Act § 1101 amends § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent loans to
individual companies; however, it still allows the Federal Reserve Act to bail out an industry or mul-
tiple entities. Under the scenario posed, there seems to be little preventing a number of shadow banks
from adopting Goldman Sachs' strategy and "forcing" the Federal Reserve to use its emergency pow-
ers to extend loans to systemically important institutions. In fact, since the Federal Reserve's emer-
gency powers under § 13(3) can now only be used to bailout multiple entities, it may be more willing
to provide bailouts if several systemically important entities are endangered.
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2. The Collins Amendment
The Collins Amendment," 2 named after Senator Susan Collins, im-
poses, over time, leverage and risk-based standards currently applicable to
U.S. insured depository institutions on shadow banks. The Collins
Amendment also directs the appropriate federal banking supervisors, sub-
ject to Council recommendations, to develop capital requirements for all
insured depository institutions, depository institution holding companies,
and systemically important nonbank financial companies to address sys-
temically risky activities." 3
Under the Collins Amendment, the appropriate Federal banking agen-
cies are required to establish minimum leverage and risk-based capital
requirements to apply to insured depository institutions, bank and thrift
holding companies and systemically important nonbank financial compa-
nies.114 The minimum leverage capital and risk-based capital requirements
applicable to these institutions are subject to two floors: they must neither
be less than the generally applicable risk-based capital requirements and
the generally applicable leverage capital requirements, nor quantitatively
lower than the above requirements that were in effect for insured deposito-
ry institutions as of the date of enactment of the bill." 5
Davis Polk & Wardwell (Davis Polk) state:
The Collins Amendment defines "generally applicable risk-based
capital requirements""16 and "generally applicable leverage capital
requirements"'7 to mean the risk-based capital requirements and
minimum ratios of Tier1 capital to average total assets, respective-
ly, established by the appropriate Federal banking agencies to ap-
ply to insured depository institutions under the prompt corrective
action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, regardless
of total consolidated asset size or foreign financial exposure."'
Davis Polk noted that the leverage and risk-based capital requirements on
minimum risk-based capital ratios for Tier 1 are 6% to be considered
112. See SA 3879 (Collins Amendment).
113. Id.
114. See Collins Amendment SA 3879; see also Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Client Memoran-
dum: Collins Amendment-Minimum Capital and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 1 (Jun. 3, 2010),
http:// www.davispolk.com/ files/ Publication/b051fc39-71f-4b4c-9fdb-9b6934f4c2d9/ Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/ 07bafe6-3c02-424a-afeb-9e3636532e10/062810_collins-summary.pdf.
115. See Collins Amendment SA 3879.
116. Id. (The formula for "generally applicable risk-based capital requirements" must include the
required ratio of regulatory capital components (numerator) over risk-weighted assets (denominator).).
117. Id. (The formula for "generally applicable leverage capital requirements" must include the
required ratio of regulatory capital components (numerator) over average total assets (denominator).).
118. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 114, at 1.
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"well capitalized" and 4% to be considered "adequately capitalized. ""9
Bank holding companies and systemically important nonbank financial
companies are required to have a 10% total capital ratio in order to be
considered "well capitalized" and 8% to be considered "adequately capita-
lized. ,120
The Collins Amendment also makes important steps toward curbing
the abuses that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, but it similarly fails
to prohibit shadow banks from becoming too big to fail for three reasons.
First, the Collins Amendment does not expressly permit the U.S. banking
supervisors to amend capital adequacy guidelines in accordance with the
Basel 111121 standards, which will become effective by the end of 2012.122
"As a result, the Collins Amendment will create a statutory floor and U.S.
banking regulators will be able to implement Basel III only to the extent it
is consistent with the Collins Amendment floor."123 Davis Polk believes
this generally means that the more stringent Basel III capital rules could be
imposed on some shadow banks, with the possible exception of giving
effect to any countercyclical requirements contemplated by Basel III and
the bill.' 24 Davis Polk also summarized the difficult work of implementing
the Collins Amendment as follows:
U.S. banking supervisors will have the unenviable task of imple-
menting the intersection of Collins Amendment, Basel III, capital
standards under the systemic risk regime, the requirement else-
where in the bill to adopt countercyclical regulatory capital re-
quirements and the capital requirements that will apply to the sep-
arately capitalized subsidiaries required for certain derivatives ac-
tivities. However, at a minimum, the Collins Amendment will set
a floor for the U.S. banking supervisors in the ongoing Basel III
discussions. 125
This assessment makes clear the logistical difficulty associated with
implementing overlapping mandates-particularly ones that do not explicit-
ly coincide with one another-implying that some desirable Basel III regu-
119. Id. at3.
120. Id.
121. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http:// www.bis.org/ publ/ bcbs188.htm (The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the final Basel 111 rule in December 2010. It would
require 7% Tier 1 common equity (after accounting for a 2.5% buffer) and an additional systemic risk
capital surcharge for the largest institutions thought to be about 1 %.); See also Davis Polk & Ward-
well LLP, supra note 114, at 2.
122. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 114, at 2.
123. Id.
124. Id. (The summary provided by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP provides a very thorough break-
down of the Collins Amendment.).
125. Id. at 1.
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lations could conflict with the Collins amendment. As a result, the regula-
tory gap could allow undesirable capital levels untouched.
Second, it is not clear that systemically important shadow banks will
necessarily be subject to the Collins Amendment. Some shadow banks
will certainly be categorized as "systemically important nonbank financial
companies." If the Federal Reserve exempts any shadow banks that quali-
fy as "systemically important nonbank financial companies," then these
shadow banks could arguably evade the Collins Amendment.126 In order
to do so, the Federal Reserve must determine, after consulting with the
Council, that the requirements are not appropriate for a company because
of the company's activities or structure, and must apply other standards
that are supposed to result in similarly stringent controls. 127  A healthy
financial institution should be resilient enough to absorb large losses, but
many shadow banks could remain fragile if the Federal Reserve exempts
them from compliance with the Collins Amendment. 128  For example, by
March 2008, Bear Steams had $11.1 billion in tangible equity capital sup-
porting $395 billion in assets, a leverage ratio of more than 35-to-1,129
even a small loss of only 3.2% of the assets would obliterate stockholder
equity. The importance of liquidity has certainly been known since at
least 1984 when Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. failed
because its overnight lending grew costlier as lenders worried about its
viability. 130 An exemption, even the possibility of one, is anathema to the
126. See Margaret E. Tahyar, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Collins Amendment Sets Minimum
Capital Requirements, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION, http:// blogs.law.harvard.edu/ corpgov/ 2010/ 07/ 08/ collins-amendment-
sets-minimum-capital-requirements/ (July 8, 2010, 09:21 EST). This Part notes that while systemical-
ly important nonbank financial companies are subject to the Collins Amendment, in another part of the
bill, the Federal Reserve has the authority to exempt systemically important nonbank financial compa-
nies from application of the risk-based capital requirements and leverage requirements.
127. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 113(f)(1); see also Gelinas, supra note 99,
at 4.
128. See Tahyar, supra note 126. Tahyar notes that if the Federal Reserve makes this determina-
tion, Davis Polk does not believe that the Collins Amendment would apply to a systemically important
nonbank financial company, but the interaction of the two portions of the bill is not as clear as one
would hope. Tahyar further states that, "[aissuming the better reading applies, then hedge funds, asset
managers and systemically important insurance companies would have tailored, rather than bank-
centric, capital standards apply to them as the new regime is implemented." Id. This assumption
places a lot of faith in the Federal Reserve.
129. See Roddy Boyd, The last days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Mar. 31, 2008), avail-
able at http:// money.cnn.com/ 2008/ 03/ 28/ magazines/ fortune/ boyd-bear.fortune/.
130. See Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, at Al (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 09/ 26/
business/ 26wamu.html (The case of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company represents
another step in the institutionalization of the too big to fail concept. Continental experienced a fall in
its overall asset quality during the early 1980s. Difficulty acquiring loans, Mexico's default, and
plunging oil prices followed a period when the bank had aggressively pursued commercial lending.
Continental also held highly speculative oil and gas loans of Oklahoma's Penn Square Bank. Compli-
cating matters further, the Continental's funding mix was heavily dependent on large CDs and foreign
money markets, which meant its depositors were more risk-averse than average retail depositors in the
U.S.
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Dodd-Frank Act's stated purpose of ending the too big to fail concept.
Moreover, the lack of a capital cushion and over-leveraging contributed to
the need for a federal bailout of Bear Stearns and AIG and the failure of
Lehman Brothers. 1' Until the day before J. P. Morgan bought Bear
Stearns in March 2008, however, regulators said its capital buffer was
sufficient. 1312  The 2008 bailouts illustrate that in order for the Dodd-Frank
Act to discourage the moral hazard implicit to the too big to fail concept,
there should be no exceptions or discretion to the Collins Amendment's
leverage requirements, lest another massive collapse occurs.
Last, nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act protects shadow bank creditors,
beyond a shadow bank's equity capital, should it collapse. To the extent
that one of the rationales for the necessity of federal bailouts of too big to
fail shadow banks is that investors have a diminished incentive to closely
monitor and discipline shadow banks, because federal intervention exists
to mitigate the consequences of total collapse, the Dodd-Frank Act offers
little solace. When a large shadow bank's stability becomes precarious
and it suffers losses, market participants, especially creditors, become
suspicious that the shadow bank's assets are insufficient to cover its liabili-
ties. 133 Despite the breadth of the Dodd-Frank Act, it does not heighten
creditors' capacity to absorb large losses.' 34 To address this concern, the
Dodd-Frank Act requires a "study" on the effects of having contingent
convertible capital.' 35 Unless this study results in an explicit requirement
131. See Yalman Onaran, Lehman's Fuld Snubbed Risk Managers, Nerds Got Revenge: Books,
BLOOMBERG, at 2 (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http:// mobile.bloomberg.com/ news/ 2010-04-20/
lehman-s-fuld-snubbed-risk-managers-street-nerds-took-revenge-interview. Onaran interviewed Mark
T. Williams, a former risk manager in the 1990s after a stint as a Federal Reserve bank examiner.
Williams stated: "Liquidity is a big risk especially if you're relying very heavily on overnight borrow-
ing. Lehman was borrowing $180 billion a day on the repo market. Bear Stearns Cos. was knocking
on the repo door for about $50 billion every day, assuming it was going to be open for them." Id.
132. See SORKIN, supra note 5, at 17. Sorkin notes that during an interview with the Wall Street
Journal regarding rumors that Lehman Brothers would soon be joining Bear Stearns as a failed bank,
Dick Fuld, of Lehman Brothers, assured Wall Street Journal reporter Susanne Craig that between
Lehman's liquidity and the Federal Reserve's discount window that Lehman would not fail.
133. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF
2008 (W.W. Norton & Company 2009). Economist Paul Krugman described the run on the shadow
banking system as the core of what happened to cause the crisis. As the shadow banking system
expanded to rival, or even surpass, conventional banking in importance, politicians and government
officials should have realized that they were re-creating the kind of financial vulnerability that made
the Great Depression possible-and they should have responded by extending regulations and the
financial safety net to cover these new institutions. He referred to this lack of controls as "malign
neglect."
134. See Christopher Papagianis, Fixing Dodd-Frank: 3 Targets, SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 9, 2011,
available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/251777-fixing-dodd-frank-3-targets. Papagianis argues
that the Congress should replace the Dodd-Frank Act's "study" on contingent convertible capital with
an explicit requirement that a portion of large financial firms' senior debt automatically converts to
equity. Because there is "no plan to reform bankruptcy law, address the payment priority for deriva-
tives payables, increase the capacity of creditors to withstand losses, or otherwise introduce market
discipline for creditors to the largest banks, the only thing standing between taxpayers and another
bailout is bank's equity capital."
135. Id.
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that a portion of large shadow banks' senior debt automatically converts to
common equity capital, many creditors will be relatively unprotected, thus
exacerbating one of the major compulsions for federal bailouts.' 36 A man-
datory conversion ensures that another fimancial crisis triggers automatic
changes in a shadow bank's capital structure to resolve uncertainty about
negative equity through established rules of ownership priority-a kind of
"bail-in" instead of a federal bailout. 137 The Dodd-Frank Act already re-
duces leverage, but shifting some quantum of risk from equity to debt
holders is not only cost-neutral, but also reduces pressure to bailout failing
shadow banks.138 This change is also especially important now because of
the uncertainty created by the new "orderly resolution authority" and the
manner in which the rules governing this authority are being imple-
mented. 139  The alternative to this mandatory conversion is an ad hoc
TARP-like program whereby the federal government provides additional
equity capital to increase net assets, a politically and socially unpalatable
resort in light of the massive 2008 bailouts.
Shadow banks will predictably cite traditional pro-market fundamen-
talist arguments that mandatory equity conversions will increase the cost
of capital, yet this increased cost may be a necessary measure anti-market
intervention to reduce moral hazard in the shadow banking system. 140
3. Securitization
The proponents of the Dodd-Frank Act believed an essential cause of
the 2008 financial crisis was that shadow banks lacked risk in securitiza-
tion deals.'' Securitization is a process of turning non-marketable credit
instruments into marketable ones through pooling and creates credit wor-
thiness out of the theory of large numbers and the theory of averaging to
manage the risk of default by spreading it to a large pool.142 The major
aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act's securitization reform requires the securi-
tizer to retain 5% of risk; however, if originator retains some amount of
risk, the securitizer only retains the remaining risk (up to 5% total). 43
Risk retention also to apply to collateral debt obligations (CDOs), securi-
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (Mandatory equity conversion is theoretically cost neutral because it will lower the cost of
equity while raising the cost of convertible senior debt, leaving the total cost of capital unchanged.).
139. See infra, Part W.E., discussing uncertainty associated with interplay of § 13(3) of the Feder-
al Reserve Act.
140. Under this scheme, bank equity will be safer while reducing its cost, and encourage shadow
banks to hold less risky portfolios.
141. See Papagianis, supra note 135.
142. See SYLVIAN RAYNEs & ANN RUTLEDGE, THE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURED SECURITIES:
PRECISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION 103 (Paul Donnelly ed., 2003).
143. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 941 (which amends § 3(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a), accordingly).
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ties collateralized by CDOs, and similar instruments.'" The "risk reten-
tion types, forms[,] and amounts for commercial mortgages will be deter-
mined by [the appropriate] regulators, including permitting a third party
that purchases a first-loss position at issuance and who holds adequate
financial resources to back losses [which will] substitute for the risk reten-
tion requirement of the securitizer."' 45 "Regulations relating to credit risk
retention requirements will become effective one year from enactment for
residential mortgage assets and will become effective two years from
enactment for all other asset classes." 14 6  The Dodd-Frank Act also re-
quires asset-level disclosures, "including data with unique identifiers relat-
ing to loan brokers or originators, the nature and extent of the compensa-
tion of the broker or originator of the assets backing the security, and the
"'47amount of risk retention of the originator or securitizer of such assets."
In addition, the originator must aggregate "fulfilled and unfulfilled repur-
chase requests across all trusts . . . so investors can identify originators
with clear underwriting deficiencies." 148 The Dodd-Frank Act permits no
hedging or transfer of risk and requires securitizers to perform due dili-
gence analyses for investors. 1
49
The new securitization rules not only fail to address the root of the
2008 financial crisis, but also potentially exacerbate the risks associated
with risk retention. The proponents reasoned that shadow banks sold infe-
rior quality collateralized mortgage-backed securities based on low quality
loans to unsuspecting investors of the loans because the shadow banks did
not retain the risk of the securities. 50 In fact, shadow banks' use of com-
plex securitization forms like "asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
conduits, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and other variable interest
entities (VIEs)" failed to transfer the associated risks as intended.' 5 ' The
Dodd-Frank Act proponents' views are also at odds with the research of
several other scholars.'52 That research suggests that late stage securitiza-
144. Id.
145. Morrison & Foerster LLP, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet, 9 (2010), available at http://
www.mofo.com/ files/ Uploads/ Images/ SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. "In addition to the changes effected by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC recently released a
667 page rule amending Regulation AB's registration, disclosure, and reporting requirements for asset-
backed securities and other structured finance products." Id. at 8. The FDIC also proposed a rule
.amending its "securitization rule" safe harbor to require financial institutions to retain more of the
credit risk from securitizations . . . ." Id. Moreover, the Federal Accounting Standards Board revised
its accounting rules "relating to sales of financial assets and consolidation of certain off-balance sheet
entities . . . ." Id.
150. See Papagianis, supra note 135.
151. Id.
152. See Viral Acharya, Philipp Schnabl & Gustavo Suarez in Securitization Without Risk Transfer,
3-4 , 16-31 (NBER Working Paper No. 15730, 2010). Their main conclusion is that, somewhat
surprisingly, this crisis in the asset backed commercial paper market did not result, for the most part,
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tion markets concentrated financial risks in the banking sector, rather than
dispersing them, and failed to transfer risk to third parties.5 3  Such re-
search also indicates that these late stage securitization markets reduced
shadow banks' capital as well.154  Thus, the problem was inadequate capi-
tal regulation, rather than insufficient exposure to the credit risk of the
underlying loans. If anything, shadow banks had too much exposure.'55
By stipulating that securitizers hold 5 % of the risk, rather than increasing
their further increasing capital requirements, not only reduces liquidity,
but also syndication-the process by which multiple banks distribute large
loans to a number of companies or investors. 56 While this would reduce
liquidity risk, it would have the effect of raising the cost of capital and
conceivably make them less profitable. Assuming that a proper balance
between stability and economic growth requires diminished profits for the
sake of stability, this concession may be unpleasant but necessary.
Given that the Dodd-Frank Act does not fully address the effect that
over speculation has on debt securitization, the Dodd-Frank Act perpe-
tuates one of the major contributors of the 2008 financial crisis. Ultimate-
ly, the Dodd-Frank Act encourages moral hazard because it allows shadow
banks to escape important regulations, does not sufficiently constrain regu-
latory discretion, and does not sufficiently address and restrict the use of
over speculation to become "too big to fail." Allowing shadow banks to
engage in Minsky-evolution strongly encourages moral hazard because
shadow banks are still free to over-speculate and over-leverage. This pat-
tern of unsustainable growth will likely cause another financial crisis.
Therefore, 5 points will be assessed.
in losses being transferred to outside investors in asset backed commercial paper. Instead, the crisis
had a profoundly negative effect on commercial banks because banks had, in large part, insured out-
side investors in asset backed commercial paper by providing guarantees to conduits, which required
banks to pay off maturing asset backed commercial paper at par. Effectively, banks had used conduits
to securitize assets without transferring the risks to outside investors, contrary to the common under-
standing of securitization as a method for risk transfer. We establish this finding of securitization
without risk transfer using a hand-collected panel dataset on the universe of conduits from January
2001 to December 2009.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Papagianis, supra note 134. Papagianis states that "Igliven banks' cumulative losses on
structured securities, it seems more accurate to say banks had too much skin in the game and should
have dramatically reduced exposures," and that "[t]he problem was inadequate capital regulation and
disclosure rules, not insufficient exposure to the credit risk of the underlying loans." Id.
156. Id. Papagianis argues that by employing debt syndication, several banks, investment firms, or
other companies share both the profits and the risk of making a large loan. It is common to use debt
syndication when the loan required to fund a company is at least several million US dollars (USD). A
decline in the number of available lenders complicated debt syndication.
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B. Three-Dimensional Information Asymmetry
The LPMH model analyzes three dimensions of information asymme-
try. Generally, information asymmetry describes a situation where one
party to a transaction has more information than another party does.
157
Moral hazard is encouraged when the party with superior information can
use that information to take advantage of the party with inferior informa-
tion. 158
In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the information asymmetries
within shadow banks, between shadow banks and investors, between sha-
dow banks and the major rating agencies, and between shadow banks and
government regulators contributed to several large shadow banks' overall
risk prone investing."' Because the rating agencies profited from assign-
ing overly high ratings to investments, they had an incentive to mislead
investors to ensure continued patronage."6 This is particularly true given
the lag time between when an investment rating was assigned and when
investors realized the ratings were not reflective of the risk involved. 161
The shadow banks, in turn, were able to attract investors by leveraging
their lofty credit ratings. 162 Ultimately, given legislative changes, such as
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, this information
asymmetry forced government regulators to rely on the credit rating agen-
cies-not only for information, but also for de facto supervision of an oth-
erwise under-regulated derivatives market. Shadow banks must endeavor
to prevent endogenous information asymmetries, but the Dodd-Frank Act
must eliminate any exogenous ones. Thus, in order for the Dodd-Frank
Act to end the too big to fail concept it must close these three remaining
exogenous information asymmetries.
157. Investopedia defines asymmetric information as:
a situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared
to another. This often happens in transactions where the seller knows more than the buyer,
although the reverse can happen as well. Potentially, this could be a harmful situation be-
cause one party can take advantage of the other party's lack of knowledge.
INVESTOPEDIA, http:// www.investopedia.com/ terms/ a! asymmetricinformation.asp. When one takes
advantage of asymmetric information, it can lead to immoral behavior, or moral hazard. For example,
if someone has fire insurance they may be more likely to commit arson to reap the benefits of the
insurance.
158. Id.
159. See McCulley, supra note 2, at 2.
160. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS,
AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 77-78 (2008) (Morris notes that "the public may think of [the ratings
agencies] as detached arbiters of security quality", but they were, in fact, "building booming, diversi-
fied, high-margin businesses." Moreover, the ratings agencies gave high investment-grade ratings, in
short, not because their models were hostage to recent history, but because they strenuously ignored
it.).
161. See McCulley, supra note 2, at 2.
162. Id.
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1. First Dimension of Information Asymmetry: Government-Shadow
Bank Information Asymmetry
As stated above, the disjointed structure of U.S. regulatory agencies
was outdated for dealing with the complex and interwoven financial in-
struments currently used. Regulators generally lacked the adequate legal
authority and expertise to keep pace with the development of innovative
financial products and processes that they were supposed to regulate.163
This information asymmetry provided the opportunity to engage in risky
investing strategies because regulators typically lacked the necessary in-
formation to effectively guard against these new risks."6 While innovation
tends to outpace regulation, regulators put unjustified faith in credit-rating
agencies whose judgment was impaired by information asymmetry. 165
Usage of two financial instruments that exemplified the information
asymmetry in the shadow banking system were the CDO and credit default
swap (CDS). 16
163. See SORKIN, supra note 5, at 89. Despite undeniable mounting evidence of the risks of the
derivatives and the obvious fact that shadow banks were gorging on them, the Federal Reserve had
failed to gauge the severity of the situation. Id. Timothy Geithner, in fact, had repeatedly warned of
the catastrophe he helped "resolve" in many speeches. Id. at 65. Specifically, Geithner had warned
that the reliance on derivatives was making the financial industry more insecure, rather than less,
because of the potential of default inertia-defaults causing more defaults. Alan Greenspan, on the
other hand, did not share Geithner's skepticism on the use of derivatives. Id. Greenspan would later
admit that even he did not understand the mechanics behind the CDO:
"I've got some fairly heavy background in mathematics," he stated two years after he
stepped down from the Fed, "but some of the complexities of some of the instruments that
were going into CDOs bewilders me. I didn't understand what they were doing or how
they actually got the types of returns out of the mezzanines and the various tranches of the
CDO that they did. And I figured if I didn't understand it and I had access to a couple of
hundred PhDs, how the rest of the world is going to understand it sort of bewildered me.
Id. at 90. Further, Bernanke's analysis failed to take into account certain critical factors, primarily the
link between the housing market and the financial system through the ubiquitous use of derivatives. Id.
at 89. Between regulatory ignorance and failure to appraise the risk to the overall financial system, it
is clear that information asymmetries existed between the regulators and shadow banks regarding the
risks of CDOs and other derivatives. Id. Even as late as June 5, 2008, Bernanke had declared in a
speech "at this point, the troubles in the subprime sector seem unlikely to seriously spill over to the
broader economy or the financial system." Id. See also DAVID FABER, AND THEN THE ROOF CAVED
IN: How WALL STREET'S GREED AND STUPIDITY BROUGHT CAPITALISM TO ITS KNEES 95 (2009).
164. See SORKIN, supra note 5.
165. McCulley, supra note 2, at 2. (McCulley notes that "the rating agencies face an in-built prob-
lem of putting ratings on new innovations, because they have not had a chance to observe a historical
track record and monitor their performance over a full cycle.").
166. See Henry C.K. Liu, Too Big to Fail Versus Moral Hazard, ASIA TIMES, (Sept. 23, 2008),
available at http:// www.stwr.org/ global-financial-crisis/ too-big-to-fail-versus-moral-hazard.html.
Liu notes that the credit default swap related aspects of the 2008 financial crisis were also rooted in
AIG's trouble.
AIG's current trouble has its roots in a decision in the late 1980s to take over a group of
derivative specialists from Drexel Burnham Lambert, which went bankrupt due to specula-
tive losses in junk bonds. AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) wrote hundreds of billions of
dollars of derivatives, spilling over from AIG's insurance business. The business model
rested on leveraging AIG's low-cost of short-term funds to profit from high-yield long-term
investments. With its AAA credit rating, AG was an attractive counterparty for swap
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"The commercial paper market first burgeoned in the 1960s and for
four decades .... CDOs dominated the global credit market, until the
credit crisis of 2007. "167 The CDO relied on securitization.' 68 "When a
lender lends to a risky company, he bears the full risk of default."
169
However, if the lender invests in a CDO, he is lending to a pool of com-
panies whose theoretical default rate is coverable by the interest rate
spread.' 7 Securitization ceases to work during a liquidity crisis because
all exits from purportedly open markets are suddenly closed when all par-
ticipants move to the sell side and no buyers remain. 7' Moreover, "in the
US, where loan securitization is widespread, banks are tempted to push
risky loans by passing on the long-term risk to non-bank investors through
debt securitization."' 72 Because this game of financial "hot potato" focus-
es on reselling rather than monitoring, no one party has access to all the
information needed to make reasonable decisions, including regulators. 1
73
The second financial instrument was the credit-default swaps. Credit-
default swaps allow investors to hedge against securitized mortgage pools.
This type of contract "had been limited to the corporate bond market,
conventional home mortgages, and auto and credit card loans." 174 In June
2005, hedge funds began using a new standard contract to trade "bets on
home-equity securities backed by adjustable-rate loans to sub-prime bor-
rowers, not as a hedge strategy but as a profit center.' 7 5  Credit-default
swaps and CDOs were incredibly lucrative for some time, but the system
engendered a massive lack of accountability. 176  Titles I, VII, IX, and XI
of the Dodd-Frank Act are designed to close the information asymmetries
transactions. The Financial Products division, unregulated because it is not an insurance
entity nor a banking operation, fell between the regulatory crack. It expanded geometrical-
ly over the decades into areas such as credit-default swaps (CDS), which insure against
risks of default, as well as originating mortgages and consumer debt.
Id. AIG, "faced with $441 billion of exposure to credit-default swaps and other derivatives," faced
losses on these contracts and it drove AIG into a vicious downwards spiral needing ever more cash to
remain a top-rated counterparty. Id. Its interconnectedness "forced" the Federal Reserve to structure
a bailout for AIG.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 9.
172. See Liu, supra note 167, at 6.
173. See STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETs (2d ed. 2010),
Ch. 1 (Cecchetti states that when lending standards decline, the securitization process becomes a hot
potato because all of the actors want to pass along the risky loans.); see also Module on Chapter 11,
Screening, Monitoring and Free Riding, at 4, available at http:// highered.mcgraw-hill.com/ sites/
0070983992/ student view0/ updatemodules.htl.
174. See Liu, supra note 167, at 6.
175. Id.
176. Id. (Liu states that "[tihe disjointed structure of US regulatory agencies was outdated for
dealing with today's brave new world of complex and interwoven financial instruments[" and that
"[riegulators generally lack adequate mandates and expertise to keep pace with the supersonic speed of
innovative financial products and processes that they are suppose to regulate.").
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between regulators and shadow banks; however, they do not completely
eliminate the information asymmetry. Title I attempts to close the infor-
mation asymmetry between regulators and shadow banks by creating two
new agencies' 77 tasked with monitoring systemic risk and researching the
state of the economy. Title VII abrogates some of the exemptions granted
under §§ 206B and 206C of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to regulate the
credit default swaps and credit derivatives that contributed to the 2008
financial crisis. 7 8 Title IX focuses on "Credit Risk Retention" that would
require originators and securitizers of financial assets to retain a portion of
the credit risk of securitized financial assets. 179 In addition, the securitiza-
tion provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act set forth disclosure requirements
for the issuer and credit rating agencies that rate the issuer's securities.
180
Title XI of the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly states that the Federal Reserve's
responsibility is to "identify, measure,... monitor[,] . [and] mitigate
risks to the financial stability of the United States. "181
a. Title I-Financial Stability
Title I creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council ("the Coun-
cil") and the Office of Financial Research, 182 but, as argued below, it
closes neither the information asymmetry between shadow banks and rat-
ing agencies, nor the information asymmetry between shadow banks and
investors. Both the Council and the Office of Financial Research are un-
der the aegis of the Treasury Department. The Treasury Secretary is
Chair of the Council, and the Head of the Financial Research Office is a
Presidential appointment with Senate confirmation. The Council has three
objectives: (1) identifying risks to the fimancial stability of the United
States, (2) promoting market discipline, and (3) responding to emerging
threats to the stability of the financial markets. 8 3 At a minimum, the
Council must meet quarterly. 8"
The Council has very broad powers to monitor, investigate, and assess
any risks to the U.S. financial system. The Council is responsible for
collecting data from regulators and financial institutions to assess systemic
risks to the financial system, monitor the financial services marketplace,
and make general regulatory recommendations to affiliated agencies re-
177. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 111, 112, 152, and 153.
178. Id. at §§ 761, 762, 763, 766, and 768. Financial instruments have the meanings given to the
terms in the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § la).
179. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 941.
180. Id. at § 941.
181. Id. at §§ 165(i)(1)(B)(iii), 165(e)(2).
182. Id. at §§ 111, 152.
183. Id. at § 112(a)(1).
184. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 111 (e)(1).
Does the Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big To Fail?
flecting a broader consensus.' 85 The Council has the authority to collect
information from any State or Federal financial regulatory agency and may
direct the Office of Financial Research, which supports the work of the
Council, "to collect information from bank holding companies and non-
bank financial companies." 186 Moreover, the Council may also require the
Federal Reserve to assume an oversight position of certain financial insti-
tutions considered to pose a systemic risk to the financial system. 17 The
Council and the associated Office of Financial Research are to "facilitate
information sharing and coordination among the member agencies and
other Federal and State agencies regarding domestic financial services
policy development, rule-making, examinations, reporting requirements,
and enforcement actions."' 88 On a regular basis, the Council is required
to make a report to Congress describing the state of the financial sys-
tem.189 Each voting member of the Council is required to either affirm
that the Federal Government is taking all reasonable steps to assure finan-
cial stability and mitigate systemic risk or to describe needed additional
measures. 
190
Under specific circumstances, the Chairman of the Council, with the
concurrence of two-thirds voting members, may place non-bank financial
companies or domestic subsidiaries of international banks under the super-
vision of the Federal Reserve if it appears that these companies could pose
a threat to the financial stability of the U.S. 19 1 The Federal Reserve may
promulgate safe harbor regulations to exempt certain types of foreign
banks from regulation, with approval of the Council. 92 The Council may
also recommend that the primary regulatory agency provide stronger regu-
lation of a specific financial activity. 193 The Council then reports to Con-
gress on the implementation or failure to implement such recommenda-
tions.194 A potentially powerful tool in the Council's regulatory arsenal to
close the government-shadow bank information asymmetry is the Coun-
cil's ability to require any bank or non-bank financial institution with as-
sets over $50 billion to submit certified reports as to the following infor-
mation: (1) financial condition; (2) systems in place to monitor and control
any risks; (3) transactions with subsidiaries that are regulated banks; and
(4) the extent to which any of the institution's activities could have a po-
185. Id. at § 112(a)(2).
186. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(A).
187. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(H).
188. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(E).
189. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(N).
190. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 112(b)(1).
191. Id. at § 113(a)(1).
192. Id. at § 170(a).
193. Id. at § 120(a).
194. Id. at § 120(d).
20121
42 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 3:1
tential disruptive impact on financial markets or the overall financial sta-
bility of the country.19 5
Title I certainly attempts to close any conceivable information asym-
metry between the regulatory government agencies; however, it does not
close any of the three dimensions of information asymmetry that existed
before the 2008 financial meltdown. First, the Council, being under the
Treasury Department, is susceptible to a possible policy dissonance that
could obscure the scope and manner in which it collects data."9
Second, the bureaucratic difficulties associated with the Council when
deciding how to evaluate whether to label a non-bank "systematically im-
portant" according to the Dodd-Frank Act's factors create the possibility
that primary regulators may provincially horde information to protect cer-
tain shadow banks or the entire shadow banking industry. 197 In particular,
given the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department's decades long pro-
market policies and relationships,' 98 each may be prone to protect activities
or entities important to the financial system despite Title I's requirements.
Given that each voting member of the Council is required to either affirm
that the federal government is taking all reasonable steps to assure finan-
cial stability and mitigate systemic risk,'9 the question remains: What will
Congress do with this information? This question is only made more
complicated by the logistical difficulties associated with inter-agency coor-
dination, the time delay between concluding that the federal government
should take additional reasonable steps, implementation of those steps, and
195. Id. at § 116(a).
196. See infra Part Iv.C.
197. See Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Volcker Rule Tests New Systemic Risk Council,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 14, 2011), available at http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2011/ 01/ 14/
volcker-rule-tests-new-sy_n_809019.html. The council is expected to release a study by the time this
Article will be published recommending how to implement the Volcker rule. "Under Dodd-Frank, the
council must consider a series of factors including the institution's leverage and risk exposures in
determining whether to label a nonbank 'systemically important.'" Id. The article quotes Heather
Slavkin, a policy adviser for the country's largest labor federation the AFL-CIO, who stated that
"[rlegulators can't just focus on the institution, they have to look at the relationships the institution has
with other institutions." Id. This article also notes that supporters of the rule want regulators to send
banks a signal that their lobbying for weak implementation has been ineffective. "The council is also
expected to propose criteria that will be used to determine which nonbanks should be subject to addi-
tional scrutiny by the Fed and how a section of law concerning concentration limits should be imple-
mented." Id.
198. See GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES 24 (2008). Cooper states that "[tihe
US Federal Reserve does not appear to believe there can be an excessive level of money growth, credit
creation or asset inflation." Id. It does, however, believe, according to Cooper, that there can be an
unacceptably low level of all three. As a result, Cooper argues that
the Fed's monetary policy can be characterised as one in which policy is used aggressively
to prevent or reverse credit contraction or asset price deflation, but is not used to prevent
credit expansion or asset inflation. This philosophy has been encapsulated by the idea that
asset bubbles cannot be identified until after they burst, and it is only then that the central
banks can and should take action.
Id.
199. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 112(b)(1).
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measurement of any expected outcome.2° Unless there is an efficient and
objective way to collect data, interpret the information, and report these
findings, this provision could prove difficult to actualize.
Third, Title I assigns the onus for financial reporting to the shadow
banks without stipulating the manner in which such information is re-
ported, which offers the opportunity for "creative" or even distortive re-
porting, specifically, given the questions raised by the Lehman Brothers
use of "Repo 105" transactions, 0 l which were recorded as sales rather
than secured borrowings.02 Given that the Council is required to review
and submit comments to the SEC and any standard-setting body with re-
spect to an existing or proposed accounting principle, standard, or proce-
dure,2 3 it is odd that the Dodd-Frank Act imposes no clear rules on the
entities it regulates with regard to reporting standards so that "creative"
accounting cannot mask losses. In fact, when traditionally requested to
provide information as to their financial health, shadow banks have rou-
tinely provided misleading or untrue information reflecting stability where
none existed. 2°4  A report by Frank Partnoy and former SEC Chief Ac-
countant Lynn Turner concluded that abusive off-balance sheet accounting
was a major cause of the financial crisis.2 5 Their report found that ac-
200. See Jeffrey Owen Herzog, Senate Passes Dodd-Frank Act Financial Reform Headed to Presi-
dent for Signature, U.S. BANKING WATCH, July 15, 2010, available at
http://www.texasborderbusiness.com/News/1007945 (Herzog notes that although the Dodd-Frank Act
entails a number of notable changes for the banking system, a considerable amount of the legislation
defers to regulators for study, definition, and implementation of the legislative language, suggesting it
will take many months before the final regulatory picture is in place.).
201. See Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner's Report, JENNER &
BLOCK, http:// lehmanreport.jenner.com/. According to the Lehman Brothers examiner's report
prepared during Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers took advantage of accounting rules
to record temporarily a loan as a sale. By carefully timing this transaction just before the release of its
quarterly financial report, it was able to deceive the public and regulators into believing it was ade-
quately capitalized. The federal bankruptcy court examiner found colorable claims against Lehman's
senior officers who oversaw and certified the firm's misleading financial statements. Although the
repurchase transactions engaged in by the firm may not have been inherently improper, the federal
bankruptcy court examiner found a colorable claim that their sole function as employed by Lehman
was balance sheet manipulation.
202. Id. (The authors note that the Dodd-Frank Act has no provisions on financial reporting or
accounting-neither for financial firms nor nonfinancial finns, despite the questions raised in March
by the Lehman Brothers Examiner's Report about Lehman Brothers' use of "Repo 105" transactions,
which were accounted for as sales rather than secured borrowings.); see also Stephen Barlas, The
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, STRATEGIC FINANCE BULLETIN, at 23, available at http://
www.imanet.org/ PDFs/ Public/ SF/ 2010_09/ 09_2010_sfbulletin.pdf ("The Lehman bankruptcy was
the most expensive bust of all time, so you might have assumed that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) might have tightened up requirements in that cor-
ner of off-balance-sheet accounting.").
203. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 112(a)(2)(L).
204. See supra note 203. The Lehman Brothers debacle is a prime example of such data manipula-
tion.
205. Jeff Partnoy & Lynn Turner, Bring Transparency To Off-Balance Sheet Accounting, Make
Markets Be Markets, 2009 at 85, available at http:// www.makemarketsbemarkets.org/ report/ Ma-
keMarketsBeMarkets.pdf. Partnoy and Turner note:
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counting abuses caused regulatory opacity by removing transparency from
investors, markets, and regulators.' Moreover, Title I allows, but does
not require, the Council to compel any bank or non-bank financial institu-
tion with assets over $50 billion to submit certified reports on its overall
health, risk management, and the extent to which any of the institution's
activities could have a potential disruptive impact on financial markets or
the overall financial stability of the country." 7 Moreover, as regulators
implement the Dodd-Frank Act, Senators argue that complete disclosure of
all off-balance sheet activities is necessary for the largest and most inter-
connected shadow banks.2"8 Without such disclosure, they argue that ef-
Abusive off-balance sheet accounting was a major cause of the financial crisis. These
abuses triggered a daisy chain of dysfunctional decision-making by removing transparency
from investors, markets, and regulators. Off-balance sheet accounting facilitated the spread
of the bad loans, securitizations, and derivative transactions that brought the financial sys-
tem to the brink of collapse ....
•.. Banks in particular have become predisposed to narrow the size of their balance sheets,
because investors and regulators use the balance sheet as an anchor in their assessment of
risk. Banks use financial engineering to make it appear they are better capitalized and less
risky than they really are....
Off-balance sheet problems have recurred throughout history, with a similar progression.
Initially, balance sheets are relatively transparent and off-balance sheet liabilities are mi-
nimal or zero. .... Complex institutions increase their use of off-shore subsidiaries and
swap transactions to avoid disclosing liabilities, as they did during both the 1920s and the
2000s. Over time, the exceptions eat away at the foundations of financial statements, and
the perception of the riskiness of large institutions becomes disconnected from reality.
Without transparency, investors and regulators can no longer accurately assess risk. Final-
ly, the entire edifice collapses....
... Because off-balance sheet assets and liabilities were not included in financial state-
ments, banks took leveraged positions that were hidden from regulators and investors. Be-
cause bank liabilities used to finance assets were not transparent, the financial markets
could not effectively discipline banks that used derivatives and complex financial engineer-
ing to take excessive risks. Even if there are legitimate exceptions for items that might not
belong on the balance sheet, those exceptions should not swallow the rule. Yet that is what
has happened.
Id.
206. Id.
207. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 116(a) ("Subject to subsection (b), the Council,
acting through the Office of Financial Research, may require a bank holding company with total con-
solidated assets of $50,000,000,000 or greater or a nonbank financial company supervised by the
Board of Governors, and any subsidiary thereof, to submit certified reports to keep the Council in-
formed.").
208. James Hamilton, Key Senators Urge the SEC to Adopt Regulations Enhancing Off-Balance
Sheet Disclosures, JIM HAMILTON'S WORLD OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Aug. 18, 2010, 6:63 PM)
http:// jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/ 2010/ 08/ key-senators-urge-sec-to-adopt.html. Senators Ro-
bert Menendez, Ted Kaufman, Barbara Boxer, Diane Feinstein, Carl Levin, and Sherrod Brown have:
urged the SEC to use its existing authority under Sarbanes-Oxley to require that companies
write detailed descriptions of all their off-balance sheet activities in their annual Form 10-K
reports and not just descriptions of those activities that are reasonably likely to affect the
firm's financial condition, as the regulations currently state. In a letter to SEC Chair Mary
Schapiro, the senators also urged the Commission to require companies to explicitly justify
why they have not brought those liabilities onto the balance sheet. As regulators implement
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, noted the senators, the
complete disclosure of all off-balance sheet activities is particularly crucial for the largest
and most interconnected companies, including both banks and non-banks. Without such
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fective implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act will be almost impossible,
because regulators will have no reliable basis upon which to set appropri-
ate capital and leverage requirements.2° It is difficult to imagine that any
shadow bank will present an objective assessment of its health or any of its
activities that cause concern unless specific reporting requirements are
implemented.
Fourth, the Dodd-Frank Act places the Council in the noble, but diffi-
cult, position of having to anticipate the negative consequences of new
financial instruments and other financial innovations. 210  No matter the
context--doping scandals or financial crises-innovation always outpaces
regulation, if only temporarily. 2,,
Fifth, the Council's power is limited to making recommendations, and
therefore has little if any emergency power.2t 2 The use and ultimate of
effect of its studies and recommendations are yet to be determined.
Moreover, the agency refusing to implement the Council's recommenda-
disclosure, they emphasized, it will be almost impossible for regulators to set appropriate
capital and leverage requirements under Dodd-Frank and for investors and counterparties to
make wise decisions about where to put their money.
Id. See also Preventing Another Lehman: Mendez and Colleagues Urge S.E.C. to Require Better
Corporate Accounting Disclosure, (Aug. 6, 2010), http:// menendez.senate.gov/ newsroom/press/
release/ ?id=5d15ad41-3196-432c-919a-3a8d2e0df3eb (see text of letter from Senators Robert Menen-
dez, Ted Kaufman, Barbara Boxer, Diane Feinstein, Carl Levin, and Sherrod Brown to Sen. Mary L.
Schapiro).
209. See Preventing Another Lehman, supra note 208.
210. See Edward J. Kane, The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating The Safety-Net Conse-
quences Of Regulation-Induced Innovation, 1, 7 (2009), available at http:// ssrn.com/ ab-
stract = 1507802. Kane argues that:
As national markets became highly connected and products developed more potential substi-
tutes, compartmentalization strategies quickly became riddled with loopholes. Regulators
and legislatures in different jurisdictions competed eagerly with one another for regulatory
domain and seemed all too willing to accept as tribute a mere fraction of the incremental
value that the loopholes they create generate for the firms that use them....
... Much of this variation is driven by an irreconcilable tension between adjustments in
regulation or supervision and loophole-seeking avoidance activity undertaken to make regu-
latory interference less burdensome. Regulation begets avoidance activity, and avoidance
eventually begets some form of re-regulation. Regulatory adjustments, problems, and mar-
ket events unfold and mutate as part of alternating sequences in which either regulation
spawns new forms of avoidance (RA sequences) or the growing effectiveness of particular
avoidance activities finally results in a threshold level of avoidance activity (A*) that calls
forth innovative re-regulation (A*R sequences). Adapting regulatory protocols to innova-
tive avoidance activity is an endless task. Each and every piece of regulatory re-
engineering kicks off a series of RAA*R sequences. Inevitably, the range, size, and speed
of regulation-induced innovation outpaces the vision and disciplinary powers that regulatory
authorities can bring to bear....
Id.
211. Id.
212. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 112(a)(2)(K). This section requires the Council
"make recommendations to primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards
and safeguards for financial activities or practices that could create or increase risks of significant
liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank holding companies, nonbank financial
companies, and United States financial markets." Id. (emphasis added).
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tion is required to provide its rationale; however, it is still free to refuse213
on plausible, albeit unwise grounds.
As of January 18, 2011, the Financial Stability Oversight Council met
for the third time, but it was the first time the Council discussed how to
implement the Dodd-Frank Act. 214  The Dodd-Frank Act already requires
the Council to consider a series of factors, including the institution's leve-
rage and risk exposures in determining whether to label a nonbank "sys-
tematically important." 215  The criteria proposed did not require "much
more detail than what is already outlined" in Title I of the Dodd-Frank
Act.
2 16
213. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 115(a)(1). This section states the following:
[iln order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States that
could arise from the material financial distress, failure, or ongoing activities of large, inter-
connected financial institutions, the Council may make recomnendations to the Board of
Governors concerning the establishment and refinement of prudential standards and report-
ing and disclosure requirements applicable to nonbank financial companies supervised by
the Board of Governors and large, interconnected bank holding companies ....
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasis places the power to recommend with the Council, but § 115
gives no emergency powers to the Council.
214. See Clarke & Younglai, supra note 197 (The Council considered the implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Act particularly addressing "how to put into a practice a ban on banks trading with their
own capital for profit in securities, derivatives and certain other financial instruments" (the Volcker
Rule). Also, the Council discussed additional "criteria that will be used to determine which nonbanks
should be subject to additional scrutiny by the Fed . . . ." Id. Clarke and Younglai note that the
Volcker Rule "will challenge the regulators to prove they can avoid the type of turf fights that have
divided them in the past and produce the single regulatory vision imagined by the law." Id. They
further note that those familiar with the plan maintain, "[tIhe criteria, if proposed, is not expected to
provide much more detail than what is already outlined in Dodd-Frank." Id.
215. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 113(a)(2). The Council must consider the following
factors in making a determination under that an institution should be shall be subject to prudential
standards:
(A) the extent of the leverage of the company; (B) the extent and nature of the off-balance-
sheet exposures of the company; (C) the extent and nature of the transactions and relation-
ships of the company with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant
bank holding companies; (D) the importance of the company as a source of credit for
households, businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the
United States financial system; (E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for
low-income, minority, or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities; (F) the extent to
which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the extent to which own-
ership of assets under management is diffuse; (G) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentra-
tion, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company; (H) the degree to which
the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary financial regulatory agencies; (I)
the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company; (J) the amount and types of
the liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on short-term funding; and
(K) any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate.
Id.
216. Clarke & Younglai, supra note 197.
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b. Title VII- Wall Street Transparency and Accountability
Title VII addresses the credit-default swaps and credit derivatives that
contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.21 7 On a broader level, the Dodd-
Frank Act encourages swaps, which were traditionally traded over the
counter, to be traded through exchanges or clearinghouses.218 The Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC both regulate
swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act, but the SEC has authority over "securi-
ty-based swaps." 2 9 The regulators are required to consult with each other
before implementing any rule-making or issuing orders regarding several
different types of security swaps .22 The Act also repeals the exemptions
for security-based swaps under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 22' The
CFTC and SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, are responsible
for further defining swap-related terms.22 2 The prohibition on federal as-
217. See Byungkwon Lim & Emilie T. Hsu, Derivatives Regulations: Central Clearing and Trans-
parency, 4 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REPORT, 16 (Jul. 2010), available at
http:// www.debevoise.com/ files/ Publication/ dfblcd97-8958-4ab4-ac27-5bac49a60af9/ Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/ 76cd95aa-0e92-45c3-817b-82a4108ee697/ FIReportJuly2OlO.pdf.
218. See id. (Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the "Wall Street Transparency and Accountability
Act" (Title VII) "intends to lay the foundation of a new regulatory system for the U.S. market for
swaps and other over the- counter derivatives. Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
focus of derivatives regulation had been mostly on the prevention of fraudulent and manipulative
practices in futures and securities markets and on the preservation of the financial soundness of regu-
lated financial institutions such as banks and broker-dealers. . . ."). Under the new Title VII regime,
all derivatives transactions and all entities that enter into them could be subject to potential regulations,
and the goal of the regulatory framework is to promote the stability of the entire financial system and
further transparency and competition in the derivatives market. Id.
219. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 712(a)(1). That section states:
Before commencing any rulemaking or issuing an order regarding swaps, swap dealers,
major swap participants, swap data repositories, derivative clearing organizations with re-
gard to swaps, persons associated with a swap dealer or major swap participant, eligible
contract participants, or swap execution facilities pursuant to this subtitle, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission shall consult and coordinate to the extent possible with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the prudential regulators for the purposes of as-
suring regulatory consistency and comparability, to the extent possible.
Id.
220. See generally Kane, supra note 210.
221. The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 761,762, 763, 766 (These sections repeal the
provisions enacted under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (§§ 206B and 206C) and the Commodity Fu-
tures Modernization Act of 2000 that prohibited the SEC from regulating security-based swaps beyond
the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Act and of the Exchange Act, and the
insider trading provisions of the Exchange Act, and adds regulation of security-based swaps under the
Securities Act and under the Exchange Act.); see also Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP &
Affiliates, The Dodd-Frank Act: Commentary and Insights, (2010) 1, 55, available at http://
www.skadden.com/ Cimages/ siteFile! SkaddenInsightsSpecialEditionDodd-FrankActI .pdf.
222. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, § 712(d)(1) (requiring the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, in consultation with the Board of Gover-
nors, to further define the terms "swap"; "security-based swap"; "swap dealer"; "security-based swap
dealer"; "major swap participant"; "major security-based swap participant"; "eligible contract partici-
pant"; and "security-based swap agreement" in § la(47)(A)(v) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7
U.S.C. § la(47)(A)(v)) and § 3(a)(78) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(78)).
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sistance to any "swaps entity" only goes into effect at the end of a transi-
tion period that could be as long as five years, which allows for time to
sow the seeds for financial disaster in the interim. 223  Given the role that
misuse and under-regulation played in the 2008 financial crisis, these fi-
nancial and economic regulations attempt to strike the proper balance be-
tween pro-market fundamentalism and anti-market interventionism; how-
ever, this section could be interpreted to create an information asymmetry
between regulators and shadow banks if a swap does not require clear-
ing. 224 Any capital and margin requirements imposed by subsequent rule-
making could be of limited utility given the nature of financial innovation.
Ultimately, Titles I and VII make important strides in closing the in-
formation asymmetry between government regulators, but, in attempting
to close the asymmetries between regulators, it leaves open important in-
formation asymmetries between the government regulators and shadow
banks. Therefore, 2 points will be assessed.
2. Second Dimension Information Asymmetry: Investor-Shadow Bank
Information Asymmetry
Buried deep within the free market theory is the unstated assumption
that investors always have the necessary information with which to calcu-
late the correct price of an asset. If this assumption turns out to be false,
and investors lack the necessary information to make informed judgments
about asset prices and, ultimately their investments, or worse still if they
receive misleading information, then it becomes possible for asset price
223. See Robert M. Kurucza, United States: The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act
of 2010: Regulation of Derivatives Markets-Part 1, MONDAQ, Aug. 3, 2010, available at http://
www.mondaq.com/ unitedstates/ article.asp?articleid=106944 (Kurucza notes that the prohibition
against federal assistance will become effective two years after the effective date of the Derivatives
Act, which will take effect 360 days after the Enactment Date.); see Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47,
at §§ 754, 774 (Banking entities may have up to twenty-four months to spin off a "swaps entity" as
determined by the applicable Prudential Regulator (after consultation with the SEC or the CFTC, as
applicable). Such twenty-four-month transition periods may be further extended an additional year for
potentially up to five to six years elapsing before a banking entity must comply with the push-out
rule.).
224. Skadden et al., supra note 221, at 64. According to § 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFTC occupies a gate-keeping role in determining which swaps must be cleared. Id. The CFTC may
review swaps by two alternative means. First, it may review a swap or group, category, type or class
of swaps to determine whether it should be required to be cleared on its own initiative. Id.
The CFTC must consider several broad factors in making its decision: (1) the existence of
significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity and adequate pricing data; (2)
the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources and credit
infrastructure to clear the contract; (3) the effect on mitigation of systematic risk; and (4)
the effect on competition; and the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the
insolvency of the derivatives clearing organization or its members.
Regardless of these factors, it remains difficult to predict what swaps will be subject to
the requirement.
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bubbles to form.225 Thus, this information asymmetry, in conjunction with
the other LPMH model factors, contributes to the shadow banking sys-
tem's belief that the true extent of the risky behavior never reaches their
investors. Hiding the true extent of the risks associated with their invest-
ments perversely strengthens the argument that some shadow banks are too
big to fail because investors remain unaware that they face tremendous
losses until the specter of that shadow bank's collapse seems imminent. 26
Moreover, because there is a perception that the Federal Reserve is un-
derwriting all bank-like institutions equally,227 there is no incentive for
investors to investigate the practices of the shadow banks with whom they
invest.
Title IX, Subtitle D of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled "Investor Protec-
tions and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities Improvements to
the Asset-Backed Securitization Process" attempts to rectify the informa-
tion asymmetry between investors and shadow banks by revamping the
SEC, credit rating agencies, and the relationships between investors.
228
Title IX is deficient in several ways. First, the SEC is empowered to
promulgate a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers that provide persona-
lized investment services, but it is not required to do so. 229  Second, noth-
ing in the Dodd-Frank Act prevents shadow banks from short-circuiting
capital markets by using illusory accounting tricks to mislead investors and
creditors. 23" As the financial markets attempt to recover from the latest
225. See COOPER, supra note 200, at 112. Cooper argues that
within the Efficient Market Hypothesis is the unstated assumption that investors always
have to hand the necessary information with which to calculate the correct price of an asset.
If this assumption turns out to be false and investors are sometimes denied the necessary in-
formation to make informed judgments about asset prices, or worse still if they are given
misleading information, then it becomes possible for asset price bubbles to form.
Id.
226. See Barlas, supra note 202.
227. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 70-87. Cooper argues that there is a perception that the
Federal Reserve is underwriting all banks equally, and thus, there is no incentive for investors to
investigate the practices of the banks with whom they invest. The only interest and investor has is
seeking the highest rate of return. Typically, the banks offering the highest rates of return were the
ones taking the most risk with investors' money.
228. Section 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act states, in pertinent part, that the Committee shall:
advise and consult with the Commission on (i) regulatory priorities of the Commission; (ii)
issues relating to the regulation of securities products, trading strategies, and fee structures,
and the effectiveness of disclosure; (iii) initiatives to protect investor interest; and (iv) initi-
atives to promote investor confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.
Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 911.
229. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 913(f). This section states, in pertinent part:
the Commission may commence a rulemaking, as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest and for the protection of retail customers (and such other customers as the Commis-
sion may by rule provide), to address the legal or regulatory standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or dealers, and persons asso-
ciated with investment advisers for providing personalized investment advice about securi-
ties to such retail customers.
Id. (emphasis added).
230. See Barlas, supra note 202.
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meltdown, the SEC has faced congressional pressure to implement new
rules that will inhibit shadow banks' ability to mislead investors and credi-
tors in the future.2 31 The SEC exists to filter full and accurate information
about companies' finances so investors and creditors can effectively allo-
cate capital.232 Despite its mandate, six Democratic senators have urged
the SEC to use its existing authority under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to re-
quire that companies write detailed descriptions of all of their off-balance
sheet activities in their annual Form 10-K reports.3 3  These off-balance
sheet accounting arrangements allowed shadow banks to hide trillions of
dollars in obligations from regulators.234 For example, the senators noted
that Citigroup reportedly kept $1.1 trillion worth of assets off its books in
various financing vehicles and trusts that used to handle mortgage-backed
securities and issue short-term debt.235 It never reasonably disclosed the
risks posed by their off-balance sheet activities to investors. 236  Had the
shadow banks disclosed the associated risks, these senators argued that
investors and creditors might have made better decisions.237 In order to
prevent this from happening in the future, "the Senators urged the SEC to
require the disclosure of period end and daily average leverage ratios in
quarterly and annual reports. . . . 'Rather than relying on carefully-staged
quarterly and annual snapshots,"' the senators argued that "'investors and
creditors should have access to a complete . . . company's financial situa-
tion.'"238 This would provide better information to investors and creditors
231. See Hamilton, supra note 208 (These six senators also want to aggressively investigate and
prosecute past misconduct.).
232. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC
PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION,
http:// sec.gov/ about/ whatwedo.shtml ("The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital forma-
tion.").
233. See Preventing Another Lehman, supra note 208.
234. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C.
235. See Bradley Keoun, Citigroup's $1.1 Trillion of Mysterious Assets Shadows Earnings,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 14, 2008), available at http:// www.bloomberg.com/ apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alliVM3tG3al. At an investor presentation in May 2008, Keoun noted
that
... Citigroup Inc. Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit said that shrinking the bank's
$2.2 trillion balance sheet, the biggest in the U.S., was a cornerstone of his turnaround
plan.
Nowhere mentioned in the accompanying 66-page handout were the additional $1.1
trillion of assets that New York-based Citigroup keeps off its books: trusts to sell mortgage-
backed securities, financing vehicles to issue short-term debt and collateralized debt obliga-
tions, or CDOs, to repackage bonds.
Id.
236. Id.
237. See Skadden et al., supra note 221.
238. Bill Swindell, SEC Asked to Tighten Reporting Requirements, NATIONALJOURNAL (Aug. 13,
2010), available at http:/ / green.lib.udel.edul webarchives/ kauftman.senate.gov/ press/ in the news/
news/ -id=7b5a664b-5056-9502-5d4b-b5f833d1835b.htm.
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to assist their decision-making processes and help significantly reduce the
information asymmetry between investors and shadow banks.
Moreover, Lehman Brothers' use of the "repo 105" is paradigmatic of
the information asymmetry shadow banks opportunistically used to main-
tain superior information over investors as well as regulators. Strong evi-
dence indicates that Lehman Brothers actively concealed information ne-
cessary for the credit rating agencies to make informed decisions as to
what ratings to assign.239 Investors ultimately relied on these ratings in
deciding whether to invest in Lehman Brothers. A March 2010 report by
the court-appointed examiner indicated that Lehman executives regularly
used cosmetic accounting tricks at the end of each quarter to bolster its
financial outlook.2' This practice was a type of repurchase agreement that
temporarily removed securities from the company's balance sheet. How-
ever, unlike typical repurchase agreements, Lehman Brothers described
these deals as the sale of securities and created "a materially misleading
picture of the firm's financial condition in late 2007 and 2008. "241  This
report revealed that Lehman Brothers used an accounting procedure
termed "repo 105" to exchange temporarily $50 billion of assets into cash
just before publishing its financial statements.242 Distorting its financial
state could reasonably lead investors into believing that Lehman Brothers'
capital reserves were greater than they were, that their losses were not as
great, and that its overall financial health was better than it actually was.
Because of the effects of this information asymmetry and the remaining
factors, Lehman Brothers was nearly able to extract a bailout from the
Federal Reserve and Treasury Department.243
239. See Examiner's Report Section IIL.A.4: Repo 105 732, 853, available at http:// jenner.coml
lehmani VOLUME%203.pdf ("When senior management gave balance sheet targets to business divi-
sions within Lehman, the orders were given so that the firm could manage its business towards a target
net leverage ratio with an eye toward rating agencies and the firm's public disclosures." (citing Ex-
aminer's Interview of Joseph Gentile, Oct. 21, 2009, at 5)). Gentile stated that Lehman as a firm
managed its entire business towards a target net leverage ratio. Id. at n.3278; see also Id. at n.3278
(citing Examiner's Interview of Ian T. Lowitt, Oct. 28, 2009, at 10 (stating that businesses within
Lehman managed their respective businesses toward balance sheet targets.)).
240. See Examiner's Report, supra note 239, at 853-54.
241. See Mark Trumbull, Lehman Bros. Used Accounting Trick Amid Financial Crisis-and Earli-
er, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 1, 1 (2010), available at http:// www.csmonitor.com/ USA/ 2010/
0312/ Lehman-Bros.-used-accounting-trick-amid-financial-crisis-and-earlier (Trumbull notes that the
court-appointed examiner found that Lehman Brothers used the "Repo 105" repurchase agreement, an
unusual accounting gimmick, to make its finances appear more robust.).
242. See Examiner's Report, supra note 239, at 873 (The report notes that "the total amount of
Repo 105 transactions at the end of first quarter (February) 2008 was approximately $49 billion, the
intra-quarter dip as of April 30, 2008 was approximately $24.7 billion and the quarter-end amount for
second quarter (May) 2008 was approximately $50.38 billion.").
243. See SORKIN, supra note 5, at 218. Sorkin notes that the primary reasons for the ultimate
denial of a bailout for Lehman Brothers was not that it was not considered to be "too big to fail;"
rather, a lack of legal authority to affect any of Lehman's non-U.S. units, concerns of political back-
lash given the recent Bear Stearns bailout, and fear of accusation of nepotism prevented the govern-
ment interventionism witnessed in previous bailouts. Id. There was also another reason that made a
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Therefore, Title IX still leaves open critical information asymmetries
between investors and shadow banks, and 2 points will be assessed.
3. Third Dimension Information Asymmetry: Credit Rating
Agency-Shadow Bank Information Asymmetry
Credit rating agencies purport to safeguard investors by providing in-
vestment information to determine the risk of securities .2 4 In the lead up
to the 2008 financial crisis, shadow banks required some seal of approval
so that providers of short-dated funding could convince themselves that
their investments "were de facto 'just as good' as deposits at banks with
access to the government's liquidity safety nets."245 Conveniently, the
credit rating agencies acted cooperatively and provided such seals of ap-
proval. 6 Moreover, these credit rating agencies lacked any incentive to
provide accurate information because they were paid handsomely by the
shadow banks. Accordingly, "Moody's and [Standard & Poor's] (S&P)
would put an A-i/P-i rating on the commercial paper, which in turn
would be bought by money market funds." 247  The credit rating agencies
were tasked with rating new financial innovations for which there was no
historical track record.248 In other words, these credit rating agencies
could not observe their performance over a full cycle.2 49 During the late
1980s and early 1990s, shadow bankers and issuers created "a range of
highly rated asset-backed transactions and collateralized bond obligations,"
and credit rating agencies, specifically S&P and Moody's, became more
profitable and also began providing ratings of transactions designed to
achieve particular ratings. 25" By the early 2000s, rating agency models,
bailout of Lehman politically unpalatable: the intersection between government and private relations.
Id. at 284. Then-President "Bush's brother, Jeb, the former governor of Florida, worked as an advis-
er to Lehman's private equity business;" President Bush's cousin, George H. Walker, was on Leh-
man's executive committee; and Paulson's brother, Richard, worked for Lehman. Id. Fearful of even
the appearance of nepotism made bailing Lehman Brothers out unlikely. Id. Thus, Lehman found
itself without government assistance, no buyer, and no LTCM-like solution; the only resort was an
orderly Bankruptcy. Id.
244. See Standard & Poor's Rating Services, http:// www.standardandpoors.com/ about-sp/ main/
en! us (Standard & Poor's mission statement states, in pertinent part: "Today Standard & Poor's
strives to provide investors who want to make better informed investment decisions with market intel-
ligence in the form of credit ratings, indices, investment research and risk evaluations and solu-
tions."); see Moody's, http:// www.moodys.coml Pages/ atc.aspx (Moody's mission statement states,
in pertinent part: "Moody's is an essential component of the global capital markets, providing credit
ratings, research, tools and analysis that contribute to transparent and integrated financial markets.").
245. See McCulley, supra note 2, at 2.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Jeff Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis,
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 27, 2009) 1, 3, available at http:// ssrn.com/
abstract= 1427167 (As the regulatory reliance on credit ratings agencies increased, Partnoy notes that
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and assumptions about historical default, recovery, and correlation, sug-
gested that extant mortgage-backed securities could be repackaged and
resold in ways that would outperform, not only the mortgage-backed se-
curities themselves, but also other comparably rated securities.251 Since
these credit rating agencies faced either no risk, or, at least, a deferred
loss from inaccurate ratings, while the potential gains from inaccurate rat-
ings were immediate and increased over time, they had every incentive to
exacerbate any information asymmetry between themselves and the inves-
tors.252 If the credit rating agencies had used accurate models and assump-
tions, then it is reasonable to believe that investors would have responded
by refusing to invest in these securities that carried risk beyond some de-
gree. 253  Thus, these credit rating agencies had incentive to distort the data
used for their models.
By using models and data that distorted the actual risk of the underly-
ing mortgages, including risks that already were included in the price of
those securities in the market for mortgage-backed securities,254 credit
rating agencies could ensure their fees by issuing attractive ratings and still
generate attractive yields for purchasers.255 Credit rating agency assump-
tions and models did not accurately capture the risk associated with
"second-level" securitizations. 256  Default rate assumptions were derived
the ratings agencies profited from assigning overly high ratings to investments since they had an incen-
tive to mislead investors to ensure continued patronage. This is particularly true given the lag time
between assigning a rating and when investors realized that the ratings that credit agencies assigned
were not reflective of the risk involved.).
251. Id. at 9. Partnoy writes:
In particular, CDOs and S1Vs were designed to create large tranches of AAA-rated assets
backed by lower-rated mortgage-backed securities. Even after a mortgage-backed security
had been re-securitized through cash-flow based CDOs, market participants suggested that
there was no reason why investors couldn't take on exposure to a particular mortgage-
backed security more than once. Arrangers created synthetic exposure based on side bets
derived from the value of the underlying mortgage-backed securities so that investors could
obtain exposure to the performance of a pool of mortgages without having an investment
vehicle or special purpose entity actually buy the mortgage-backed securities. Synthetic
CDOs and SIVs obtained exposure through derivatives transactions, most commonly credit
default swaps.
Id. at 7.
252. Id. at 4-5.
253. Id. at 7-8.
254. Id. at 8.
255. See Partnoy, supra note 250, at 8. Partnoy states:
The simplest way to generate inappropriately high ratings was to use outdated and inap-
plicable historical assumptions with respect to the underlying mortgage-backed securities.
The inputs to the relevant models were straightforward: expected default rate, recovery rate
upon default, and, for portfolios of assets, the correlation of expected defaults.
Id.
256. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N , SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1, 12 (2008) ("One
analyst expressed concern that her firm's model did not capture 'half' of the deal's risk, but that 'it
could be structured by cows and we would rate it.'"). The SEC investigation of the credit rating
agencies found that they struggled to adapt to the complexity of mortgage-backed structured finance
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from historical information, including default data about other asset cate-
gories as well as asset price correlations, rather than default correla-
tions.257 Thus, the rating agencies created models that generated tranche
credit ratings for repackaged securities deals based on the inputs of mort-
gage-backed securities, and those models, in turn, relied on assumptions
relating to the expected distribution on the returns of the underlying colla-
teral .258
Given how freely credit rating agencies assigned AAA ratings (the
highest and safest rating), many investors believed that the securities were
indeed very safe and thus they made investments in mortgage-backed se-
curities.259 Investors trusted these ratings, because the credit rating agen-
cies are supposed to assist in making informed decisions 6.2 ' The interests
of the rating agencies and the investors were misaligned, and thus they
were less reliable as a source for information for the investors. 26' Thus,
the credit rating agencies willfully became subject to a dangerous informa-
tion asymmetry that inhibited their ability to determine the true risk asso-
ciated with these innovations.
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act that passed in 2006 requires
credit rating agencies to register with the SEC and submit reports. 262 The
Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the SEC rules attempt to address the
information asymmetry between the credit rating agencies and investors,
but it can only do so to the extent that it first corrects the information
asymmetry between investors and shadow banks. Rather than focus on the
credit ratings agency-shadow bank information asymmetry, the Dodd-
Frank Act directs the SEC's attention on credit agencies' procedures and
methodologies for assigning ratings.263 While these procedures and me-
thodologies are the basis for how ratings are assigned, these new measures
do not address the information flow from shadow banks to their credit
rating agencies and create little incentive for the credit rating agencies to
perfect their information. Section 939G of the Dodd-Frank Act "repealed
deals. The SEC also found that "[riating agencies made 'out of model' adjustments and did not docu-
ment the rationale for the adjustment." Id. at 14); see also Partnoy, supra note 250 at 9.
257. See Partnoy, supra note 250, at 11.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 9 (Partnoy argues that if the rating agencies had used accurate models and assumptions,
then it is reasonable to believe that investors would have responded by refusing to invest in these
securities that carried risk beyond some degree.).
260. See supra note 244.
261. See generally Partnoy, supra note 250.
262. See generally Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291 (2006); see
also U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, available at http:// www.sec.gov/
spotlight/ dodd-frank/ creditratingagencies.shtml.
263. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 932 (The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to
conduct a study of the independence of ratings agencies, issue rules regarding ratings procedures and
methodologies, and establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures that define and disclose the
meanings of any ratings. Moreover, federal agencies will review reliance on references to ratings.);
see also Morrison & Foerster LLP, supra note 145, at 16.
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SEC Rule 436(g) promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933. " 2 1 In
general, rule 436(g) stated that credit ratings were not expert portions of
registration statements. Under rule 436(g), "credit rating agencies were
not subject to strict liability under section 11 of the Securities Act for the
opinion reflected in their ratings." 265  Section 939G now exposes credit
rating agencies to liability by classifying their rating as an expert-certified
part of the registration statement for a security .266 This flawed approach is
not likely to remedy the information asymmetry between the shadow bank
and credit rating agencies. Arguably, civil liability-the only incentive for
credit rating agencies to demand more transparency-so far has not incen-
tivized credit rating agencies to demand better information from shadow
banks. z 7 In fact, it has resulted in Fitch Ratings, S&P and Moody's, the
three major credit rating agencies, to initially refuse to have their ratings
included in registration documents for fear of civil liability, while leaving
the capital markets in limbo. 268  "This temporarily froze the [capital] mar-
ket[s], until the SEC stepped in to allow deals to go forward if ratings
were not included in the prospectus.,, 269 The uncertainty over Rule 436(g)
is impeding, rather than enabling, "the recovery of legitimate parts of the
securitization markets that are critical to supplying credit to households
and businesses. ,270
Moreover, this "remedy" for investors is replete with problems that
will not only fail to incentivize the credit rating agencies, but also offer
little solace to investors. Litigation as a remedy is, by definition, retros-
pective and uncertain. Under § 939G of the Dodd-Frank Act, credit rating
agencies will almost certainly react to create a litigation buffer or other-
wise include the expected costs and probability of litigation into the costs
of doing business. Because the Dodd-Frank Act does not correct the cre-
264. Sheppard Mullin, Registered Public Offerings of Debt Services and the Use of Credit Ratings
Information in SEC Filings after Dodd-Frank, BOARDMEMBER, Sept. 8, 2011, available at http:/
www.boardmember.com/ Article details.aspx?id=5326.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Anusha Shrivastava, Bond Sale? Don't Quote Us, Request Credit Firms, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2010, at 1, available at http:// online.wsj.com/ article/ SB10001424052 7487047236045753
79650414337676.html?mod=loomia&loomiasi=tO:al6:g2:r2:cO.0661899:b35877358 (Standard &
Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings fear being exposed to new legal liability created
by the landmark Dodd-Frank financial reform law. The companies say that, until they get a better
understanding of their legal exposure under the Dodd Frank Act, they are refusing to let bond issuers
use their ratings.).
268. Id. at 2-3.
269. See Papaianis, supra note 134. Papagianis notes that, by repealing Rule 436(g) under the
Securities Act of 1933, the Dodd-Frank Act "would expose rating agencies to new lawsuits by treating
their rating as an expert-certified part of the registration statement for a new security." Id. Papagianis
also notes "Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investor Service responded by refusing to
be named as experts in registration documents." Id.
270. Id.
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dit ratings agency-that is, shadow bank information asymmetry-it en-
courages moral hazard. Therefore, 2 points will be assessed.
C. Entrenched Relationships and Policies
While shadow banks often calculate during times of crisis that the
Federal Reserve and Treasury Department will consider them indispensi-
ble to the financial system, or "too big to fail," it is not necessarily the
Federal Reserve's or Treasury Department's role to bail out failing enti-
ties. Two policy concepts encouraged the moral hazard associated with
the too big to fail concept observed during the 2008 financial crisis and
resulting bailouts: (1) central bank policy imbalance and (2) interest distor-
tion.
A policy imbalance describes a central bank's difficulty in balancing
its competing and often contradictory roles given the dynamism of a finan-
cial system. In many economies, including the U.S., central banks are
required to balance the following contradictory objectives: "(1) restrain
credit creation for financial stability; (2) promote credit creation for de-
mand management; (3) restrain monetization to control inflation; and (4)
promote monetization to avoid economic contractions after ... policies of
promoting credit expansion have been too successful." 271  The original
purpose of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, according to the Federal
Reserve Act was, in part, "to afford means of rediscounting commercial
paper" by providing a currency that could respond to the ebbs and flows
of the economic cycle,272 which allowed Congress to expand the Federal
Reserve's role to foster a sound banking system and a healthy economy.273
The Federal Reserve also acts to manage consumer demand in its role as
guardian of financial stability by raising or lowering interest rates .274
When it lowers interest rates, it encourages borrowing. Borrowing, how-
ever, increases leverage, which causes financial fragility. 27 ' Along these
lines, when credit creation becomes excessive, the Federal Reserve's role
is to raise interest rates and push the economy into contraction; 276 econo-
mists refer to this concept as counter-cyclical policy.277 Once the contrac-
271. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 89.
272. This quote can be found on the original paperwork written by congress when the act was
debated and passed. It used to be at the top of the official Federal Reserve Act page on the official
Federal Reserve Board of Governors website (http:// www.federalreserve.gov/ Generallnfo/ fract/),
but as of the August 2008 website revision, this quote has been removed. It can be found in older
editions, such as, CLARENCE WALKER BARRON, THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 151 (1914).
273. See U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IN PLAIN ENGLISH: MAKING
SENSE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1, 1, available at http:// www.stlouisfed.org/ inplainenglish/ de-
fault.html.
274. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 87.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Counter-cyclical policy, ANSWERS.COM, http:// www.answers.com/ topic/ countercyclical-
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tion has had the desired effect, the Federal Reserve's role is then to lower
interest rates, triggering credit expansion again. 278 Given the dynamism of
such a system, perfect stability is desirable, but not possible. Policies that
inhibit growth through credit and monetary restraint to create stability, but
policies that encourage growth tend to dismiss any possibility an economy
can generate too much credit, while viewing any economic expansion as a
sign that an economy is moving toward a stable equilibrium.279 The diffi-
culty for the Federal Reserve, however, has been determining which
theory and policy framework the financial system needs. 28' This requires
accepting a fact that pure pro-market fundamentalism rejects-credit crea-
tion can be excessive. Ultimately, financial stability requires limiting cre-
dit expansion while demand management requires maintaining credit ex-
pansion-two policies that are difficult to balance. Many central banks,
like the Federal Reserve, tend to ignore their financial stability role and
focus instead on the demand management role.281
Interest distortion occurs when a subset (the "interest group") forms
from a larger group, subject to a body of laws or regulation; identifies a
common interest relative to the subset, but narrowly held relative to the
larger group; forms relationships with their regulators that result in poli-
cies beneficial to the subset, but not to the larger group. Thus, regulators
inflate or distort the importance of the interest group's narrow interest
relative to its importance to the larger group.282 In The Rise and Decline
policy#ixzzlJNsVvWyM (A counter-cyclical policy is a "[glovernment economic policy designed to
dampen the effects of the business cycle. During the inflation of the early 1980s, the action by the
federal reserve board to raise interest rates was a countercyclical policy designed to reduce demand
and thus end inflationary expansion.").
278. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 87.
279. Id. at 87. Cooper states that "financial stability requires limiting credit expansion while de-
mand management requires maintaining credit expansion"-two policies that are difficult to balance.
Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). Olson described the
special interest groups, and, drawing on a variety of historical examples, summarized his argument
with a set of general implications that he then listed at the end of the chapter after discussing them
individually. They are as follows:
(1) There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a
common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining[;J
(2) Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and or-
ganizations for collective action over time[;] (3) Members of "small" groups have dispro-
portionate organizational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but
does not disappear over time in stable societies[;] (4) On balance, special-interest organiza-
tions and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they
operate and make political life more divisive[;] (5) Encompassing organizations have some
incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to
redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease
such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost
of the redistribution[;J (6) Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the in-
dividuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bar-
gaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities[;J (7) Distributional coalitions slow
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of Nations, Mancur Olson analyzed the nature of interest distortion by
studying some of the policies resulting from close relationships between
regulators and the regulated.283 Olson argued that successful countries
give rise to interest groups that accumulate increasing levels of influence
over time." Eventually, the groups become powerful enough to win gov-
ernment favors in the form of new laws, policies, or co-opted regula-
tors.2 85  Favorable policies and friendly regulators breed practices that
encourage moral hazard, because the beneficiaries welcome government
intervention when it protects their profits, but resist regulation on the basis
that it stifles innovation and competitiveness.286 Favorable policies and
friendly regulators, however, inevitably allow the beneficiaries to benefit
or profit at the public's expense, because the loose regulatory environment
encourages, rather than prevents, crises.287
The combined effect of these two phenomena also encourages moral
hazard, because the policies interest groups advocate for tend to favor
little to no regulation, and the cozy relationships tend to cause weak en-
forcement of the existing laws.288 Sorkin demonstrates how these two
phenomena were certainly observable during the 2008 financial crisis and
subsequent bailouts: when many of the shadow banks faced the probability
of collapse, they abandoned their sacred pro-market or free market mantra
of deregulation in favor of raw government interventionism in the form of
taxpayer funded or federally orchestrated bailouts.289
Empirically, the Federal Reserve's practices demonstrate its belief that
there can be no "excessive level of money growth, credit creation, or asset
inflation." 21 "[It does], however, believe that there can be an unaccepta-
down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response
to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth[;j (8) Distribution-
al coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of
incomes and values of their membership[; and] (9) The accumulation of distributional coali-
tions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of
understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution.
Id. at 74.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See OLSON, supra note 282.
289. See generally SORKIN, supra note 5 (Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, AIG, and Goldman
Sachs all sought the assistance of the Federal Reserve and each attempted to persuade the Federal
Reserve of its importance to the financial system, either citing § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as
authority for financial assistance, or for assistance finding a potential buyer for their respective busi-
nesses.).
290. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 23-24. As a result, Cooper argues that:
the [Federal Reserve's] monetary policy can be characterized as one in which policy is used
aggressively to prevent or reverse credit contraction or asset price deflation, but is not used
to prevent credit expansion or asset inflation. This philosophy has been encapsulated by the
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bly low level of all [three]"; in fact, the past three Federal Reserve
Chairmen all shared a similar ideology: credit expansion is the primary
driver of economic growth, and policy should promote credit expansion. 9'
For over thirty years, that ideology formed the basis for the Federal Re-
serve's pro-cyclical monetary policies. 292 Those policies, in turn, ignited
the proliferation of dubious financial innovations, increasingly risky in-
vestments, and an overall willingness within Americans to borrow.29 3
Economic growth may be a short-term benefit of these policies, but one
consequence of this lopsided pro-market focus is that the Federal Reserve
reallocates attention away from credit and monetary restraint. As a result,
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy has been to "aggressive-
ly ... prevent or reverse credit contraction or asset price deflation," but
rarely has it worked "to prevent credit expansion or asset inflation." 2
Failure to implement or enforce diligently these two counter-cyclical
policies during the short-term may be a regulatory failure; however, over
several decades, this failure can become the regulatory equivalent of a
blind spot, where regulators, like the Federal Reserve, become unable to
appreciate the risk presented by an activity, because they believe that cris-
es cannot be anticipated.29 5 In essence, the Federal Reserve's philosophy
is as follows: "bubbles cannot be identified until after they burst, and it is
only then that the central banks can and should take action." 96 Unfortu-
nately, deviating from a chosen course can be difficult and can produce
unintended effects. For example, a central bank may make the decision to
accept more types of collateral for access to its discount window in hopes
of increasing overall stability during financial emergencies,297 thus unin-
idea that asset bubbles cannot be identified until after they burst, and it is only then that the
central banks can and should take action.
Id.
291. Id.
292. See MORRIS, supra note 160, at 18. (Morris states that "Ronald Reagan's election in 1980
signaled that Keynesian liberalism was dead[,j" and under Reagan, free market theorists would get "to
run their race."); see also Krugman, supra note 19.
293. See McCulley, supra note 2, at 9 (McCulley states that regulators and rating agencies believed
that low default rates during the period of soaring home prices were the normalized default rates for
low quality borrowers, particularly ones with no down payment. McCulley further states that the
rating agencies' actions were particularly egregious, because the lofty ratings they put on securities
backed by dud loans were the fuel for explosive growth in the shadow banking system, which issued
tons of similarly highly-rated commercial paper to fund purchases of the securities.).
294. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 24.
295. Id.
296. id. (It is a logical belief that the best method for preventing moral hazard may be to prevent
bubbles before they develop, but that requires constant vigilance and prudential regulation.).
297. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 63. (This example is drawn from Schwartz's article where she
notes that the 1991 amendments to FDIC Improvement Act following the S&L crisis, which amended
§ 13(3) to allow the Federal Reserve to loan to non-banks without requiring that their notes, drafts, or
bills be eligible for discount by member banks, was quickly seized upon by Sullivan & Cromwell, a
New York law firm that interpreted the amendments to lend directly to nonbank firms during times of
emergency.).
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tentionally encouraging excessively risky business strategies and subse-
quent reliance on the central bank during emergencies.298 Many of the
shadow banks' dealings with the Federal Reserve during the 2008 financial
crisis fit this pattern. 29  These unintended effects can become entrenched
when those policies become institutional norms over a long period, and
when relationships form between the regulators and the regulated. From
the above analysis, it follows that the Federal Reserve either helps cause
or solve financial instability.' °°
Similarly, the Treasury Department is responsible for "maintain[ing] a
strong economy and creating economic and job opportunities by promoting
the conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and
abroad, strengthen[ing] national security by combating threats and protect-
ing the integrity of the financial system, and manag[ing] the U.S. Gov-
ernment's finances and resources effectively. , 301 The relevant functions of
the Department of the Treasury include:
(1) Managing federal finances; (2) Collecting taxes, duties and
mon[ey] paid to and due to the U.S. and paying all bills of the
U.S.; (3) currency and coinage; (4) managing Government ac-
counts and-the public debt; (5) supervising national banks and
thrift institutions; (6) Advising on domestic and international fi-
nancial, monetary, economic, trade and tax policy; [and] (7) En-
forcing Federal finance and tax laws.3°2
In light of the history of the Federal Reserve's and Treasury Depart-
ment's pro-market policies and close relationships with shadow banks, it
would be logical for any post-crisis financial reform to strip away supervi-
sory powers from each agency, given their contribution to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, took the counter-intuitive
course of giving greater supervisory authority to the Federal Reserve and
Treasury Department over shadow banks .3 3 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank
298. Id. (Schwartz presciently asks "whether [the Federal Reserve] will be firm in the future in
resisting pressures to fund insolvent firms that are politically U connected.").
299. See generally SORKIN, supra note 5. -
300. See COOPER, supra note 198, at 35 (If the Friedman school of Efficient Market Hypothesis is
correct that financial markets are destabilized by the moral hazard partially created by central banks,
then the 2008 financial crisis suggests that the Federal Reserve should be abolished. On the other
hand, if the Minsky Financial Instability Hypothesis is correct and markets are inefficient, unstable,
and require central bank stabilization, then the particular policies that have led to the 2008 financial
crisis must be assessed and better policies must be implemented.).
301. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DUTIES & FUNCTIONS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, available at hop:// www.treasury.gov/ about/ role-of-treasury/ Pages/ default.aspx.
302. Id. (This simple list of Treasury Department functions does not nearly capture the de facto
power the Treasury wields.).
303. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47 (Title I outlines two new agencies tasked with
monitoring systemic risk and researching the state of the economy and clarifies the comprehensive
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Act seeks to challenge the pro-market policy inertia by requiring these
agencies to produce a unified counter-cyclical regulatory vision, despite
shunning counter-cyclical policies over the decades.3°4 The difficulty as-
sociated with implementing a new counter-cyclical financial policy is made
more complicated by the fact that the individuals tasked with implementing
it, Geithner and Bernanke, were responsible for continuing many of the
same pro-market policies that caused the 2008 financial crisis.3"5 Unless
these individuals and agencies can balance anti-market interventionism
with pro-market fundamentalism in creating counter-cyclical policies, they
will consciously and sub-consciously circumvent and ignore the Dodd-
Frank Act, potentially deepening the same entrenched policies and rela-
tionships that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. 3" Thus, in order to
end the too big to fail concept, the Dodd-Frank Act must prevent the pro-
market ideologies of the regulators and shadow banks from co-opting its
regulations, and provide barriers against the formation of the cozy rela-
tionships that have historically inhibited effective supervision and en-
forcement. Without questioning the sincerity or authenticity of those
tasked with implementing the policies embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act, it
would be oversight to ignore the ideologies and recent actions of the indi-
viduals leading the major institutions tasked with its implementation-
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner. Ideology and genuine difference of opinion could lead to in-
complete or partial implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act such that the
contradictory policies of the Federal Reserve remain unbalanced. This
Part examines the difficulty associated with policy inertia. For three rea-
sons, there is legitimate concern that the pro-market policy and relation-
ship inertia may encourage moral hazard.
First, because the Federal Reserve Chairman and Treasury Secretary
are presidential appointees,3 7 it is possible that innate policy biases will be
supervision of bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve. Title I creates the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research. The two new offices are attached to the
Treasury Department, with the Treasury Secretary being Chair of the Council, and the Head of the
Financial Research Office being a Presidential appointment with Senate confirmation.).
304. See id. at § 616(a)(2) ("In establishing capital regulations pursuant to this subsection, the
Board shall seek to make such requirements countercyclical, so that the amount of capital required to
be maintained by a company increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of eco-
nomic contraction, consistent with the safety and soundness of the company.").
305. See John Cassidy, The Minsky Moment, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/ talk/ comment/ 2008/ 02/ 04/ 080204taco talk cassidy.
306. See Robert Kuttner, Blowing a Hole in Dodd-Frank, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http:// prospect.org/ cs/ articles?article=blowinga hole in doddfrank; bat see Steve
Goldstein, Bernanke: Moral Hazard to be Cut by Dodd-Frank, MARKET PULSE (Mar. 23, 2011),
available at http:// www.marketwatch.com/ story/ bemanke-moral-hazard-to-be-cut-by-dodd-frank-
2011-03-23.
307. See U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 273, at 10 (The
Federal Reserve is headed by a government agency in Washington known as the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve. The Board of Governors consists of seven presidential appointees, each of
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implemented despite the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act calls for the imple-
mentation of counter-cyclical policies. 38  Having leaders helm the very
agencies whose complicity contributed to the policies that caused the 2008
financial crisis undermines thorough implementation and enforcement of
the Dodd-Frank Act.309 If policies are an unbroken line of concepts de-
signed to bring about a desired behavior or result, then it should come as
no surprise that the 2008 financial crisis occurred given the policymakers
who have helmed the Federal Reserve. While many competing policies,
interests and contradictory visions of the American financial system con-
tributed to the 2008 financial crisis, the policies of former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan and current Chairman Ben Bemanke have con-
tributed more than most. 3
10
Several notable economists31I have also argued that Greenspan's en-
trenched policies about global capitalism and free competitive markets
contributed the 2008 financial crisis.312 Greenspan's policies were as re-
sponsible for the need for financial reform as any shadow bank's reckless-
ness, 313 and those policies heavily influenced on his prottg6, Benjamin
whom serves fourteen-year terms. All members must be confirmed by the Senate and can be reap-
pointed. The board is led by a chairman and a vice chairman; each appointed by the President and
approved by the Senate for four-year terms.); see also 12 U.S.C. § 241. The Secretary of Treasury is
appointed by the US President pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 301(b).
308. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 619.
309. See supra note 299; See infra notes 315, 316, 318, and 320.
310. See Cassidy, supra note 305, at 1-2 (While many competing policies, interests and contradic-
tory visions of the American financial system contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, the policies of
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and current Chairman Ben Bernanke, have contri-
buted more than most. Greenspan kept interest rates too low for too long and ignored warnings from
his own colleagues about the brewing storm in the mortgage market.); see also Greenspan's conces-
sion on the consequences of a free market economy. Greenspan's entire testimony is available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ testimony/1998/19981001.htm (As early as 1998, Green-
span eerily acknowledged in a sober cost-benefit analysis during a Congressional hearing that the cost
of American prosperity and a "free market" was moral hazard and the occasional recession borne of
excessive leverage and weak financial regulations.); See also Nouriel Roubini, Who is to Blame for the
Mortgage Carnage and Coming Financial Disaster? Unregulated Free Market Fundamentalism Zealo-
try, RGE MONITOR (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http:// www.roubini.com/ roubini-monitor/ 184125/
who is to blame for the mortgagecarnageandcomingfinancialdisaster (Unchecked credit ex-
pansion was only part of Greenspan's legacy. He had also championed financial deregulation, resist-
ing calls for tighter government oversight of the newer financial products, such as over-the-counter
derivatives, and championed the growth of subprime mortgages. Greenspan's policies of adjusting
interest rates to historic lows certainly contributed to a housing bubble in the United States, because
the housing market is a key channel of monetary policy transmission, asset prices are influenced by the
Federal Reserve's interest rates.).
311. Notable critics include economists Paul Krugman, J. Bradford DeLong, and Christopher
Whalen. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THlE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008
(2009); see also J. Bradford DeLong, Sympathy for Greenspan, PROJECT-SYNDICATE (Jun. 26, 2009),
available at https:// www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/ delong9l/ English; see also Christopher
Whalen, The Rubin-Greenspan Legacy: Now Paulson's Ongoing Nightmare, INT'L ECON. 54 (2008).
312. Whalen, supra note 311.
313. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to the Con-
gress, Feb. 27, 2002, available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/ boarddocs/ hh/ 2002/ February/
FullReport.txt (From 2001 to 2005, Greenspan's policies helped guide the economy towards excess.
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Bernanke.314 Until 2007, Ben Bernanke's policies rarely deviated from his
predecessor, Alan Greenspan; in fact, Greenspan had a direct impact on
Bernanke's economic philosophy." 5 One of the defining moments in Ber-
nanke's career, and on his economic policies as Federal Reserve Chair-
man, occurred in the summer of 1999 at the height of the internet stock
bubble when he presented a paper at an annual policy conference orga-
nized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City at a resort in Jackson
Hole, Wyoming. t6 Bernanke believed that the Federal Reserve should
ignore bubbles and stick to its traditional policy of controlling inflation.3"7
Henry Kaufman, a notable Wall Street economist, argued in response to
Bernanke's theory that it would be irresponsible for the Federal Reserve to
ignore rampant speculation." 8 Further, in a prescient tone, Rudi Dorn-
busch, the late M.I.T. professor, pointed out that Bernanke had ignored
the possibility that credit could dry up after a bubble burst and that such a
development could have serious effects on the economy.31 9 Despite the
criticism, Alan Greenspan was more receptive to Bernanke's theories.32"
Beginning in 2001, Greenspan's lowering of the Federal Reserve's funds rate contributed to the surg-
ing home sales that marked the beginning of the housing bubble. To avoid an economic slump follow-
ing the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to reduce the federal
funds rate from 3.5% to 3.0%. Then, after the accounting scandals of 2002, the Federal Reserve
dropped the federal funds rate from 1.25% to 1%. Greenspan acknowledged that these interest rate
drops would lead to a surge in home sales and refinancing. This surge in the home sales and refinanc-
ing created a need for more lending to prospective homeowners.); see also Sue Kirchhoff & Barbara
Hagenbaugh, Greenspan Says ARMs Might Be Better Deal, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 2004, available at
http:// www.usatoday.com/ money/ economy/ fed/ 2004-02-23-greenspan-debt x.htm (Greenspan's
explicit and implicit encouragement of prospective homeowners' use of Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARMs) and subsequent federal fund rate hikes also helped start the massive chain reaction of home
loan defaults that triggered the 2008 financial crisis.); see also Joseph Stiglitz, How to Prevent the
Next Wall Street Crisis, CNN.coM, Sept. 17, 2008, http:// www.cnn.com/ 2008/ POLITICSI 09/ 17/
stiglitz.crisis/ (Stiglitz stated that Greenspan never truly supported regulation because his adherence to
free market theory required self-regulation "when the excesses of the financial system were
noted.., an oxymoron. ").
314. See John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the financial crisis, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http:// www.newyorker.com/ reporting/ 2008/ 12/ 01/
081201fa fact cassidy?currentPage=all (Cassidy argues that "[flor more than a year after Bernake
was appointed by President George W. Bush to chair the Fed[eral Reserve], in February, 2006, he
faithfully upheld the policies of his immediate predecessor,.... Alan Greenspan, and he adhered to
the central bank's formal mandates: controlling inflation and maintaining employment .... But since
the market for subprime mortgages collapsed, in the summer of 2007, the financial crisis forced Ber-
nanke to intervene on Wall Street[: ... He has slashed interest rates, established new lending pro-
grams, extended hundreds of billions of dollars to troubled financial firms, bought debt issued by
industrial corporations such as General Electric, and even taken distressed mortgage assets onto the
Fed's books.").
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. (Bernanke argued that if a bubble inflated and burst on its own, according to Bernanke, the
Federal Reserve could always bring down rates to mitigate broader economic damage.).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See Cassidy, supra note 314.
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Once Bernanke became Federal Reserve Chairman, he generally ad-
hered to Greenspan's laissez-faire approach.32' In May 2006, Bernanke
"rejected calls for direct regulation of hedge funds, saying that such a
move would 'stifle innovation.'- 3 22  In 2007, Bernanke and a core group
of advisers, including Tim Geithner, Donald Kohn, the Federal Reserve
vice chairman, Bill Dudley, the New York Fed's markets desk chief, and
Brian Madigan, director of the division of monetary affairs, presented
what became known as the "Bernanke Doctrine" at Jackson Hole.3 23  In
this address, Bemanke stated, "It is not the responsibility of the Federal
Reserve-nor would it be appropriate-to protect lenders and investors
from the consequences of their financial decisions. ,3 24  Nevertheless, Ber-
nanke's next sentence bolstered what had been perceived as the Federal
Reserve's policy since the Federal Reserve organized and Wall Street fi-
nanced bailout of LTCM in 1998: "But developments in financial markets
can have broad economic effects felt by many outside the markets, and the
Federal Reserve must take those effects into account when determining
policy.' '325 Simply stated, the Federal Reserve, through Bernanke, articu-
321. Id.
322. Id. Cassidy notes that:
The following month, in a speech on bank supervision, he expressed support for allowing
banks, rather than government officials, to determine how much risk they could take on,
using complicated mathematical models of their own devising-a policy that had been in
place for a number of years. 'The ongoing work on this framework has already led large,
complex banking organizations to improve their systems for identifying, measuring, and
managing their risks,' Bernanke said.
Id.
323. Id. Casssidy notes that:
Bernanke and his colleagues settled on a two-part approach to the crisis. (Geithner later
dubbed it "the Bernanke doctrine.") First, to prevent the economy from stalling, the Fed-
eral Reserve would lower the federal funds rate modestly ... to 4.5% [, which did not] di-
rectly address the crisis of confidence afflicting the financial system ....
Id. Cassidy points out that, "[h]owever, borrowing from the Fed's discount window, its main tool for
supplying banks with cash, not only meant paying a hefty interest rate, but also signaled to competitors
that the lender was having difficulty raising money." Id. Further, Cassidy adds:
[v]ersions of the Y2K proposals became the second part of the Bernanke doctrine.... The
programs, which have received little public attention, were supposed to be temporary, but
they have been greatly expanded and remain in effect. 'It's a completely new set of liquidi-
ty tools that fit the new needs, given the turmoil in the financial markets,' Kevin Warsh, the
Federal Reserve governor, said. 'We have basically substituted our balance sheet for the
balance sheet of financial institutions, large and small, troubled and healthy, for a time.'
Id.
324. SORKIN, supra note 4, at 220.
325. See id. Sorkin writes:
In his address at the 2007 conference, Bernanke said 'It is not the responsibility of the Fed-
eral Reserve-nor would it be appropriate-to protect lenders and investors from the conse-
quences of their financial decisions.' Yet his very next sentence ... bolstered what had
been perceived as the [Federal Reserve's] policy since the hasty, Federal Reserve orga-
nized, Wall Street financed bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998: 'But devel-
opments in financial markets can have broad economic effects felt by many outside the
markets, and the Federal Reserve must take those effects into account when determining
policy.'
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lated a policy of taxpayer-funded federal bailouts of shadow banks during
a financial crisis, if that financial crisis were arguably serious enough to
affect the entire financial system. Thus, the Federal Reserve was forced
to endorse a policy of pro-shadow bank economic interventionism.
3 26
The "Bernanke Doctrine" faced harsh criticism as being ad hoc, inef-
fective and promoting moral hazard, despite having made a plea to erect a
statutory resolution process designed to wind down shadow banks. 321  It is
clear now that the policy of self-regulation was a resounding failure.
Questions remain as to whether the 2008 financial crisis has truly altered
his pro-market fundamentalism and whether the Dodd-Frank Act can con-
strain his discretion if it has not. Given the amount of oversight responsi-
bility with which the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the Federal Reserve,
particularly over shadow banks' liquidity, leverage, and capital require-
ments, adherence to core counter-cyclical policies will be essential to suc-
cessful implementation. Yet, given Bernanke's pro-market philosophy,
this is an open question despite public protestations to the contrary.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, while not as outspoken on his
own market philosophy, has clearly demonstrated a propensity to rescue
failing institutions when he believed it was necessary.328 Moreover,
Geithner has expressed his own frustration with aspects of the Dodd-Frank
Act, specifically the Volcker Rule.3 29  One of the clearest indications of
Id. Simply stated, the Federal Reserve had articulated a policy that if the consequences of a financial
crisis "were serious enough to affect the entire financial system, the Federal Reserve might indeed
have broader obligations that might require intervention." Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 219-20.
328. Id. at 282 (noting that Timothy Geithner's role in the bailouts of 2008 demonstrates his belief
that federal intervention is occasionally necessary. For example, when Paulson and Geithner consi-
dered bailing out Lehman Brothers, they envisioned a public-private pooling of money to loan Bank of
America so it could buy Lehman Brothers, much like the LTCM solution.); see id. at 77-78 (Moreo-
ver, on Thursday, March 13, 2008, Gary Parr, a banker at Lazard, who represented Bear Stearns,
called Jamie Dimon and asked if he could speak with Alan Schwartz, the CEO of Bear Stearns. The
call meant that Bears Stearns's financial condition was worse than the public was aware. Schwartz
told Dimon that Bear Stearns had run out of cash and needed help. Schwartz stated that Bear Stearns
needed $30 billion. After telling Schwartz that JP Morgan could not come up with that amount so
quickly, Dimon called Timothy Geithner at the New York Federal Reserve. He informed Geithner
that JP Morgan was willing to be a part of the solution. On March 14, the following day, the Federal
Reserve funneled a loan through JP Morgan to Bear Stearns that would end the immediate crisis and
give Bear Stearns twenty-eight days to arrange a long-term deal. Neither the Fed, nor the Treasury
was willing to wait that long, and over the weekend the Federal Reserve and Treasury urged Dimon to
acquire Bear Stearns.); see id. at 78 (Geithner would accept no refusal and pressed Dimon on what
terms would the acquisition of Bear Stearns be acceptable. They finally agreed on a $30 billion loan
against Bear Stearns's difficult-to-value collateral, leaving JP Morgan liable for the first $1 billion in
losses.).
329. Jon Taplin, Volcker In, Geithner Out, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 22, 2010, 01:08 AM),
http:// tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/ 2010/ Ut/ 22/ volker ingeithner out/ (Geithner opposed the
new rules, but Volcker has the President's ear, according to Taplin.); see also Ryan Chittum, What
Does Tim Geithner Really Think About the Volcker Rule?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 22, 2010,
11:26 AM) http:// www.cjr.org/ the audit/ what doestim_geithner really.php (Chittum also notes
that "sources, speaking anonymously because Geithner has not spoken publicly about his reservations,
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Geithner's market ideology is his response to the 2008 financial crisis:
when AIG was in the midst of preparing for bankruptcy, Geithner, clearly
aware of the vast counterparty exposure that AIG's failure would cause,
asked representatives from J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs during a Fed-
eral Open Markets Committee meeting on September 16, 2008, how to
structure a bailout loan to AIG if the Federal Reserve were to assist.330
Thus, despite insisting that the Federal Reserve would not bail out AIG,
Geithner capitulated.33' When Geithner realized a consortium of banks
could not raise sufficient capital to rescue AIG,332 Geithner proposed in-
voking § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act by suggesting that if the Feder-
al Reserve took a decisive step to backstop AIG it would also have the
effect of restoring confidence in the capital markets.333 Thus, Geithner
offered Federal Reserve assistance rather than simply covering the short-
fall between what the consortium could raise and what AIG needed.334
While the supposed intent of the Federal Reserve's backstopping AIG was
to bolster market confidence, the effect of this aspect of the Federal Re-
serve's bailout of AIG (and of Bear Stearns) benefitted the counterparties,
and the policy effect encouraged counterparty risk. 35  This incident de-
said that Geithner is concerned the proposed limits on big banks' trading and size could impact U.S.
firms' global competitiveness. He also has concerns that limits on proprietary trading do not necessar-
ily get at the root of the problems and excesses that fueled the recent financial meltdown, the sources
said. ").
330. See SORYN, supra note 5, at 388-90 (Sorkin notes that when AIG was in the midst of prepar-
ing for bankruptcy, Geithner, clearly aware of the vast counterparty exposure that AIG's failure would
cause, essentially reversed course and asked representatives from JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs
during a Federal Open Markets Committee meeting, on September 16, 2008, how a loan could be
structured to bail out AIG if the Federal Reserve were to assist. Thus despite days of insisting that the
Federal Reserve would not bail out AIG, Geithner capitulated. Geithner, realizing that there was not
going to be a private market solution to rescue AIG, proposed invoking § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act by suggesting that if the Federal Reserve took a decisive step to backstop AIG it would also have
the effect of restoring confidence in the capital markets.).
331. Id.
332. See id. at 375 (It is important to note that Geithner, Paulson, and Bernanke were drawing
from the LTCM precedent in structuring a bailout for AIG. When LTCM nearly collapsed, the Fed-
eral Reserve organized a consortium of Wall Street Banks to raise sufficient capital to rescue it. This
precedent was to be the basis for a bailout of AIG.).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 388-90.
335. Darrell Issa, Public Disclosure As A Last Resort: How the Federal Reserve Fought to Cover
Up the Details of the AIG Counterparties Bailout From the American People, U.S. H.R. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 1 (Jan. 25, 2010), http:// www.zerohedge.com/ sites/ de-
fault/ files/ aigstaffreportwithcover.pdf. Issa notes:
One idea presented to FRBNY officials would have allowed the counterparties to keep the
underlying assets and the protection provided by the credit default swaps. Under this op-
tion, the obligation to perform under the contract would have been transferred from AIG to
a special purpose vehicle ("SPV") funded by the FRBNY, in exchange for the counterpar-
ties agreeing to waive any further collateral calls. FRBNY officials cited a lack of statutory
authority in rejecting this option. This excuse is problematic, as the Federal Reserve guar-
anteed assets against losses in bailouts of other firms during the height of the financial cri-
sis.
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monstrates that Geithner is vulnerable, at the very least, to fears of sys-
temic collapse precipitated by the failure of a large interconnected entity.
Second, because the Federal Reserve is empowered to oversee large
interconnected shadow banks, it could potentially exploit the Dodd-Frank
Act. Perhaps one of the more essential powers outlined under the Dodd-
Frank Act is the power to impose capital requirements upon financial insti-
tutions that are "countercyclical, so that the amount of capital required to
be maintained by a financial institution increases in times of economic
expansion and decreases in times of economic contraction," to ensure the
safety and solvency of the financial institution and society.336 This impres-
sive array of specific risk factors gives the Federal Reserve, one of the
principal regulators who bailed out Bear Stearns, AIG, and several others,
the task of setting the limits by which these shadow banks operate. Giving
the Federal Reserve "another" chance after decades of pro-cyclical ex-
tremes seems an odd way to begin an era of counter-cyclical policies.
This wide degree of discretion could still be exercised in a manner that
tilts in favor of pro-market fundamentalism, with the lowest possible con-
tingent capital requirement, short-term debt limits, but high maximum
leverage ratio. Neither history nor the law of inertia favors an immediate
policy reversal by the Federal Reserve.
Furthermore, because the Council must make recommendations to the
Federal Reserve, rather than create its own standards,337 the Federal Re-
serve retains wide discretion in regulating nonbank financial companies
and large interconnected bank holding companies. 31' This degree of dis-
cretion could allow the Federal Reserve myriad opportunities to implement
selectively pro-market policies while working under a countercyclical re-
gime, especially for shadow banks. Given history and the amount of dis-
cretion given to the Federal Reserve, a pro-market interpretation of the
Dodd-Frank Act is particularly possible given Geithner's public views on
the Volcker Rule.339 It is common knowledge that Geithner had endorsed
336. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 616(a)(2).
337. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 112(a)(2)(F) (The Council is required to recommend
to the member agencies general supervisory priorities and principles reflecting the outcome of discus-
sions among the member agencies.).
338. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(1) (noting that the Council must make recommendations, to the Board of
Governors concerning the establishment of heightened prudential standards for risk-based capital,
leverage, liquidity, contingent capital, resolution plans and credit exposure reports, concentration
limits, enhanced public disclosures, and overall risk management for nonbank financial companies and
large, interconnected bank holding companies supervised by the Board of Governors. Therefore, the
Federal Reserve still retains final decision-making power.).
339. See Cassidy, supra note 312; see also Salmon, infra note 339 (Salmon notes that if Geithner
and hostile Congressional members want to render The Volcker Rule toothless, they almost certainly
can.); see also Letter from Timothy Geithner, infra note 340 ("Finally, preserving the flexibility of the
Federal Reserve and the other U.S. banking agencies to design and calibrate a leverage constraint for
U.S. financial firms is essential to enable the agencies to successfully negotiate a robust international
leverage ratio that works in all the major jurisdictions and does not leave U.S. firms at a competitive
disadvantage to their foreign peers.").
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a very different plan for regulating systemic risk. Given his change of
view, political pressure from Congress could certainly influence how the
Federal Reserve and Treasury Department exercise their new mandates.
A letter from Representative Spencer Bachus to Geithner illustrates the
pressure to interpret and implement the Volcker Rule's prohibitions nar-
rowly and loosely.34° Sentiments like these could signal a significant wea-
kening of not only how the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department
implement the Volcker Rule, but also how the Federal Reserve and Trea-
sury Department exercise other aspects of their authority under the Dodd-
Frank Act. Further evidence of Geithner's divergence of opinion from
Volcker and other aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act is a January 11, 2010,
letter from Geithner to Representative Keith Ellison:
Finally, preserving the flexibility of the Federal Reserve and the
other U.S. banking agencies to design and calibrate a leverage
constraint for U.S. financial firms is essential to enable the agen-
cies to successfully negotiate a robust international leverage ratio
that works in all the major jurisdictions and does not leave U.S.
34'firms at a competitive disadvantage to their foreign peers.
Geithner's unusually clear expression of pro-market sympathies should
concern the Dodd-Frank Act's supporters that one of the primary policy-
makers tasked with implementing and enforcing its major components is
more concerned with US banks operating at "a competitive disadvantage"
rather than ensuring that another crisis is brewing. The Federal Reserve
and Treasury Department's discretion, tinged with heavy pro-market sym-
pathies, could result in further policy inertia.
Third, critics argue that the coziness of President Obama's top eco-
nomic advisers, along with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, with their former Wall Street colleagues
makes it unlikely that genuine reform of the Federal Reserve's and Trea-
340. See Felix Salmon, The Volcker Rule Under Threat, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2010, http://
blogs.reuters.com/ felix-salmon/ 2010/ 11/ 05/ the-volcker-nde-under-threat/. Salmon cites a letter
from Rep. Spencer Bachus to Secretary Timothy Geithner, which, in pertinent part, states the follow-
ing:
If the Volcker Rule's prohibitions are expansively interpreted and rigidly implemented
against U.S. institutions while other nations refuse to adopt them, the damage to U.S. com-
petitiveness and job creation could be substantial ....
I strongly recommend that your study of the Volcker Rule take account of how trading
activities fit into the core business plan of global banks, as well as the consequences for
U.S. banks and the banks' clients of prohibiting those activities in the U.S. while they con-
tinue to be permitted everywhere else in the world.
341. Letter from Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, to Keith Ellison, United States
Representative (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http:// docs.google.com/ viewer?url=http:// elli-
son. house.gov %2Fimages %2Fstories %2FDocuments % 2F2010 % 2F01 -11 -10 TreasuryLetter.pdf.
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sury Department's entrenched relationships will occur.342 During the 2008
financial crisis, many of the shadow banks directly lobbied for federal
bailouts when their risk-prone investment strategies began to fail. Exam-
ples include the four attempts to find a buyer for Lehman Brothers, the
selling of Bear Steams (at no risk to J.P. Morgan), and the massive bailout
of AIG.343 While it is not surprising that these shadow banks would advo-
cate for themselves, it is disturbing that Geithner, Bernanke, and, largely,
former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson directly advocated on behalf of
these shadow banks during potential merger discussions, sales, and even
subsidizing their behavior through massive federal bailouts. 3' " That they
believed no other option was available indicates that their pro-market ide-
ologies limited the range of possible options, especially in light of the in-
consistent treatment of Lehman Brothers and those who benefitted from
TARP.3 4' There is little in the Dodd-Frank Act that prohibits the same
conflicted relationships from forming.346 Given the manner in which dec-
ades of pro-market relationships and pro-cyclical policies led to rampant
credit expansion, and, ultimately, to federal bailouts,34 7 it is difficult to
imagine that the culture within the Federal Reserve and Treasury Depart-
ments will change with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act.
342. Gary Becker & Richard Posner, Five Major Defects of the Financial Reform Bill, BECKER-
POSNER BLOG 1 (Jul. 11, 2010), http:// www.becker-posner-blog.com/ 2010/ 07/ five-major-defects-
of-the-financial-reform-bill-becker.html. Becker and Posner state that the Dodd-Frank Act:
gives several government agencies considerable additional discretion to try to forestall
another crisis, even though they already had the authority to take many actions. The Fed
could have tightened the monetary base and interest rates as the crisis was developing, but
chose not to do so. The SEC and various Federal Reserve banks-especially the New York
Fed-had the authority to stop questionable lending practices and increase liquidity re-
quirements. These and other government bodies did not use their authority to try to head
off the crisis partly because they got caught up in the same bubble hysteria as did banks and
consumers. In addition, regulators are often 'captured' by the firms they are regulating,
not necessarily because the regulators are corrupt, but because they are mainly exposed to
arguments made by the banks and other groups they are regulating.
Id.
343. See SORKIN, supra note 5.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See Becker and Posner, supra note 342.
347. See Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan & Matthew S. Johnson, The Origins of the Financial
Crisis, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 40, available at http:// www.brookings.edu/ -/ media/ Files/ rc/
papers/ 2008/ 11origins crisis bailylitan/ 11 origins crisis bailylitan.pdf. Baily, Litan, and
Johnson note that:
for over 30 years there has been a thrust in U.S. policy towards reduced regulation of pri-
vate markets . . . President Reagan was a supporter of deregulation ... [and] financial
markets have also gradually been deregulated, going back to the ability of money market
mutual funds to issue interest-bearing checking accounts, through the ending of Glass-
Steagall prohibitions on banks .... In addition, the Federal Reserve, like other central
banks, stands as the lender of last resort to provide additional liquidity to banks in difficul-
ty, a role that was extended to the investment hank Bear Stearns in March 2008, and since
then has effectively been extended to the entire financial system.
Id. at 40.
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Fourth, placing new agencies within the Treasury Department and
Federal Reserve, two of the regulatory culprits in the 2008 financial crisis,
is contradictory to the notion of independence and may result in additional
pro-market policy inertia. The Dodd-Frank Act places under the aegis of
the Federal Reserve an "independent" Bureau of Consumer Financial Pro-
tection (the Bureau) .348 The Dodd-Frank Act also places the Council un-
der the aegis of the Treasury Department. There is no question that the
Dodd-Frank Act undercuts this notion of independence by placing these
supposedly important new agencies under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department. 349  The Dodd-Frank Act could have
actualized this goal of independence simply creating the Bureau and the
Council outside the purview of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Depart-
ment, yet it specifically places them in a compromised position under
agencies with long pro-market policy histories, run by men with open and
obvious pro-market policy leanings. This is a recipe for another financial
disaster. The Dodd-Frank Act ultimately not only leaves in place the same
characters that articulated the same pro-market policies that contributed to
the 2008 crisis, but also grants them more power and oversight when it
should have been streamlined.
Fifth, the Dodd-Frank Act was sold as the financial reform to end the
moral hazard implicit to the too big to fail concept and the federal bailouts
associated with it. 350 Title 11 of the Dodd-Frank Act purports to end feder-
al bailouts by providing for liquidation of non-bank financial companies,
or shadow banks.35' If the financial institution's board of directors does
not agree, then provisions are made for judicial appeal, once determined
that a financial institution satisfies the criteria for liquidation.352 The Fed-
eral Reserve, however, is tasked with determining whether a financial
institution should be placed in receivership.353 The Treasury Secretary, in
consultation with the President, may also determine whether to place fi-
nancial institutions in receivership.3 54 The GAO must review the Treasury
348. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at §§ 111, 152.
349. See Becker and Posner, supra note 342.
350. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47 (The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is "[tio promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.").
351. See id. at § 203.
352. See id. at § 202.
353. See id. at § 203(a)(1)(A) (establishing that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Federal Reserve jointly or independently, determine by 2/3 vote whether a broker dealer
should be placed in receivership. The Federal Insurance Office and the Federal Reserve determine by
2/3 vote whether an insurance institution should be placed in receivership.).
354. See id. at § 203(b)-(c) (establishing that when the Treasury Secretary places a financial institu-
tion into receivership under these provisions, he must report to Congress within twenty-four hours and
report to the public within sixty days).
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Secretary's decision and report to Congress,355 and the GAO's report must
contain various details on the state of the institution, the impact of its de-
fault on the institution, and the proposed action.356 This level of discretion
could certainly be problematic if the Federal Reserve has not altered its
pro-market leanings, or has discretion to act contrary to the spirit of the
Dodd-Frank Act. If so, then the policies and relationships that led to fed-
eral bailouts will continue.
The Dodd-Frank Act does little to staunch the inertial flow of pro-
market policies by entrusting the Federal Reserve and Treasury Depart-
ment with more oversight and does nothing to break up the cozy relation-
ships that allowed for the negotiation of massive federal bailouts. Thus,
the Dodd-Frank Act encourages moral hazard and scores 5 points for this
factor.
D. Principal-Agent Separation
This Part describes the propensity of shadow bank executives and
managers to use high-risk investment strategies to maximize not only in-
vestor and shareholder returns, but also to pursue short-term profit max-
imization.3 57 The LPMH model also analyzes principal-agent separation,
where an agent acts on behalf of and controls the property of the principal.
The agent usually has more information about his or her actions or inten-
tions than the principal does, because the principal usually cannot com-
pletely monitor the agent.358  From the viewpoint of the principal, the
agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately, if the interests of the
agent and the principal are not aligned. 359  The misalignment of interests
associated with principal-agent separation was clearly present during the
2008 financial crisis, allowing for mortgage lenders, and shadow banks to
maximize their profits without being fully accountable for the risks. 6
355. See id. at § 203(c).
356. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 203(c)(5).
357. Paul Davidson, Paul Wiseman & John Waggoner, Will New Financial Regulations Prevent
Future Meltdowns?, USA TODAY (Jun. 28, 2010), http:// www.usatoday.com/ money/ companies/
regulation/ 2010-06-25-fixed-or-notN.htm. Davidson, Wiseman, and Waggoner note that:
[t]op executives at the nation's largest banks and financial firms reaped big bonuses for
pumping up quarterly earnings by buying and selling mortgage-backed securities in the
housing bubble. When the subprime mortgage market imploded, it drove the firms into
ruin; the government had to bail them out to avert a financial system collapse.
Id.
358. Investopedia defines "asymmetric information" as
[a] situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared
to another. This often happens in transactions where the seller knows more than the buyer,
although the reverse can happen as well. Potentially, this could be a harmful situation be-
cause one party can take advantage of the other party's lack of knowledge.
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http:// www.answers.com/ topic/ information-asymmetry (Feb. 10, 2012).
359. See Davidson, Wiseman & Waggoner, supra note 357.
360. Id.
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Shadow banks' securitized mortgages using complex financial structures
and then negotiated high ratings giving these the securities the false bene-
diction of safety.3 6' In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it became
clear these securities were riskier than expected. In essence, shadow
banks' short-term profit maximization contributed to the proliferation of
sub-prime mortgages.362 One of the deepest fears in assessing the 2008
financial crisis was that highly compensated shadow bank managers and
executives pursued short-term profit maximization with impunity, despite
the known risks, because short-term profit maximization guaranteed their
own bonus-based compensation and the federal government would rescue
their companies should calamity threaten.3 63  This fear exemplifies the
principal-agent interest divergence associated with moral hazard. Thus,
the 2008 financial crisis exposed the consequences of separating ownership
from control, as when shareholders and investors, the principals, cede
control of their capital to shadow banks, their agents.
The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to align the principal-agent divergence be-
tween shadow bank and shareholder interests, 36 but it fails to align fully
shareholder and shadow-bank interests because it does not prevent short-
term profit maximization. The Dodd-Frank Act requires new stock ex-
change listing standards, mandated resolutions for public company proxy
statements, and expanded disclosures for all public companies soliciting
proxies or consents. These requirements may require shadow banks to
adopt new compensation systems and structures and heighten corporate
governance policies. Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC
to issue rules requiring public disclosure of executive compensation, in-
361. See McCulley, supra note 2, at 2. McCulley argues that:
shadow banking needed some seal of approval, so that providers of short-dated funding
could convince themselves that their claims were de facto "just as good" as deposits at
banks with access to the government's liquidity safety nets. Conveniently, the friendly faces
at the rating agencies, paid by the shadow bankers, stood at the ready to provide such seals
of approval.
Id.
362. See Davidson, Wiseman & Waggoner, supra note 357.
363. See Morrison & Forrester LLP, supra note 145, at 22. Morrison & Forrester LLP state that:
[Ilingering concerns with executive compensation and corporate governance practices at
public companies ... culminated in specific provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that require
new stock exchange listing standards, mandated resolutions for public company proxy
statements, and expanded disclosures for all public companies soliciting proxies or con-
sents. As a result of these provisions, companies will potentially have to change the com-
position and operation of their compensation committees, adopt new governance and com-
pensation policies, and prepare for an advisory vote on executive compensation.
Id.
364. See Davidson, Wiseman & Waggoner, supra note 357 (Davidson, Wiseman, and Waggoner
interviewed Jeff Mahoney, general counsel for the Council of Institutional Investors, which represents
pension funds. Mahoney stated that "[giving shareholders a non-binding vote on executive pay would
put political pressure on directors to heed their concerns, and allowing shareholders to nominate direc-
tors likely would yield boards that are more focused on a company's long-term growth than short-term
profits.").
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cluding relationship with the company's actual performance; whether any
director or employee is permitted to purchase financial instruments de-
signed to hedge their equities; and median compensation of all employees
(other than the CEO); total compensation of the CEO; and the ratio of
these two amounts.365 In addition, stock exchanges are also required to
adopt standards requiring that listed companies develop and implement
policies providing for the recoupment of compensation in the event of an
accounting restatement. 36
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires stock exchanges adopt listing stan-
dards providing that the members of the compensation committee meet
"enhanced independence standards" comparable to what is required for
audit committee members under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.36 These listing
standards will prescribe that a compensation committee must consider the
independence standards established by the SEC before selecting compensa-
tion consultants, legal counsel, or other advisers.368 Moreover, the Dodd-
365. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 953 (noting that enhanced disclosure will be required
of a company's policy on incentive-based compensation that is based on financial information required
to be reported under the securities laws).
366. See id. at § 952(0(1) ("The Commission shall, by rule, direct the national securities ex-
changes and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is
not in compliance with the requirements of this section.").
367. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 952(a) (requiring the SEC "by rule, to direct the
national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any equity
security of an issuer, other than an issuer that is a controlled company, limited partnership, company
in bankruptcy proceedings, open ended management investment company that is registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, or a foreign private issuer that provides annual disclosures to
shareholders of the reasons that the foreign private issuer does not have an independent compensation
committee, that does not comply with the requirements of this subsection."); see also Robert Sweet,
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act-Key Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Provi-
sions (Corporate Finance & Securities Alert), FOLEY HOAG, LLP, Jul. 27, 2010, http://
www.foleyhoag.com/ NewsCenter/ Publications/ Alerts/ Securities/ Corpo-
rateFinance and SecuritiesAlert-072710.aspx (noting that the Dodd Frank Act "mandates that
national stock exchanges adopt listing standards requiring that members of a listed company's compen-
sation committee meet enhanced independence standards, similar to those required for audit committee
members under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The new independence standards will direct boards to con-
sider all forms of compensation received by a compensation committee member from the company,
including consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fees, as well as any affiliations between the
member and the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the compa-
ny.").
368. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 952(b)(1) and (b)(2) (This section of the Act requires
that: "The compensation committee of an issuer may only select a compensation consultant, legal
counsel, or other adviser to the compensation committee after taking into consideration the fac-
tors ... (A) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person that employs the compensation
consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser; (B) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the
person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser, as a percentage of
the total revenue of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other
adviser; (C) the policies and procedures of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal
counsel, or other adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest; (D) any business or personal
relationship of the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser with a member of the
compensation committee; and (E) any stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant, legal
counsel, or other adviser .... [These factors] shall be competitively neutral among categories of
consultants, legal counsel, or other advisers and preserve the ability of compensation committees to
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Frank Act also prohibits national stock exchanges from listing securities of
firms that do not have independent compensation committees, by mid-July
2011.369
It also makes several changes to corporate governance. For the first
shareholder meeting occurring after January 21, 2011, SEC registered
firms must take the following measures: (1) provide for a non-binding
shareholder "say on pay" vote on executive compensation, and a vote on
whether to vote again in one, two, or three years; and (2) provide for a
non-binding vote on "golden parachute"3 70 if shareholders are voting on a
merger or similar extraordinary transaction.
3 71
These measures are incomplete for three reasons. First, it fails to dis-
courage short-term profit maximization through a contingent payment pol-
icy. Traditionally, organizations have used contingent payment, or bonus,
systems purportedly to align their interests with those of their sharehold-
ers. If implemented properly, bonus systems financially incentivize em-
ployees to perform optimally, help the business achieve its financial objec-
tives, and, thus, align the interests of the principal and agent. A misa-
ligned compensation system either rewards average employee performance
or, even worse, can incentivize an employee to pursue recklessly short-
term profit maximization.372 Either example of a misaligned compensation
system should be anathema to the shareholder's primary interest in strate-
gies that produce the greatest amount of profit over the long run, or max-
imize their stock value and dividends. When shadow banks pursued short-
term profit maximization, executives and managers could maximize their
bonuses by generating huge profits, despite the risk associated with com-
bining a high-leverage ratio, large investments in illiquid assets, and trad-
ing in risky derivatives. 3  The consequences of these misaligned compen-
retain the services of members of any such category. Id.).
369. See Sweet, supra note 367.
370. See SMALLBUSINESS.COM, which defines a golden parachute as:
an agreement between a company and an employee specifying that the employee will re-
ceive certain significant benefits if employment is terminated. Sometimes, certain condi-
tions, typically a change in company ownership, must be met, but often the cause of termi-
nation is unspecified. These benefits may include severance pay, cash bonuses, stock op-
tions, or other benefits.
http:// smallbusiness.com/ wiki/ Golden_parachute.
371. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 951 (The proxy statement for a meeting discussing
"golden parachutes" must include a "clear and simple" disclosure of the arrangements or understand-
ings and the amounts payable.).
372. See Roubini, supra note 310 (Roubini offers a stinging indictment of the short-term profit
maximization that free market fundamentalists encourage. He argues that free market fundamentalism
led to the subprime disaster in the first place: privatize the profits of greed and unregulated gambling
for redemption and socialize the costs and losses when disaster from free market fundamentalism
occurs. Moreover, Roubini argues that free market fundamentalist zealots enjoy private profits in
good times and corporate welfare paid by the US taxpayer when their free market greed and excesses
lead to nasty financial busts.).
373. See Joe Nocera, First, Let's Fix the Bonuses, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009 at 1- 2 (Noce-
ra notes that the whole system, from mortgage brokers to Wall Street risk managers, seemed tilted
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sation systems became evident a few years after when the housing bubble
collapsed and created massive shareholder and investor losses, but the
shadow bank bonuses vested.374 In essence, short-term profit maximiza-
tion allowed shadow bank managers to profit for actions that caused their
principals harm.
In order for the Dodd-Frank Act to end the too big to fail concept, it
must force shadow banks to create executives and managers compensation
systems that address the persistent problems associated with principal-
agent separation. A quality executive/manager compensation system de-
pends on tying executive compensation to mid- to long-term company per-
formance. The Dodd-Frank Act establishes greater transparency for un-
derstanding the basis of executive compensation, as well as augmenting
the independence with which executive compensation is determined, and
providing a periodic symbolic shareholder vote on compensation. Most of
these changes, however, overlook the incentives to pursue short-term prof-
it maximization. A well-designed executive compensation system links
bonuses, not only to employee performance, but also to long-term health
and prudential risk management.3  Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act fails to
align fully shareholder and shadow-bank interests because it does not pre-
vent short-term profit maximization.
Second, the ex post compensation recoupment provision,37 6 ostensibly
one of the stronger corporate governance enhancements in the Dodd-Frank
toward taking short-term risks while ignoring long-term obligations. He argues that financial institu-
tions: "made short-term underwriting fees for packaging mortgage-backed securities that have since
become known as 'toxic assets.' Traders booked short-term profits trading them (or simply marking
them up). Executives pushed their subordinates to take more risk because that would yield more
profits, and bigger bonuses. Nobody had any incentive to worry about whether those securities would
someday 'blow up,' because too much bonus money was at stake." Id.); see also MORRIS, supra note
160, at 59-61, 108. Morris corroborates this claim by illustrating how shadow banks, through hedge
funds, could collect "hefty fees" through securitization while encumbering "little if any of their capi-
tal." Id. at 60. Moreover, Morris notes that the largest banks dominate the hedge fund prime broker-
age market "with Morgan Stanley, Goldman, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Deutschebank topping most
lists." Id. at 111.
374. See Nocera, supra note 373.
375. See id. at 2-3 (Nocera advocates for "smart pay incentives" that encourage sensible risk-taking
such as an approach that requires everyone who gets a bonus to have a large chunk of it deferred.
Nocera also interviewed said Jaidev R. lyer, a managing director at the Global Association of Risk
Professionals, who supports this approach: "You can have a pool of cash and common equity that
would comprise the compensation that is being deferred," lyer stated. Nocera states that traders
would get the deferred portion of their bonus paid out over a number of years, as the profitability of
their trades were assured. And if the trades went sour, traders would have to give some, or all, of
their bonus back. That way, traders would have an incentive to act for the long term, instead of
churning out short-term, often illusory, profits.); see also Jenny Stilwell, Setting Up a Bonus System:
Six Mistakes to Avoid, MYBRC, (Oct. 31, 2008) at 1, available at https:// mybrc.com.au/ Staffing/
Staff-Motivation/ Performance-Reward /Pages/ SettingUpBonusSystem.aspx ("If the company
doesn't perform according to plan (refer Mistake # 2 about forecasts ... ) then there won't be much
excess for a bonus pool. If employees are offered bonus rewards that are contingent only upon their
own performance and not the company's, there may not necessarily be excess funds in the company at
the end of the year to pay individual bonuses.")
376. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 954.
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Act, is problematic for several reasons. The policy clearly underlying this
provision seeks to address the diverging principal-agent interests by dis-
gorging the shadow bank employee's compensation, if the shadow bank's
restated accounting did not "merit"377 such compensation,378 but the Dodd-
Frank Act does not define "executive officer." 379  Additionally, despite
requiring return of all "incentive-based compensation" that would not have
been awarded under the restated financials, the term "incentive-based
compensation" is not defined, apart from the express inclusion of stock
380options. Moreover, this ex post procedure will suffer from the multiple
transaction costs associated with an institution implementing and enforcing
this policy.381 For example, the Pepper Hamilton LLP noted that § 304 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act38z contains a clawback provision, but that provi-
sion applies only if the restatement is the result of misconduct, applies
only to the CEO and CFO, and seeks to recoup only those amounts re-
ceived in the year following the first improper filing. In contrast, the
377. 1 use the term "merit" because the Dodd-Frank Act provides no intent requirement to trigger
§ 954. In this regard, Pepper Hamilton LLP characterizes this section as a strict liability law. See
infra note 377.
378. Frank A. Meyer, ILI & Michael J. Callaghan, Update to Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking: Orderly
Liquidation Authority, Including the Ability of the FDIC to Recoup Executive and Director Compensa-
tion (Mar. 17, 2011), http:// www.pepperlaw.com/ publicationsupdate.aspx?Articlekey=2403 ("The
policy appears to seek alignment of insuring executive officers' and directors' compensation with long-
term rather than short-term shareholder value.")
379. Roger A. Lane, Courtney Worcester & Katherine B. Hollingsworth, Dodd-Frank's Mandatory
Executive Compensation Clawback: A Practical Review and Assessment (Aug. 18, 2010), http://
www.pepperlaw.com/ publications update.aspx?Articlekey=1868 (Lane, Worcester, and Hol-
lingsworth state: "[tihe Act does not define 'executive officer'-that task has been left to the SEC and
the exchanges .... The SEC may well turn to Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which defines "executive officer" as a company's president; any vice-president in charge of a principal
business unit, division or function; any other officer who performs a policy-making function; or any
other person who performs similar policy making functions for the company. Alternatively, the SEC
could turn to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has been interpreted to cover
any officer of a registered issuer, or it could develop a new definition for this section of the Act." Id.).
380. Id. (Lane, Worcester, and Hollingsworth note that, "[tihe term 'incentive-based compensa-
tion' also is not defined, apart from the express inclusion of stock options." Id.).
381. Id. (Lane, Worcester, and Hollingsworth note: "many companies do not presently have claw-
back policies at all, and among those that do, few have policies that contemplate a mandatory claw-
back regardless of the reason for restatement or an individual's responsibility for it . . rarer still are
clawback policies that encompass former executives. In addition, many companies have not historical-
ly identified what portion of an executive's incentive-based compensation was based solely on manda-
torily reported financial metrics, as distinguished from other performance objectives .... As of
2008, of 2,121 companies surveyed, only 13.9 percent had clawback policies. Of those, only 39
percent (5 percent overall) had a policy that applied to all executives, regardless of fault, who received
an incentive payment based on errant financials, while 44 percent (6 percent overall) had a clawback
policy that applied only to executives who engaged in fraudulent activity that caused a restatement."
Id. (citing The Corporate Library, 2008 Proxy Season Foresights #11, Analyst Alert "Clawback
Policies.")).
382. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002).
383. See Lane, Worcester & Hollingsworth, supra note 381 (Lane, Worcester, and Hollingsworth
note "[wihile the concept of 'clawing back' executive compensation is not new, the Act goes well
beyond what has been required before. For example, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains
a clawback provision, but that provision is only triggered if the restatement is the result of misconduct,
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Dodd-Frank Act effectively imposes "no fault" strict liability: a company
must recover from current and former executive officers any excess incen-
tive-based compensation awarded in the previous three years, if it res-
tates.384 Thus, this ex post procedure assumes that recoupment will be
practicable regardless of when the shadow bank restates its accounting.
Therefore, while the Dodd-Frank Act makes important strides to align
shareholder-shadow bank interests, it nevertheless encourages moral ha-
zard. As a result, 5 points will be assessed based on the misalignment of
shareholder-shadow bank interests.
E. Institutional Government Intervention
Government taxation and reallocation of tax revenue force taxpayers
to contribute to federal bailouts. 85 This "force" takes the form of legisla-
tion. It has been argued that moral hazard exists because legislation allo-
cates resources differently than would otherwise occur in the absence of
moral hazard.386 Through taxation and legislation that authorizes federal
bailouts, the government intervenes by commanding property owners to
use their resources in a manner that they would not choose but for the
government's initiative.387 By its nature, government reallocation of tax
revenue toward federal bailouts necessitates moral hazard; federal bailouts
create a situation where the beneficiaries of the government intervention
have an incentive to expropriate the resources subject to government inter-
vention. 88 From this, it follows that legislation that provides for bailouts
incentivizes shadow banks that are arguably too big to fail to invest reck-
applies only to the CEO and CFO, and seeks to recoup only those amounts received in the year fol-
lowing the first improper filing. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243. In contrast, the Act effectively imposes strict
liability-if a company restates for any reason, then it must recover from current and former executive
officers any excess incentive-based compensation awarded in the previous three years." Id.).
384. Id.
385. Hiilsmann, supra note 53 (Htilsmann argues that: "an interventionist government commands
other property owners to use their resources in a different way than these owners themselves would
have used them. In so doing, the interventionist government makes some person or group A (for
example itself) the uninvited co-owner of other agent B's property. The essence of interventionism is
precisely this: institutionalized uninvited co-ownership. Government makes itself the uninvited and
unwanted co-owner whenever it taxes, regulates, and prohibits. The specific forms of taxation, regu-
lation, and prohibition are myriad. The important fact is that any form of government intervention-
ism, by its very nature, entails a forced separation of ownership and effective control .... Regulation
means that the government proscribes a certain use of certain resources. This use is typically not the
one that the citizens would have chosen .... " Id.).
386. See generally id.
387. See id.
388. Id. (Hulsmann argues that: "government interventionism always and everywhere entails a
forced separation of ownership and control. It always and everywhere creates unwanted -partner-
ships" between the citizens and their government. It follows that, by its very nature, it creates a moral
hazard both for the citizens and for the government. Most importantly, it creates a situation in which
each of the parties involved (the citizens on the one hand and the government on the other hand) de-
sires to expropriate the resources subject to interventionism at the expense of the other parties." Id.).
20121
78 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 3:1
lessly and expect that the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department will
not allow such an important business to fail. 389 As noted above, Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act was sold as the financial reform to end the moral ha-
zard implicit to the too big to fail concept and the federal bailouts asso-
ciated with it.390 The Dodd-Frank Act states that, "[lt]axpayers shall bear
no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title., 39 1 While
Title 1I's wind down provision was clearly necessary in light of the fate of
Lehman Brothers' historic bankruptcy, it is not sufficient to end the too
big to fail concept.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act purports to end federal bailouts by pro-
viding for liquidation of non-bank financial companies, or shadow
banks. 392 Title II makes the FDIC responsible for managing the Orderly
Liquidation Fund (the Fund), which can only be used when a subject fi-
nancial institution's liquidation 393 is not covered by FDIC or SIPC. 394 The
Fund is capitalized by collecting risk-based assessment fees on any "eligi-
ble financial institution" -which is defined as "any bank holding company
with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50,000,000.00 and
any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors. ,195
The severity of the assessment fees can be adjusted on an as-needed ba-
sis, 396 and the relative size and value of a firm is to play a role in deter-
mining the fees to be assessed.3 97 A financial institution that does not
qualify for fee assessment would be subject to the fees in the future if it
exceeds the $50 billion threshold, or becomes subject to Federal Reserve
scrutiny. 398 Initially, the Fund is to be capitalized over a period no shorter
than five years, but no longer than ten years; however, in the event the
FDIC must make use of the Fund before it is fully capitalized, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and the FDIC are permitted to extend the period as
399determined necessary.
To the extent that a financial institution subject to the Dodd-Frank Act
has a negative net worth and its liquidation creates an obligation to the
FDIC as its liquidator, the FDIC shall charge one or more risk-based as-
389. See Liu, supra note 166 ("'Too big to fail' is the cancer of moral hazard in the financial
system. Moral hazard is a term used in banking -circles to describe the tendency of bankers to make
bad loans based on an expectation that the lender of last resort, either the Federal Reserve domestically
or the International Monetary Fund globally, will bail out troubled banks.").
390. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47.
391. See id. at § 214(c).
392. See id. at § 201.
393. See id. at § 210(n)(1).
394. See id. at § 210(n)(8)(A).
395. Id. at § 210(o)(1)(A).
396. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 210.
397. See generally id.
398. See id.
399. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47.
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sessments. 4°° The Financial Stability Oversight Council uses a matrix to
arrive at these assessments and recommends those assessments to the
FDIC." The matrix examines ten factors, including strength of its on-
balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets, including, but not limited to,
leverage; potential exposure to sudden calls on liquidity precipitated by
economic distress with other financial companies; relevant market share;
the stability and variety of the institution's sources of funding;0 2 an insur-
ance institution; 40 3 the amount, maturity, volatility, and stability of the
liabilities of the institution, including the degree of reliance on short-term
funding;' the amount, different categories, and concentrations of liabili-
ties, both insured and uninsured, contingent and non-contingent, including
both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet liabilities, of the financial in-
stitution and its affiliates. 40 5 While the matrix accounts for a financial in-
stitution's economic conditions, it requires higher assessments during fa-
vorable economic conditions. 4°6 When liquidating a financial institution
under Title II, the federal government's liquidation obligation cannot ex-
ceed 10% of the total consolidated assets and 90% of the fair value of the
total consolidated assets.4 °7 In the event that the Fund and other sources of
capital are insufficient, the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the FDIC to buy
and sell securities on behalf of the institution in receivership to raise addi-
tional capital.40 8
400. See id. at § 210(o)(1)(A). The assessments are levied against any bank holding institution
with consolidated assets greater than $50 billion and any nonbank financial institution supervised by
the Federal Reserve. Under certain conditions, the assessment may be extended to regulated banks
and other financial institutions. See also id. at § 210(o)(2). Assessments are imposed on a graduated
basis, with financial companies having greater assets and risk being assessed at a higher rate. See also
id. at § 210(o)(1)(B) (The assessments must be paid within sixty months (five years) of the issuance of
the obligation.).
401. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 210.
402. See id. at § 210(o)(4). Those ten factors are the following: (1) whether institution is an in-
sured depositary institution that is a member of the FDIC, a member of the SIPC; (2) an insured credit
union; an insurance institution; (3) strength of its on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets, includ-
ing its leverage; (4) relevant market share; (5) potential exposure to sudden calls on liquidity precipi-
tated by economic distress with other financial companies; (6) the amount, maturity, volatility, and
stability of the liabilities of the institution, including the degree of reliance on short-term funding; (7)
the stability and variety of the institution's sources of funding; (8) the institution's importance as a
source of credit for households, businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidi-
ty for the financial system; (9) the extent to which assets are managed, rather than owned, by the
financial institution and the extent to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse; and (10)
the amount, different categories, and concentrations of liabilities, both insured and uninsured, contin-
gent and non-contingent, including both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet liabilities, of the finan-
cial institution and its affiliates.
403. See id. at § 210. This assessment is pursuant to applicable State law to cover costs of rehabili-
tation or liquidation.
404. See id. at § 210(o)(4)(C)(vii) (This factor takes into consideration existing systems for measur-
ing an institution's risk-based capital.).
405. See id. at § 210(o)(4)(c).
406. See id. at § 210(o)(4)(A).
407. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 210(n)(6).
408. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47 (Moreover, Title II requires liquidation for all
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From this perspective, Title II acts as a kind of insurance fund for the
orderly wind down of insolvent companies and forces the company to li-
quidate its own assets to provide for this wind down when the fund proves
insufficient. When questioned on the topic of how Title II related to end-
ing the moral hazard associated with the too big to fail concept, Paul
Volcker stated that the crucial difference between banks, which provide
important lending functions, and non-banks or shadow banks, which en-
gage in speculative activity, would be the creation of this "robust resolu-
tion authority" under Title II, with the power and resources to take over
and close down a shadow bank.4 °9 Volcker stated the following, in perti-
nent part, regarding bailing out shadow banks:
The whole point of this is importantly to get at the moral hazard
problem... these non-banks, if they get in trouble, are not going
to be saved. Their creditors can't sit there and say, I'm going to
be protected. The management can't expect to stay in office. The
stockholders can expect to lose .. . euthanasia rather than life
support and that's a big difference."'
Despite Volcker's assurances to the contrary, the Dodd-Frank Act
taxpayers will nevertheless be forced to insure future failures of shadow
banks. 41' Title II of the Dodd Frank Act has a glaring loophole that could
still allow shadow banks to force the Federal Reserve to provide the mas-
sive bailouts similar to those given in 2008. The assurances in H.R. 4173,
§ 210(n)(6) that taxpayers will not be forced to subsidize the recklessness
of shadow banks and other financial entities are contradicted by Title XI
§§ 121 and 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which alter § 13(3) of the Feder-
al Reserve Act that only further enshrines federal bailouts.412
The analysis and actions authorized by § 121 are somewhat retrospec-
tive, because the four factors assume that a shadow bank "poses a grave
threat to the financial stability of the United States. "4 Thus, the wording
financial institutions put into receivership and all funds expended in the liquidation of a financial
institution under this title are to be recovered from the disposition of assets or assessments on the
financial sector.).
409. See Freeland & Guerrera, supra note 107 (Volcker "argued that a key to drawing this distinc-
tion between banks and non-banks would be the creation of a robust 'resolution authority' with the
power and resources to take over and close down a non-bank.").
410. Id.
411. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 1101(c) (stating that if § 13(3) of the Federal Re-
serve Act is authorized the expected or final cost to the taxpayers of such assistance must be deter-
mined. This section directly contradicts the stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.).
412. Id.
413. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 121 (giving the following four factors: "(1) limit the
ability of the company to merge with, acquire, consolidate with, or otherwise become affiliated with
another company; (2) restrict the ability of the company to offer a financial product or products; (3)
require the company to terminate one or more activities; or (4) impose conditions on the manner in
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of this section presupposes that shadow banks can grow to a size or grow
so interconnected that may threaten the integrity of the U.S. financial sys-
tem. Moreover, § 121(a), paragraph (5) states that if the Federal Reserve
determines that actions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) are inade-
quate to mitigate a threat to the United States' financial stability, it may
require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance-
sheet items to unaffiliated entities.4" 4 In essence, this section allows the
Federal Reserve to engage in the same ad hoc sales, mergers, and consor-
tiums that the Federal Reserve forced in the bailouts of LTCM, Bear
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers.415 Should the threat of financial crisis
loom, there is little reason to think that Congress would behave any diffe-
rently than it did when it passed the TARP legislation in 2008.
Second, far from ending the too big to fail concept, Title XI, § 1101
of the Dodd-Frank Act amends § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to al-
low the Federal Reserve to bailout shadow banks, pursuant to a program
or facility that features "broad-based eligibility. , 416  Indeed, the Act di-
rects the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department to create emergency
lending programs and facilities "as soon as practicable." 417 The only limi-
which the company conducts 1 or more activities." Id.).
414. Id.
415. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's
Response to the Financial Crisis (Nov. 24, 2008) available at hup:// ssrn.com/ abstract= 1306342
(discussing the ad hoc nature of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department's forced sales of mer-
gers during the Bear Stearns and attempted bailout of Lehman Brother); see also generally SORKIN,
supra note 5.
416. Title X1, § 1101 amends the § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as follows:
(3)(A) In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any
Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates estab-
lished in accordance with the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to dis-
count for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or
otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That before
discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain
evidence that such participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility is una-
ble to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such
discounts for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility shall be
subject to such limitatigns, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System may prescribe.
Federal Reserve Act 12 U.S.C. § 343, § 13(3)(A), available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/
aboutthefed/ sectionl3.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2010); See also Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at
§ 1101.
417. Steven Ramirez, Dodd-Frank II: Revising Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (Jul. 22,
2010, 12:31 PM), http:// corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/ 2010/ 07/ dodd-frank-ii-revisioning-
section-133.html (Ramirez notes that: "section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act in a way that paves the way for the Fed to bailout large banks so long as it
does so pursuant to a program or facility that features 'broad-based eligibility.' Indeed, the Act directs
the Fed and the Treasury to create emergency lending programs and facilities 'as soon as practicable.'
The only limitations the Act imposes on this emergency lending power is that borrowers cannot al-
ready be in bankruptcy or receivership and the loan cannot be made with the 'purpose of' assisting a
'single and specific company.' The Act specifically contemplates that the Fed may become an unse-
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tations imposed on this emergency lending power is that borrowers cannot
already be in bankruptcy or receivership and the loan cannot be made with
the "purpose of' assisting a "single and specific company."418 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, spectacular single bailouts of specific companies like
Bear Steams and AIG may no longer occur, but the Dodd-Frank Act spe-
cifically contemplates bailouts for groups of shadow banks in the same
predicament as AIG and Bear Stearns." The Act specifically contem-
plates that the Federal Reserve may become an unsecured or at least an
under-secured creditor.42° Thus, federal bailouts have become more deep-
ly codified in the American financial system, gaining another formal legal
authorization.
As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act's institutionalized governmental in-
tervention into the natural fate of shadow bank allowing federal bailouts,
moral hazard is encouraged, because shadow banks will now have an in-
centive to cooperate and form a united front of systemic risk to convince
the Federal Reserve that it should use its emergency power under § 13(3),
rather than angle for their own individual benefit. Because the use of
§ 13(3) has not been effectively limited in a way that will prevent reliance
on government bailouts, there is a distinct likelihood that more federal
bailouts will again be authorized. Therefore, 6 points will be assessed.
V. CONCLUSION
With all five of the LPMH model factors being present, the Dodd-
Frank Act scores a 28 out of 28 on the ratings metric. The Dodd-Frank
Act dangerously encourages moral hazard, because of the following con-
clusions: it fails to impose size limits or break up those shadow banks that
are too big to fail, allows for several information asymmetries, leaves un-
disturbed the principal-agent separation that allows for short-term profit
maximization, trusts the most critical aspects of reform with the pro-
market leaning Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, and makes only
cosmetic changes to the infamous bailout provision, § 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act.
cured or at least undersecured creditor. The bottom line here then is that while high profile bailouts of
specific companies like AIG and Bear Stearns are out, regulations that would authorize bailouts of
many companies in the same straits as AIG and Bear Stearns are in, and so those kinds of bailouts now
have formal legal authorization." Id.); See also Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47, at § 1101.
418. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 467 at § 1101.
419. See id.
420. See id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
During the last three decades, there was a push for deregulation,421 but
after the 2008 financial crisis, there was a general push for stricter regula-
tion. The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act stands as recognition that there
must be a shedding of the excesses of over-securitization, over-leveraging,
and over-speculation built over a decade. 422 Framing regulation to discou-
rage moral hazard would require that policymakers acknowledge that lax
regulation and ineffective regulators, in part, caused the 2008 financial
crisis by allowing, if not encouraging, shadow banks to become overly
interconnected Ponzi units. The Dodd-Frank Act seems to acknowledge
the roles that unbalanced pro-market policies and regulators played in con-
tributing to the crisis, but it is unwilling or unable to close the myriad ex-
ceptions and opportunism that led to the 2008 financial crisis. While the
Dodd-Frank Act promotes counter-cyclical policymaking to reverse the
decades of moral hazard, innovation will always outpace regulation. This
Part contains broad-based recommendations in four categories that could
assist in the successful implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act: (1) regula-
tory modification; (2) executive compensation; (3) securities standardiza-
tion; and (4) credit rating agency.
A. Regulatory
The Dodd-Frank Act must focus on prudentially regulating the use of
leverage, which relates to capital, and speculation. Three measures could
have dramatically boosted the Dodd-Frank Act's ability to discourage the
moral hazard implicit to the "too big to fail concept." First, if the Dodd-
Frank Act had required all financial institutions, regardless of classifica-
tion, to maintain a certain percentage of capital for all securitized debt,
regardless of type, then the financial system would not have been afraid of
a few collapsing shadow banks precipitating a panic. For example, if Bear
Stearns had been forced to provide $5 billion on $50 billion of derivatives
liability, and place that $5 billion in an escrow account or clearinghouse,423
the public would have known that there existed a fund to absorb losses. In
the absence of such a fear, regulators would not have to delve into arcane
matters, such as determining which shadow banks are "too big to fail."
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act missed the opportunity to provide consistent
rules on trading. Third, the Dodd-Frank Act should have imposed a capi-
tal charge for short-term borrowing. Any financial institution that relies
421. See Krugman, supra note 19.
422. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 47.
423. Such a clearinghouse could be used to collect a similar capital cushion from all counterparties
to a transaction. The existence of such a clearinghouse could have helped calm any fears of wide-
spread financial collapse.
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on short-term financing, like shadow banks,424 is inherently vulnerable to
credit disruptions regardless of whether the financial institution holds long-
term assets. Long-term assets usually appreciate over time, but often their
present value can be hard to determine, particularly during a period of
massive defaults, as Minsky noted. 425 Had the Dodd-Frank Act imple-
mented these three rules, it would strongly discourage the moral hazard
underlying the too big to fail concept because there would be clear and
consistent regulations and mechanisms that would have prevented shadow
banks from freezing credit. With this regulatory framework in mind, the
following seven (7) recommendations are proposed:
1. Loans to highly leveraged parties should carry penalty capital
charges.
2. Prime broker loans to hedge funds should cease.
3. Bank-like capital requirements to should apply to all lending
entities.
4. Loan originators should always retain first losses, and put-back
agreements should get stiffer capital hits.
5. Accounts should not recognize credit insurance purchases from
thinly capitalized entities.
6. High-volume instruments like credit derivatives should trade in
exchange environments rather than over the counter, with ex-
change-managed margining to eliminate counterparty risk and faci-
litate settlements in difficult times.426
7. The risk retention requirement complicates syndication and re-
duces liquidity and should be eliminated.
B. Executive and Managerial Compensation
One possible measure would be to make all bonuses stock bonuses,
and require that they be held for at least four to five years. Moreover, the
bonus should be contingent upon executive performance in a certain range
of years. In this manner, shadow banks are even more inclined to move
away from short-term strategies. This will force them to focus on the
424. See Onaran, supra note 131, at 2 (As a pure investment bank, there were no rules to force
Bear Steams to maintain a fixed level of cash-like assets or to limits its use of overnight funds.).
425. See Minsky, supra note 54, at 7-10.
426. The main consequence is a rise in the price of credit, but it is worth the cost?
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long-term benefit of the company. In turn, this should improve stock val-
ue. Uncertainty aside, executive performance can improve the value of
this bonus significantly. Last, risk managers must have a louder voice
with regard to setting the strategic vision within shadow banks, allowing
for better control of and selection of risk that is more beneficial for the
long term profitability of the institution.
C. Standardization
To make the shadow banking less risky overall, standardized securities
would allow easier calculation of risk. Such standardization would allow
for comparisons of securities between shadow banks. This will make it
easier for shadow banks to assess their own risk.

